

localizing the triple nexus

A POLICY RESEARCH ON THE HUMANITARIAN,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PEACE NEXUS
IN NINE CONTEXTS







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DEVELOPMENT, AND PEACE NEXUS
IN NINE CONTEXTS**

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An illustration of a conflict zone. In the foreground, there are several tree stumps and a set of tire tracks on a dirt road. In the middle ground, a crowd of people is gathered. In the background, there are buildings and two blue helicopters flying in the sky. The overall color palette is warm, with oranges, yellows, and browns.

The Triple Nexus and the need for localization

This book is, in the main, a collection of nine research papers, each focusing on a case study, that explore the application of the Triple Nexus in situations of conflict and fragility and in relation to particular Humanitarian, Development and Peace projects funded by international aid. It has three main parts: (1) the political overview, which introduces the Triple Nexus, (2) the case studies, and (3) the conclusion, which summarizes the case studies and draws lessons and recommendations from these. The following are the countries and areas of the case studies gathered together here: Syria, Bangladesh, Lake Chad Region, Cameroon, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Mali, Guatemala and the Philippines.

This political overview seeks to introduce the Triple Nexus and to establish a basis for a common understanding of the concept.

Political Overview

It starts with the widely-recognized authoritative definition of the phrase from the OECD Development Assistance Committee, as well as an illustration of Triple Nexus pillars. It traces the origins of the Triple Nexus from the 1970s and 1980s and presents its crystallization into the concept that we are dealing with today, which was upheld by the leadership of the United Nations around 2016. It then discusses the context that occasioned the present discussion of the concept: mounting cases of conflict and fragility in the world, increasing aid for humanitarian assistance, and the concentration of that assistance in protracted conflicts.

The political overview then discusses the concerns about the Triple Nexus that are being raised by leaders of the Humanitarian pillar, who are some of the most vocal in responding to the idea and framework. After that, it presents the concerns, equally important, about the Triple Nexus coming from sectors outside the Humanitarian pillar. It summarizes the discussion about the Triple Nexus, ending with the basis for its implementation and the necessity of examining the Triple Nexus in relation to actual situations of conflict and fragility in national and regional contexts. Finally, it presents an

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO BRING THE THREE SPHERES TOGETHER, AS SEEN IN THESE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:

overview of the case studies that follow this section of the book.

ORIGINS

One influential current definition of the Triple Nexus states that it “refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actions,” while the nexus approach “refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity” among these three pillars (OECD LEGAL, 2019).

The following “caricatures” of each of the three actors are helpful in thinking about their nexus: “development is the domain of economists and banks determined to work with governments to reduce poverty and form prosperous states; peace is the preserve of politicians and mediators who resolve conflict within or between states and generate cross-party consensus to build peaceful political arrangements; and humanitarian action is the urgent pursuit of medics, barefoot economists and social workers to ease human suffering and restore basic living conditions for especially vulnerable people after disasters and during the horrors of armed conflict” (Slim, 2019, p. 7).

In the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America, social movements and NGOs influenced by Marxism sought to merge human rights work, humanitarian action, community development and peace initiatives. They called their movement “solidarity,” particularly with communities that were fighting right-wing dictatorships.

1970

In the 1980s and 1990s, a more technocratic approach appeared, developing alongside a then-emergent neoliberal framework. Humanitarians carried out “developmental relief” (relief that contributes to development) while development actors carried out “reliefmental development” (developmental work that comes with relief efforts). The UN took notice of these trends and sought to incorporate them in discourses about “linking relief, rehabilitation and development” or LRRD and a “relief-development continuum.”

In the 1980s, scholars and practitioners of disaster management Fred Cuny, Mary Anderson, and Peter Woodrow emphasized the need to address people’s socio-economic vulnerabilities in order to effectively confront natural disasters.

In the 1990s, Anderson developed her study further to investigate the impact of people’s vulnerabilities on peace and conflict. Her studies brought about the necessity of “conflict-sensitive programming” among humanitarian and development actors, promoting the slogan “do no harm” within conflict situations.

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, there has been a recognition of the fundamental importance and “common purpose” of humanitarian, development and peace actors—as well as the necessity of their close relations. They have, however, “three different disciplines, professions and bureaucracies,” and are “operationally distinct in their applied ethics and their professional expertise” (Slim, 2019, p. 6).

EVOLUTION

If attempts to bring humanitarian, development and peace actors closer together have been going on for many years now, then—as asked by a primer on the Triple Nexus—“why is it different this time?” Its answer: current discussions involve the central processes of the UN itself (International Council of Voluntary

In the 1990s and 2000s, in countries that became objects of “liberal interventionism”—Iraq, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Afghanistan—governments allied with the West upheld a “comprehensive approach” in state-building after the conflict. Here, UN actors were asked to work in an “integrated” way in pursuit of shared objectives (Slim, 2019, pp. 8-9). The following keywords were also used in discourses that seek to bring together the three components of the Triple Nexus: “early recovery, whole-of-government approach, stabilization, building resilience” (Carbonnier, 2018).

1980

1990

2000



Agencies, 2018, p. 1). Indeed, another observer describes the nexus as “the new meta-policy in the socio-economic policy of the [UN], several western governments and... many international organisations and humanitarian and development NGOs” (Slim 2019, p. 6).

Many accounts narrating the emergence and development of the Triple Nexus point to events that happened in 2016.

First, the UN officially launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in January 1 of that year, with the goal of achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals by the year 2030. The 2030 Agenda “arguably aspires to be a universal and comprehensive framework, going beyond the traditional economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development to encompass peace and humanitarian issues” (Howe, 2019, p. 1). Various statements in the document point to closer connections among the three components. It says, for example, that “There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development” (United Nations, 2015, p. 6). It also discusses attaining sustainable development in countries in conflict situations and in countries that demand humanitarian support (United Nations, 2015, pp. 8-14).

Second, the United Nations upheld “sustaining peace” as its conceptual framework in peace-building, with the passage of identical resolutions—pertaining to reviewing and improving the UN’s peacebuilding architecture—by the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly on April 27 of 2016

(General Assembly, 2016; Security Council, 2016). The resolution, based on reports submitted earlier, focused on activities that prevent conflict, help parties end hostilities and work towards reconciliation, address root causes, and attain development. The concept implies tighter interconnections among the UN’s pillars of peace and security, development and human rights, as well as humanitarian efforts. This means doing away with “silos” in the sequence of “prevention, humanitarian action, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development” (Caparini and Milante, 2016, p. 220), now found to be inadequate. The interventions in this approach include “strengthening the rule of law, promoting sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development and national reconciliation” (Caparini and Milante, 2016, p. 221).

Third, from May 23 to 24, 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit was held in Istanbul, Turkey. The context, as described by UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon who convened the summit, was “a time of skyrocketing humanitarian needs alongside a historic shortfall in the funding required to meet them.” In the summit, he presented the Agenda for Humanity which “sought to demonstrate that addressing people’s humanitarian needs requires more than increasing levels of assistance. It necessitates a far more decisive and deliberate effort to reduce needs, anchored in political will and leadership to prevent and end conflict, as well as a determined effort across humanitarian, development, human rights and peace and security to save lives, meet humanitarian needs and reduce risk and

vulnerability” (Secretary-General, 2016, p. 2). In his report, the UN secretary-general identified five “priority trends” from the summit”: (1) protecting civilians and minimizing human suffering, (2) leaving no one behind, or support for the 2030 Agenda, (3) instituting a new way of working, (4) confronting disasters caused by natural hazards and climate change, and (5) strengthening the resource base and increasing efficiency.

The “New Way of Working” means meeting “people’s immediate humanitarian needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability over multiple years through the achievement of collective outcomes.” This was embodied by commitments to “reinforce local leadership and ownership; transcend the humanitarian-development divide while ensuring full respect for humanitarian principles; increase preparedness and risk-driven planning and programming; create diverse partnerships and alliances to tackle specific challenges; and provide coherent and aligned financing to enable these shifts” (Secretary-General, 2016, p. 10). The “New Way of Working” states that collective outcomes should consist not only of reducing risk and vulnerability but of moving closer to meeting the 2030 Agenda in a planning timeframe of three to five years. Indeed, it is seen as enabling closer ties between humanitarian work and development work, or strengthening the humanitarian-development double nexus. It is described as providing “concrete, doable and measurable” means towards achieving the SDGs (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017, p. 4). To advance the New Way of Working, the document states the

need for humanitarian and development efforts to improve “coherence and complementarity and, where appropriate, closer alignment” in the areas of analysis, planning and programming, leadership and coordination, and financing.

Another outcome of the summit is the “Grand Bargain,” an agreement between the biggest donors and humanitarian organizations about focusing on people and communities in need and on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian work (About the Grand Bargain, n.d). The agreement has 10 work streams, one of which pertains to “enhancing agreement between humanitarian and development actors” (Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors, n.d.):

The new way of working is not about shifting funding from development to humanitarian programmes or from humanitarian to development actors. Rather, it is about working collaboratively across institutional boundaries on the basis of comparative advantage. This way of working also does not deviate from the primacy of humanitarian principles.

Fourth, In December 2016, Antonio Guterres took his oath as the new UN secretary-general. In his speech, he said that the most serious shortcoming of the international community is the “inability to prevent crises.” He set out his reform agenda, second of which is achieving the SDGs and the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, mentioning their “promise to leave no one behind.” To attain these goals, he vowed to “reposition

development at the center of our work.” He then called for bringing the humanitarian sphere closer to the development sphere. After this, he said, “Humanitarian response, sustainable development and sustaining peace are three sides of the same triangle.” He endorsed the New Way of Working that was arrived at in the World Humanitarian Summit (Guterres, 2016). With this speech, he is said to have “established” the Triple Nexus (Caparini and Reagan, 2019).

Responding to mounting discussions about the Triple Nexus, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) came up with the “Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus” in February 2019. It says that the recommendations were made “in response to the call for strengthened policy and operational coherence by humanitarian, development and peace actors” (OECD LEGAL, 2019). The document contains important definitions in the Triple Nexus discourse (see Box 1) and 11 principles or recommendations that serve as frameworks for the implementation of the Triple Nexus by DAC member-countries (see Box 2).

CONTEXT OF CURRENT USE

The call to develop the double nexus between humanitarian and development actors, and the succeeding call to develop the Triple Nexus—this time including peace actors—drew strength from mounting demands for humanitarian assistance and action worldwide. Former UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon attributed these to “armed conflicts and

nexus?

Important terms in the Triple Nexus discourse

Nexus refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actions.

Comparative advantage refers to the demonstrated capacity and expertise (not limited solely to a mandate) of one individual, group or institution to meet needs.

Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalize on the comparative advantages of each pillar—to the extent of their relevance in the specific context—in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.

Collective outcome refers to a commonly agreed measurable result or impact enhanced by the combined effort of different actors, within their respective mandates, to address and reduce people's unmet needs, risks and vulnerabilities, increasing their resilience and addressing the root causes of conflict.

Joined-up refers to the coherent and complementary coordination, programming and financing of humanitarian, development and peace actions that are based on shared risk-informed and gender-sensitive analysis; while ensuring that humanitarian action always remains needs-based and principled.

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Box 1. List of Definitions
Source: OECD (2019)

DAC OECDs

11 Principles on the Triple Nexus

01 Undertake joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict

02 Provide appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for cost-effective coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture

03 Utilise political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace

04 Prioritise prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, investing in development whenever possible, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met

05 Put people at the center, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality

06 Ensure that activities do no harm, are conflict sensitive to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximise positive effects across humanitarian, development and peace actions

07 Align joined-up programming with the risk environment

08 Strengthen national and local capacities

09 Invest in learning and evidence across humanitarian, development and peace actions

10 Develop evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies at global, regional, national and local levels, with effective layering and sequencing of the most appropriate financing flows

11 Use predictable, flexible, multi-year financing wherever possible

Aa

Box 2. The DAC OECD's 11 Principles on the Triple Nexus.
Source: OECD (2019)

other violent situations, disasters caused by natural hazards and the impacts of climate change, health threats, soaring inequality and increased fragility marked by extreme poverty and weak institutions” (Secretary-General, 2016).

Of these, armed conflicts gained particular attention in 2016, as more countries experienced violent conflicts compared to the past 30 years. The causes are not inter-state conflicts but conflicts within states, which have brought fatalities due to conflicts to the highest level within 20 years in 2014. Most of the deaths were from wars that are protracted and may bring about new outbreaks in both low- and middle-income countries. The number of armed non-state groups has also increased. At the same time, even as most conflicts are state-based, violence in these cases were being internationalized. These conflicts have caused civilian deaths and record-level displacement–


with disproportionate impacts on women over men (World Bank Group and United Nations, 2018, pp. v-vi). The resurgence of conflicts came after a period of decline when the Cold War ended in 1990 (see Graph 1).

Also gaining attention are fragile states, which receive a significant section of humanitarian assistance. The OECD defines fragile states as those that “suffer deficits in governance, reflecting the internal dynamics of a society, or exogenous factors such as natural disasters and regional conflict. Definitions of fragility used by the DAC and several aid agencies emphasize the lack of capacity and willingness of a government to perform key state functions for the benefit of all. The effects of fragility stretch beyond poor services to include conflict, state collapse, loss of territorial control, extreme political instability, clientelist policies and repression or denial of

State-based conflicts since 1946

Only conflicts in which at least one party was the government of a state are included. Ongoing conflicts are represented for every year in which they resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

- Civil conflicts with foreign state intervention
- Civil conflicts
- Conflicts between states
- Colonial or imperial conflicts



Graph 1. State-based conflicts, 1946-2016.
Source: One World in Data, n.d.



resources to subgroups of the population” (OECD, 2008, p. 7).

In 2020, before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, fragile contexts were home to 23% of the global population, but also to 76.5% of all people living in extreme poverty. These countries are nowhere near attaining the SDGs, and some have even retrogressed in relation to them. The “systemic shock” that is the COVID-19 pandemic is projected to worsen their situation (OECD 2020 B).

Situations of conflict and fragility are widely viewed as crucial to meeting the SDGs declared by Agenda 2030, as they are the primary referents of the slogan “leave no one behind.” Countries experiencing conflict and fragility need the most help in achieving the SDGs and their failure to move closer to peace and development would weigh down global performance.

Because of their crucial role in attaining the SDGs, fragile contexts attract the biggest section of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In 2016, 65.5% or USD 68.2 billion of total earmarked ODA was spent in fragile contexts, while USD 35.8 billion was spent in non-fragile contexts. Meanwhile, almost 90% of humanitarian aid is going to protracted crises (OECD LEGAL, 2019).

In 2018, USD 76 billion or 63% of ODA went to such contexts. Out of this figure, USD 60.3 billion came from OECD DAC member-countries. This is the biggest amount of ODA allocated to fragile contexts in history. In the face of the pandemic, many OECD member-countries have pledged to strive to protect ODA,


especially for fragile contexts (OECD, 2020 B).

These trends were affirmed by the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019 of Development Initiatives. In this report, the international development organization presented the following trend: a large number of people who are considered to be in need of humanitarian assistance remains concentrated in a few countries. A big proportion of humanitarian assistance continues to pour into a few crisis situations. Such assistance continues to increase, even if its rate of growth has slowed down. Majority of humanitarian assistance continues to be provided by a small group of countries led by the US, Germany, and the UK.

The Triple Nexus discourse emerged as a response to these interrelated situations—of growing conflict and fragility in the world on the one hand and of rising demands for humanitarian assistance and action on the other. As reiterated by the DAC of the OECD in crafting its recommendations, “At the centre of strengthening the coherence between humanitarian, development and peace efforts, is the aim of effectively reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities, supporting prevention efforts and thus, shifting from delivering humanitarian assistance to ending need” (OECD LEGAL, 2019). The world cannot simply continue responding to contexts of conflict and fragility by providing humanitarian assistance and action; the root causes of conflict and fragility must be addressed, so that these can be ended. This conviction is encapsulated in a Triple Nexus slogan: “Prevention always, development

wherever possible, humanitarian action when necessary” (OECD LEGAL, 2019).


In 2018, just a few years after calls to uphold the Triple Nexus were made, DAC member-states allocated their bilateral ODA this way: 25% to humanitarian assistance, 62% to development aid, and 13% to peace initiatives in fragile contexts. According to one observer, this shows that DAC members “are increasingly directing their resources towards sectors that promote long-term, sustainable development” (Desai, 2020, p. 56). This means a shift of emphasis from providing humanitarian assistance to providing development aid. Overall, there has been a trend towards rising demands on humanitarian assistance, a growing distance from actual humanitarian assistance, and a shift in funding since the Triple Nexus gained a foothold in international discourse (see Graph 2).



This change in levels of humanitarian funding amidst an increase in situations of conflict and fragility has encouraged humanitarian actors to look for other sources of funds. The Red Cross's Carbonnier (2018), for example, pointed out that ODA, including humanitarian assistance, comprised just a small segment of global resource flows to underdeveloped countries (see Graph 3). Carbonnier argued that “there is potential to leverage the resources and power of other stakeholders to achieve greater humanitarian outcomes.”

CONCERNS IN RELATION TO THE HUMANITARIAN PILLAR

A significant bulk of the concerns about the Triple Nexus was expressed in relation to the Humanitarian pillar -- by commentators at large but especially by those involved in Humanitarian work. One of the major concerns that they express is the risk that humanitarian response



Differences between Humanitarian and Development Actions

	Humanitarian Action	Development Action
Stakeholders involved	Involves all, including rebel territories, areas neglected by the State or outside its control	Tends to be State-centric
Motivations	Individual need	State-building
Conditions	Provided without conditions	Often depend on conditionalities about implementing policies and measures
Objectives	More narrow and conservative, even as it promotes behavioral changes towards upholding International Humanitarian Law	Wide-ranging, including providing financial and technical assistance for changes towards attaining Agenda 2030
Scope of planning and impact	Yearly and provides immediate benefits	Three to five years, takes significant period to maximize benefits
Stand on conflicts	Refuses to be embroiled in conflicts	Like peacebuilding, the State takes the lead even when it faces opposition from armed and other groups
Stand on conflict outcome	No interest in a particular outcome to a conflict	Works with the State which is often party to the conflict and seeks its dominance

Aa **Box 3.** Differences between Humanitarian and Development Actions.
Source: Carbonnier (2018), Slim (2019), Howe (2019), and Caparini and Reagan (2019)

would be politicized and utilized by development and peace actors for their objectives. Documents from the Red Cross and Red Crescent, UN, and OECD describe humanitarian action as “saving lives, alleviating suffering and protecting human dignity in an impartial, neutral and independent manner” (Carbonnier, 2018). Commentators have made several important distinctions between humanitarian and development actions (see Box 3).

Furthermore, there are concerns that cooperation between development and peace actors on the one hand and humanitarian actors on the other may risk undermining the neutrality of the latter,

especially in the eyes of opposing parties. This may mean reduced access to areas of other political actors (Caparini and Reagan, 2019). This may also pose problems for Civil Society Organizations working outside of government-controlled areas and may mean greater risk for humanitarian actions (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 2018).

There is also the issue of financing. Humanitarian funding, in particular, is devoted solely, or “ring-fenced,” for this purpose. It therefore does not lend itself open to the multi-stakeholder approach to funding being advocated by the Triple Nexus. The urgency of humanitarian action also needs to be synergized with

the other actors in accordance with the Triple Nexus' endorsement of a multi-year planning for financing (Caparini and Reagan, 2019).

A commentator raises the necessity of learning from the many previous experiences of trying to bring the three pillars together. He states that “The frequently expressed concern is that, in pressing for a more joined-up approach, key pillars, especially the humanitarian one, have compromised their principles and thereby undermined their ability to achieve their original purpose, while their contributions to the larger goals of security or development ended up being marginal and relatively ineffective” (Howe, 2019, p. 11).

Despite this reservation, peace actors see possible areas of cooperation. In the first place, as early as 2016, Ban Ki-moon's report during the World Humanitarian Summit called on stakeholders to “transcend the humanitarian-development divide while ensuring full respect for humanitarian principles” (Secretary-General, 2016, p. 10). Peace actors assert that collective outcomes can still be pursued. While “Big P” peace programs (political solutions and securitized responses) still provide opportunities for interlinkages in the Triple Nexus, it is the “little p” peace actions (capacity-building for peace in societies) especially at the local level in the short- to intermediate-term, that offer more opportunities for collaboration, not just cohesion or complementarity, within the framework of the Triple Nexus.

While humanitarian actors are keen on upholding humanitarian principles, actors

in the development and especially peace pillars are eager to collaborate. Peace actors say, for example, that humanitarian and development actors would also benefit from an analysis of particular conflicts and from conflict-sensitivity approaches as these would remove undue perceptions of “winners” and “losers” among parties in the conflict. They should also at times collaborate with peace actors, whenever this is appropriate. Various practical forms of interlinkages with humanitarian actors can be pursued, from context analysis and collective outcomes planning to advocating for financing and adherence to “do no harm” and other principles (IASC Results Group 4 on Humanitarian-Development Coordination, 2020, pp. 1-3).

MAJOR CONCERNS

Apart from major issues pertaining to upholding the basic principles of humanitarian action within the Triple Nexus, other equally important concerns about the latter have been raised:

01 PEOPLE-CENTERED AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

The Triple Nexus's general thrust of addressing the root causes of situations of conflict and fragility points to the importance of development actions and the Development pillar. The latter, however, is a contested terrain, and CSOs assert that development in the Triple Nexus should be people-centered and sustainable. There is a call, for example, for development assistance to go into “relevant and people-centered development projects using a rights-based

approach” (Communique on the CPDE Study Conference on Effective Development Cooperation in Contexts of Conflict and Fragility, 2019).

People-Centered, Sustainable Development

While the idea that it seeks to capture is not new, the concept of people-centered and sustainable development was crystallized and gained currency in the 1990s. There are numerous important international documents that explain the concept, but here are three of the most influential:

01 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990

People are “the real wealth of a nation,” and development should give them “long, healthy and creative lives.” It is important to look beyond dominant measurements of development in order to see development among the people (United Nations Development Programme, 1990, p. 9). Human development is seen as “a process of enlarging people’s choices.” There are three essential choices: “for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living.” Human development does not end there, but should expand and include a range of choices: “from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive, and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed human rights (United Nations Development Programme, 1990, p. 10).” At the same time, “Sustainable development strategies should meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (United Nations Development Programme, 1990, p. 7).

02 UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996

This document basically follows through on the agency’s 1990 report, affirming that “economic growth is not an end in itself [but] a means to an end -- enlarging people’s choices (United Nations Development Programme, 1996, p. 11).” It is clear in differentiating growth from human development, and comments on the lack of growth in many countries in the world, which could only entail a lack of human development as well, and the “failing” of the “links” between the two. There should be growth, but it must be ensured that this goes to “supporting human development, reducing poverty, protecting the environment and ensuring sustainability.

03 OECD DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION, 1996

The document clarified the goals of development cooperation: (1) Economic well-being, or the reduction of the number of people living in extreme poverty, (2) Social development, or universal primary education, gender equality and women empowerment in primary and secondary education, significant reduction in infant and maternal mortality, access to reproductive health services, and (3) Environmental sustainability and regeneration, or the reversal of the loss in environmental resources (OECD DAC, 1996, p. 2).

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Box 4. People-Centered, Sustainable Development.

Source: N/A

02 PEACE ACTIONS, NOT WARS AND MILITARISM. While peace actions in the Triple Nexus refer to “the preserve of politicians and mediators who resolve conflict within or between states and generate cross-party consensus to build peaceful political arrangements (Slim, 2019, p. 7),” CSOs are emphatic that these should not mean wars, militarism and repression, and should in fact counter the latter. Building peace should mean respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as opposition to the increasing scope of anti-terror laws and the criminalization of opposition or dissent. It should also mean a stop to the rechanneling of ODA funds from poverty reduction to military spending (Communique on the CPDE Study Conference on Effective Development Cooperation in Contexts of Conflict and Fragility, 2019).

03 CONFLICT SITUATIONS. Apart from ensuring that peace actions remain true to their nature, much needs to be done, even outside the Triple Nexus, to reduce wars, militarism and repression. Donor countries are criticized for collaborating with governments repressive of their people, supporting states that cause conflicts in other states, selling weapons, militarizing aid and not upholding development effectiveness principles. Changes in this area—especially in focusing aid on conflict areas within states,

strengthening democratic and civic space, increasing funding for local CSOs, and institutionalizing CSO engagement in peace and conflict platforms—are most urgent especially in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic (DAC-CSO Reference Group, 2020).

These criticisms dovetail with the view that “there is a need for humility in recognizing that the Triple Nexus approach helps to make the greatest impact possible given the circumstances, but on its own may not determine the trajectory of a conflict and the larger aspirations for peace and development.” In seeking to understand the causes of conflict and fragility, this view posits that political factors that are external to the Triple Nexus and directly affect the conditions of the population—such as “troop reductions, peace overtures, intensification of fighting, climatic events”—are more significant than factors internal to it (Howe, 2019, p. 11).

04 GENDER ISSUES. Seen from the perspective of peace, DAC member-states have much work to do in order to uphold the Triple Nexus. Donor countries are criticized for collaborating with governments repressive of their people, supporting states that cause conflicts in other states, selling weapons, militarizing aid and not upholding development effectiveness principles. Changes in this area—especially in focusing

aid on conflict areas within states, strengthening democratic and civic space, increasing funding for local CSOs, and institutionalizing CSO engagement in peace and conflict platforms—are most urgent especially in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic (DAC-CSO Reference Group, 2020).

05 CSO PARTICIPATION. There has been a lack of engagement with CSOs in discussions on the implementation of the Triple Nexus. One senior adviser of a Danish humanitarian organization says that “We are seeing closer working between the donors and the UN on developing priorities and approaches, but we’re not seeing that extended to the local, national, and even international NGOs, or community organisations and civil society groups” (Redvers, 2019). There is no formal representation for CSOs in the UN Country Team unlike in the Humanitarian Country Team. The role of CSOs remains unclear in policies pertaining to structures such as the strengthening of the Resident Coordinator, the formation of the Joint Steering Committee, and the linkage with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee or IASC (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 2018). CSOs call for the “inclusion and meaningful participation of [CSOs] in humanitarian, development, and peace-building processes and initiatives as a precondition to transparency and accountability

of duty-bearers” (Communique on the CPDE Study Conference on Effective Development Cooperation in Contexts of Conflict and Fragility, 2019).

06 IMPLEMENTATION. Other concerns about the nexus that were expressed by many commentators pertain to its implementation. One issue is the lack of common language in understanding it, as various actors have different appreciations of the framework and discourse. Another is the difficulty in securing funding, as funds are still allotted according to the three pillars. Yet another is the alignment of plans, leadership and coordination among the three actors, even at the national level (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 2018; Caparini and Reagan, 2019).

SUMMARY

In many writings about the Triple Nexus, there is an agreement about the desirability for humanitarian, development, and peace actors to work together in a closer way. One observer enumerates the following reasons for this (Slim, 2019, p. 10):

- 01** The actors share common objectives pertaining to protecting people, providing health and education, creating prosperity and building peace—as well as upholding order and the rule of law.
- 02** They all need each other, as the other two also advance when one

advances when working in the same area.

- 03** There is an “ethical duty” or moral imperative to bring about all three—humanitarian support, peace and development—and not be confined to bringing about only one or two when actors are capable.

The desirability of the Triple Nexus approach, however, must be tempered by concrete conditions obtaining in situations of conflict and fragility. As explained by Fabrizio Hochschild, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Coordination in the Executive Office, during the early years of renewed discussions on the Triple Nexus: “The main thrust” of the UN Secretary-General’s “ambition is to ensure that humanitarian, development, and peace actors respond in a context-specific manner that is driven by the situation and needs on the ground rather than preexisting frameworks and solutions” (IVCA and PHAP, 2017).

It is important to repeat that the Triple Nexus should not simply be about interlinkages among its pillars, but about “objectives, actions and results.” The considerations mentioned above—especially the people-centered and human rights-based approaches to the three pillars of humanitarian, peace and development actions—should be upheld in concrete situations where the Triple Nexus is at work.

In this light, case studies about the use and application of Triple Nexus in particular contexts of conflict and fragility are most important: Jordan, Palestine,

Syria (Kittaneh and Stolk, 2019), Honduras, Central African Republic, Chad, Liberia (Schreiber and Loudon, 2020), Central African Republic, Cameroon, Sudan and South Sudan, Sri Lanka (IASC Results Group 4 on Humanitarian-Development Collaboration, 2020), among others.

Also helpful and heuristic in studying the Triple Nexus in concrete situations is the typology drawn by Howe (2019):

- 01** In situations where there is active and widespread conflict, effective interventions of Triple Nexus actors will tend to be independent ones although sensitive to each other, even as there are opportunities for Dual Nexus approaches.
- 02** Situations where a peace agreement has been reached and conflict is subsiding are the best for Triple and Double Nexus approaches, as parties to the conflict are working for the success of the new government.
- 03** In situations where there is a high risk of violence emerging, effective interventions will tend to be independent ones although sensitive to each other, to avoid the perception of taking sides in the conflict. There would also be a need for Triple and Double Nexus approaches to sustain peace and work towards the SDGs.

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES

In the case studies presented in this publication, researchers were asked to

Overview of the case studies

01 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

- When did the conflict emerge? What conditions contributed to its emergence and continuation? What are its effects to women and children?
- Who are the contending parties? What are their histories and motives?
- What are the concrete actions that need to be done in order to resolve the conflict and bring about sustainable development?

Most writings on the Triple Nexus highlight the necessity of undertaking a concrete analysis of the concrete situations of conflict and fragility. They are most important as starting points and yardsticks for plans of action, programs and projects.

The concrete actions being asked can be presented in relation to one concretization of the objectives of the Triple Nexus: “to improve health and other basic services, to limit violence and to improve the economy, governance and the rule of law” (Slim, 2019, p. 9).

These can also be presented in relation to the OECD DAC’s statement that “At the centre of strengthening the coherence between humanitarian, development, and peace efforts, is the aim of effectively reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities, supporting prevention efforts and thus, shifting from delivering humanitarian assistance to ending need” (OECD, 2021, p. 3).

02 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROJECT/S

- What is the development cooperation project being evaluated? What are its rationale and objectives?
- What is the amount of development cooperation involved? From what source does it come from?
- Where does it fall in the Triple Nexus? Is it one of the three components? A Double Nexus? Or is it a Triple Nexus project?

03 EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROJECT/S

- Was the objective of the development cooperation project attained? Why or why not?
- How did it impact the communities involved, particularly their human rights? How did it impact on women and children? How were grassroots organizations and communities involved?
- How did it impact on the other concrete actions that need to be done in response to the conflict?
- If it is not a Triple Nexus project: How does it relate to the other aspects of the Triple Nexus?
- If it is a Triple Nexus project: What lessons can be drawn from it in relation to the Triple Nexus?
- Overall, how did it affect the objectives of resolving the conflict and bringing about people-centered sustainable development that upholds people’s rights?

04 CONCLUSION

- What are the implications of the project evaluated to the Triple Nexus?
- What are the implications of the project evaluated to fostering people-centered sustainable development that upholds people’s rights in conflict-affected, fragile states?

05 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- What recommendations can be made with regard to the Triple Nexus?
- What recommendations can be made with regard to fostering people-centered sustainable development that upholds people’s rights?

Aa

Box 5. Case Study Guidelines
Source: N/A

evaluate projects and programs in the context of conflict and fragility, especially in relation to the Triple Nexus and to fostering a people-centered sustainable development (see Box 4).

In her paper, Elle Ambler of the Arab Group for the Protection of Nature or APN discusses how the European Union's funding of humanitarian and development projects in Jordan, and refusal to fund similar projects in Syria, hinder the long-term solution of the Syrian refugee crisis. This paves the way to, and is marked by, the refugees' return to their country. Ambler presents the geopolitical interests of the EU in this funding strategy, which is related to its opposition to the emerging victor in the Syrian war—the present Syrian government.

Meanwhile, S. Jahangir Hasan Masum of the Coastal Development Partnership or CDP discusses the problems brought about by the influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar and of humanitarian and development assistance for the said refugees in the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh. Aside from presenting the bigger context of the Rohingya crisis as it impacts on Bangladesh, Masum shows the brewing antagonism and possible conflict between the host community and the refugees. He demonstrates the need for peace action on this issue, on top of development actions for the host community that are already being undertaken.

Leo Atakpu of the Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice or ANEEJ shows the achievements as well as the limitations of humanitarian

actions which was later on transformed into a Triple Nexus program proper in Lake Chad countries in response to the conflict there. While recognizing the positive contributions of the humanitarian actions, Mr. Atakpu highlights the need for development actions in order to truly solve the causes of the conflict.

In his paper, Charles Linjap of Investment Watch or I-Watch presents the gender-based violence being perpetrated by the extremist Boko Haram group among women and children in Cameroon. Linjap shows that too much international aid is going to military and security responses to the conflict, as compared to humanitarian, peace and development actions, thereby adversely affecting responses to widespread gender-based violence and its social and economic context.

Maggie Mwape of the Southern Africa Youth Forum of the Southern Africa Development Community or SAYOF-SADC presents the difficulties faced by humanitarian actions in response to cyclones Kenneth and Idai in Mozambique that are caused by the conflict between the Mozambican government and terrorist group Al Shababa. She evaluates two instruments of the Southern African Development Community or SADC in responding to the said conflict. Highlighting the dangers posed by climate change to the country, Mwape calls for development actions in tandem with peace-security actions to solve the conflict and hasten the delivery of humanitarian action in the future.

In his paper, Asadullah Mohammadi of Scholarship for Afghanistan examines World Bank-funded education projects in

the country. He shows how the projects are helpful in laying the foundation for the country's education sector after severe destruction brought about by the war. While pointing out areas for improvement in the projects, he also interrogates the orientation of the education system being constructed in the country on the basis of principles of people-centered and sustainable development.

In her paper, Rosa Belen Agirregomezkorta of the Centro de Estudios e Investigación sobre Mujeres (CEIM) examines the use and usefulness of the Early Warning System on Gender Violence in Conflict Settings or SAT-GV in Mali. Based on feminist principles, the instrument, according to the author, cuts across humanitarian, peace and development indicators and is useful in combatting gender-based violence, but is unfortunately not prioritized in funding.

Meanwhile, José Luis Siguil López of Tzuk Kim Pop, Lorena Palacios of the Reality of Aid, and Henry Morales of the AOED Movement present the situation, generally dire, of the three pillars of the Triple Nexus as they have been historically carried out in Guatemala. They show that humanitarian actions in the country are politicized and inept, development actions serve foreign and elite interests, and peace actions are being reversed. While recognizing the wisdom and necessity of applying the Triple Nexus approach to the country, the researchers discuss the many challenges that it will face in its implementation there.

Lastly, the Kabataan para sa Tribung Pilipino (Youth for Filipino Tribes) or

Katribu discusses large-scale dam projects in the Philippines funded by development cooperation that, while promising development, will adversely affect indigenous peoples in the country and even intensify the conflict situation involving them. The group's paper provides an important nuance to the Triple Nexus' objective of addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility and increasing development actions, by pointing the necessity of actions that uphold people-centered and sustainable development.

The Conclusion to this collection seeks to summarize the main points of the nine case studies gathered here, draw out their connections with the Triple Nexus discourse, and show their evaluation of the projects and programs that serve as their topics, all on the basis of development effectiveness principles. Most importantly, it presents observations relevant to the Triple Nexus that tie together the contents of the case studies.

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An illustration on the left side of the page depicts a conflict zone. It features two blue helicopters flying over a landscape with orange ground and purple, wavy shapes representing smoke or fire. Below the helicopters, there is a large crowd of blue dots representing people. The overall style is graphic and stylized.

Centering Syria in the EU Funding Response to the Syrian Crisis

 **ELLE AMBLER**

The Arab Group for the Protection of Nature (APN)

Throughout the Syrian War, millions of Syrians have been forced to leave their homes, communities, and livelihoods. Many of those who left the country in the early years of the war, as the 2011 uprising in southern Syria became an armed insurrection, expected to return quickly. These hopes were challenged as the proxy elements of the war came into sharper focus in 2014 and 2015. Among others, the US-led coalition, including several EU member states,¹ expanded its support for the opposition seeking to overthrow the Syrian government and began direct military interventions

Case Study:
Syria

in Syria under the banner of fighting the Islamic State. During this period, Russia and Iran also intensified their support to the Syrian military.

Now, after a decade of fighting, the Syrian government has endured the war and regained control over the majority of the country, bringing an end to the large-scale violence. Nonetheless, few refugees have returned to Syria. In February 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 5,174,178 Syrian refugees continue to live in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey alone.²

The response with which Syrian refugees have been met in these three countries has evolved over the last ten years. Their status as hosts has been a source of pride, popular agitation, economic pressure, and foreign aid. Despite significant external funding, each country has struggled to provide basic services for many of those in its care. In the past several years, Turkey and Lebanon have advocated relocating refugees to “safe zones” in Syria (Içduygu & Nimer, 2020, pp. 420–422). Jordan has pressed the least for the refugees to leave. In 2018, the Jordanian Prime Minister said that prospects for return are still remote and that years of rebuilding in Syria are needed (Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018). Still, conditions for Syrians in Jordan are difficult and marked by high levels of unemployment, poverty, and food insecurity.

As the lasting nature of the conflict revealed itself, UN fora, donor groups, and host governments set up various policies and programs to accommodate

Syrian refugees. Despite the changing circumstances in Syria, the European Union (EU), collectively the largest donor in the crisis, has maintained a steady funding strategy. It supports the continued residence of refugees in Jordan and other host countries through development assistance. At the same time, it opposes the forms of assistance Syria needs to be able to recover and to accommodate returnees. As it stands, EU policy perpetuates a stasis that does not serve Syrians living in their home country or in host countries. Progress towards regional stability and welfare is better served by rebalancing the forms and amount of assistance given in and outside of Syria.

THE EU'S SPLIT FUNDING STRATEGY

Given the Syrian government's emergent military victory and the perception that large-scale refugee return marks the closure of the conflict, other governments' support for return and the preparations it requires have divided roughly down wartime lines. In 2016, EU member states and institutions conditioned reconstruction funding on Syrian political transformation under UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (Council of the European Union, 2016). Although EU members differ in the strictness with which they interpret “reconstruction,” this decision has resulted in a de facto ban on nearly all EU development aid. Without intensive development and peacebuilding efforts to meet the scale of physical and social destruction left in the wake of the conflict, refugees in Jordan and elsewhere are largely unable to return.

The UNHCR lists voluntary repatriation as one of three options for a durable solution to refugee displacement. The others are third-country resettlement and local integration. Still unwilling to support the conditions needed for return, and wary of resettlement in Europe, the EU has focused its efforts on the last option, local integration, through support to host countries. In contrast to its policy in Syria, the EU has adopted a development-based approach to assistance in Jordan. Though this move has been explained as conjoining humanitarian and development aims under a “Joint Humanitarian Development Framework,” the EU and the Jordanian government have each strongly favored development-marked assistance.³ This funding diverges not only in type but in amount from the humanitarian aid currently comprising the vast majority of EU assistance in Syria (International Crisis Group, 2019, p. 18). Less than 8% of the more than EUR 24 billion in aid the EU has allocated to the crisis has been directed to work in Syria (European Commission, 2021a).⁴ Consequently, development-based programming in host countries has characterized the EU’s main reaction to the crisis.

THE DOMINANCE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN JORDAN

The EU has long supported linking development and migration policies, first by promoting development in migrants’ countries of origin and transit to reduce migration to Europe (European Council, 1999, p. 9), and more recently, to harness migrant labor as a tool for development. These goals build off one another; the EU has tried to frame accommodating

refugees (and limiting their onward migration) as a development opportunity rather than an economic burden to low- and middle-income countries. The EU positions itself as able to assist host countries in unlocking this development potential through employment programs that also benefit host communities and through economic policy that favors such countries and increases their capacity to provide services to migrants. The EU response to Syrian refugees in Jordan is led by this logic.

The turn away from a humanitarian-led response in Jordan centers on the London Conference of 2016, hosted by the UN and the Kuwaiti and European governments. The conference resulted in the pledge of USD 12 billion in grants and over USD 40 billion in loans to Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, while USD 3.2 billion was pledged to the humanitarian response in and outside of Syria (Center for Global Development & International Rescue Committee, 2017, p. 5).

The conference also saw the signing of the Jordan Compact or Compact. Under the Compact, the EU forged a new trade agreement with Jordan, reducing import restrictions to the EU, allowing more EU work permits for Jordanians, and establishing special economic zones (SEZs) for goods produced with more than 15% Syrian labor (Burlin, 2020, p. 119).

The Compact names employment generation as the key means to address refugees’ needs (European Commission, 2016a, p. 9). It was supported by the parallel creation of a World Bank funding mechanism for concessional development

loans underwritten by international donors (Center for Global Development, 2017, p. 5). The EU argues that this approach is mutually beneficial for Jordan and for Syrian refugees, and reduces the potential for social conflict with host communities. The EU also says that it has a shared interest in many of the commitments Jordan made under the Compact on subjects like gender equality and the rule of law (European Commission, 2016a, p. 6). However, after refugee deterrence, the Compact's economic components may appeal most directly to EU interests.

Development is more conducive to private investment than humanitarian aid, can be financed through loans, and holds the potential to reshape market conditions in donor countries' favor. In addition to the SEZs, access to assistance under the Compact and to World Bank concessional loans was tied to the relaxation of Jordan's stance toward Syrian refugee employment and an increase in the number of work permits issued. The informality of the Jordanian labor market and continued restrictions on the economic sectors open to refugees has limited the impact of the permits (Howden et. al, 2017, p. 6). Despite mixed success – most often seen in short-term externally-funded programs that seek to absorb unskilled labor with less regard to long-term Jordanian development – donors have continued to foreground refugees' right to work.

This livelihoods-first approach to development appeals to the oft-repeated aim of fostering refugee resilience. Its contrast to a humanitarian approach is summarized by a 2016 EU Communication titled "Lives in Dignity:

from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance,” whose stated goal is to advance a policy framework “that end[s] dependence on humanitarian assistance in existing displacement situations by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies” (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

This goal implicitly frames dependency in the face of protracted crisis as personally undignified and shields the international community from responsibility to the victims of its wars. In addition to constituting a form of market-driven penetration into the public welfare model of relief, it can be seen as a means to create new sources of surplus low-wage labor and low-cost production to the benefit of wealthy donor countries (Zetter, 2019).

The Jordanian government has also been a steady proponent of long-term development aid since its 2015 release of the first Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis (JRP), which oversaw that year’s foreign interventions. Aligned with EU rhetoric, the government described the first pillar of the Jordan Compact as “turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity” (Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2016). The focus on development has been amenable to accruing funding for the state and its citizens. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, which leads the implementation of the JRP, requires that the beneficiaries of projects consist of at least 30% vulnerable Jordanians and pressures programs to shift that balance

in host communities' favor (UNHCR, 2015, p. 35).

This expediency comes at a cost, both for Syrian refugees and Jordan. For refugees, the shift away from humanitarian aid in Jordan, paired with a lack of development and peacebuilding aid in Syria, may be experienced as a de-prioritization of their needs. For Jordan, the longer this model continues, the more reliant the country may grow on the continued presence of refugees and find its development course charted by outside actors and loan repayment schedules.

Indeed, under the Compact, Jordan commits to private sector development, improving its “business climate,” and promoting trade and investment (European Commission, 2016), and in the years since its signing, the EU has organized delegations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to Jordan to identify areas for structural reform (European Commission, 2021a). Moreover, the international aid sector may grow further institutionally entrenched in Jordan, and the EU may conclude that development support forms as an alternative to aiding the conditions for refugee return.

EU assistance should not rely on the ability of a bolstered Jordanian economy to integrate Syrian labor or for increases in Syrian employment to cover the majority of refugees' needs. Rather, aid should be allocated to respond directly to needs assessments of impacted host and refugee communities. To support Jordan's long-term development interests, as well as refugees' well-being, EU efforts

are best spent expanding assistance in Syria and supporting the conditions for refugee return. To make progress towards the resolution of this long-lasting crisis, a strategy that better integrates the response in host countries and in Syria is needed. That strategy can be found in the Triple Nexus framework.

APPLYING THE TRIPLE NEXUS FRAMEWORK TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS

The additional axis of the Triple Nexus, peacebuilding, demands a redefinition of the crisis at hand. The dominance of assistance to host countries has been justified by the portrayal of the crisis as largely a “refugee crisis,” despite the dire conditions facing most communities inside Syrian borders. This reflects the less politicized or positively politicized status of refugees in the West compared to their in-country compatriots. While Syrians also fled opposition and terrorist-held areas, the large numbers fleeing government-held areas have been a comfortable fit for aid coming from countries opposing the Syrian government in the war.

The emphasis on the refugee component of the crisis, in terms of European media coverage and monetary assistance, also reflects donor countries' anxiety over large numbers of refugees entering EU borders. The Triple Nexus approach does not allow donors approaching the Syria crisis to present themselves as funding a coherent strategy by partitioning off the refugee crisis. By prescribing examination of the root causes sustaining the refugee crisis and the points where peacebuilding is needed, the Triple Nexus places issues in Syria at the forefront of an integrated

strategy to address all aspects of the crisis. In this way, the Triple Nexus serves as an orienting tool.

The application of the Triple Nexus framework, with its peacebuilding and development components, would mark a monumental shift in EU policy towards Syria. While the continued provision of humanitarian aid and development aid in host countries would remain critical to meet urgent needs and to set the stage for successful refugee return, it would need to be paired with high levels of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding assistance inside Syria itself.

The delivery of such assistance requires a clarity about the direction of the conflict. The EU has argued that the reversal of its reconstruction policy, or of its sanctions on Syria, in place since 2011, would cement the governance issues it places at the root of the conflict.

However, the notion that these policies can achieve what years of heavy military and financial pressure during the Syrian government's most imperiled state could not is growing increasingly implausible. To be effective, the Triple Nexus would need to be applied with an understanding that crisis resolution in Syria must progress in the absence of dramatic political change. Assistance withheld and sanctions applied for the realization of unfeasible goals is no leverage at all and does little more than deepen the state of crisis.

New policy in Syria must address the concerns of the majority of refugees who hope to leave their host countries and return to improved circumstances. Common

concerns include fears of reprisals or indiscriminate violence, conscription, and a lack of employment opportunities, basic services, and adequate housing (UNHCR, 2019). These economic and political factors will require lengthy, expensive, and politically delicate work. They provide a guide to development priorities and actionable political concessions that offer a reasonable target for EU leverage.

A new strategy in Syria should also be formed in light of EU commitments to Jordanian resilience. The Triple Nexus takes the starting point that interventions in one issue or location often affect others, for better or worse. Syria's widespread destruction and economic isolation pose monumental challenges not just for its residents but the region.

Thawing relations between Jordan and Syria testify to Syria's importance as a trade partner. Between 2011 to 2018, Jordanian exports to Syria declined from USD 287 million to USD 65 million. These numbers conceal the dramatic impacts on farmers who rely on trade routes to and through Syria and whose goods made up the majority of pre-war exports. The unreliability of trade has all but ended the export of quickly perishable goods and reduced agricultural exports to Syria by 88% in this period (Atlas of Economic Complexity, 2021). The precarious position of many workers and small-scale farmers in Jordan should further prompt a reevaluation of EU sanctions and the reconstruction ban on Syria. Reconstruction would create new markets for Jordanian goods and services and begin to restore functioning trade and trade routes.

Syria

POSITIONING PEACEBUILDING
IN REFUGEE RESPONSE



Changes to the Zaatari Refugee camp in Jordan, 2013 and 2017

Credits: UK Foreign,
Commonwealth
& Development Office
& UN Photo



Wheat



Display at the former ICARDA seed bank in Aleppo

Credits: Global Crop Diversity Trust

Credits: Creative Commons

One external factor limiting EU support for Syrian development is the US sanction policy under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. Restricting US and non-US actors' operations in Syria, these sanctions are uniquely harmful to Syria's economy, ability to reconstruct, and receipt of humanitarian aid (despite humanitarian exemptions). They also deepen Jordan's economic troubles, particularly in the border regions that depend on trade with Syria and where many Syrian refugees live. While these sanctions support the EU's current attempts at exerting leverage by limiting the other actors Syria can turn to, they constrain the EU's ability to materially change its stance on reconstruction.

With a new US administration eager to prove its recommitment to its European allies and to humanitarian values, the EU should challenge this “maximum pressure” campaign in Syria, which is often attributed to a desire to weaken Russia and Iran – Syria's closest allies – by proxy. The EU should accept and promote the idea that crisis resolution precludes the extension of the proxy conflict into the post-war phase. In addition to challenging the US, the EU must develop its own policy to work in the context of Russian and Iranian influence on development.

PROSPECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION

All sides agree that reconstruction is likely to be the new frontier for struggles over power and control of Syrian resources and markets. Taking up extensive development or reconstruction in Syria while adhering to development effectiveness principles (DEPs) – transparency and mutual

accountability, focus on results, country ownership, and inclusive partnerships – poses many obstacles. These challenges must be met through the application of the Triple Nexus in program design, a framework built for such fragile situations.

Accusations of misdirected aid have been leveled throughout the war and in its aftermath, paired with reports from the EU and the UNHCR of deep problems in monitoring. The EU justifies its policy against reconstruction in part by predictions that plans will be implemented to favor Syrian government supporters, deepening societal inequities and ultimately fueling conflict. Wide scale corruption and partisan aid distribution are common to conflict and post-conflict zones.

While worries over fair distribution of reconstruction funding are appropriate, the EU faces limited choices. If the EU waits to intervene until it is assured a perfectly equitable policy is in place, it is likely to maintain the severe and destabilizing destitution that cuts across Syrian society. An alternative can be found in an incremental approach to reconstruction, where development assistance is granted according to the degree of transparency achieved or involvement with UN oversight. Testing this strategy in the context of initial infrastructure projects that affect a wide cross-section of Syrian society would allow the timely deliverance of some aid and could initiate some working trust between the government, the EU, and Syrian citizens.

If the EU joins reconstruction efforts, it, too, will be tempted to shape Syria in its

interest, most likely through support to an IMF mechanism (European Commission, 2017). The veneer of neutrality that IMF assistance carries with EU allies makes this option all the more appealing. However, the Triple Nexus's assertion that development must be linked to humanitarianism and peace points to a reconstruction rooted in people's needs, including a need to end destabilizing and unjust inequalities. Such needs are often ill-met by neoliberal macroeconomic reform. By choosing a people-first development strategy, the EU can align itself with the DEP standard of country ownership. This choice may also facilitate the up-close program effectiveness monitoring that a wide-reaching IMF mechanism may evade.

Take, for example, the case of agriculture, a sector in which 37% of prospective returnees plan to seek work (UNHCR, 2018, p. 13). A Syrian agricultural development program that is oriented towards liberalization could exacerbate the crisis of unequal land holdings, promote monocultures, and maintain high levels of food insecurity (as reflected in the effects of IMF and World Bank restructuring of the agricultural sector in many countries including Jordan).

Meanwhile, a development strategy based on rebuilding local foodways would work against these destabilizing factors. The EU could work to restore broadly needed infrastructure like water treatment facilities and increase support to public and private Syrian institutions working on increasing inputs for produce headed to local markets—such as seeds for wheat, barley, cotton, sugar beet, fruits, and vegetables. Reviving and developing the

once preeminent national agricultural institutions and the regional research organizations Syria hosted (including the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas [ICARDA] seed bank and the Arab Center for the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry Lands) would also serve to benefit the entire region.

Such moves would support the reinstatement of Syrian self-sufficiency in wheat and other crops that the country enjoyed before the war—a rarity in the region. Bolstering Syrian food sovereignty is crucial not only to feed the 60% of Syrians who are food insecure (World Food Programme, 2021) but to ward against the influence of outside parties that have sought to destabilize Syria for their benefit.

Increased support for small-scale farming, including training, equipment, and the development and rehabilitation of agricultural processing facilities, would expand employment opportunities in the sector and potentially ease the infrastructural stress exacerbated by rapid urbanization during the war. Such support would also work to restore the health of the soil which has suffered neglect and contamination due to the war. Just as de-mining is critical to advancing Syrian agriculture (and protecting Syrian lives), increasing institutional support for ecologically-sustainable practices, including the provision of organic fertilizers and the promotion of diversified crops is necessary to restore the soil. Financial and technical support to small-scale farmers and land administration institutions also reduces the potential for land grabbing and conflict. Ultimately,

to create opportunities for sustainable development and peace through agriculture, the land cannot be seen first and foremost as a commodity but as the stage for a revived and sovereign country.

A potential lack of country ownership is not the only way EU strategy in Syria may find itself at odds with the DEPs or the peacebuilding component of the Triple Nexus. During the war, the EU supported the regional councils in opposition areas with money for social services to cultivate popular support for the insurgency (Brown, 2018, p. 8). Though military support for the opposition stopped as countries grew anxious over the alternative power structures forming, the EU endures in its wartime attempt to sustain Syrian society along the lines of estrangement from the government.

In the face of a dispersed and disempowered opposition, the 2020 funding strategy of the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) – the main non-humanitarian EU funding body inside Syria – recognizes that development aid can no longer be reserved for areas under the territorial control of the opposition (European Commission, 2020, p. 13).

Rather than reanalyze the ENI's current aims of “sowing the seeds for a possible social and political transformation across Syria” (European Commission, 2020, p. 17), ENI assistance has extended its reach. Now the ENI seeks to fund “non-state actors or individual agents of change” throughout the country. Expanding the geographic coverage of this politically targeted development campaign risks further splintering Syrian society and

demonstrates an aversion to forming inclusive partnerships. The EU must adopt a stance of political impartiality as it presses for the Syrian government to do so.

Donors must recognize that neither peacebuilding nor development can fully advance in the absence of the other. Rather than reinforce social divides, early reconstruction work should pair reconciliation programming with large-scale labor-intensive projects that require coordination between social factions, such as repairing utility systems and restoring irrigation canals.

Fostering reconciliation through social collaboration is incomplete without the inclusion of women. Although the war has pushed many women into occupations outside the home where work is less socially isolated, many may not want or be able to participate in extensive construction work. Programs should address the peacebuilding needs and potential of non-working women as well as target the sectors where women are employed. The high percentage of women working in agriculture reinforces the importance of support for this sector and for the development of farmers' cooperatives, unions, and other social and professional bodies that can tie together agricultural workers from different sociopolitical backgrounds.

IMPLICATIONS OF REFUGEE RETURN

Progress in Syria will advance the resolution of the refugee component of the crisis as experienced by refugees and host communities. The link between social

and physical reconstruction and refugee return is key to resolving the wider crisis; until the status of refugees is settled, peacebuilding will remain incomplete in lieu of national reconciliation. Actors who promote reconstruction or planning for return have been broadly accused of advancing the Syrian government's ascendance at the cost of refugees' well-being (U.S. State Department, 2020). The view that reconstruction or negotiations with the state run counter to Syrian refugees' interests ignores the fact that over three-quarters hope to eventually return (UNHCR, 2019, p. 1).

As the major coordinating body for refugee issues, the UNHCR is tasked with monitoring the conditions for return and setting phases corresponding to its material support. The UNHCR will independently declare the start of Phase 2 (support for organized groups of refugees) based on a wide-ranging set of 21 criteria, rooted in securing returnees' rights, the realization of protection thresholds, and a formal agreement with the Syrian government (UNHCR Regional Durable Solutions Working Group for the Syria Situation, 2019).

The ability of the EU and other states to pressure host countries to uphold UNHCR policy is undiminished by reconciliation and reconstruction work. If any country wishes to carry out forced returns, low levels of development in Syria are unlikely to stop them. Alternatively, participating in the international conversation on reconstruction and return (up until this point largely led by Russia and dismissed by the EU)⁵ will give the EU a stronger

position to uphold the safe, voluntary, and dignified return it espouses.

EU-funded programming has many opportunities to expand the options available to refugees, without adjudication on whether it's time for anyone to return. To safeguard refugees' freedom of agency, the EU should further reduce the "push factors" Syrian refugees face in Jordan. This can be accomplished through a greater reliance on needs assessments of affected Jordanian and Syrian communities and increased funding to local Jordanian organizations directly answering those needs, rather than an anticipation that neoliberal economic reform and ad hoc labor programs will do this work. At the same time, programs in Jordan can reduce major barriers to return: occupational training can teach skills for work needed in Syria; expanded access to information on conditions in Syria can inform refugees' decisions; and work on recovering land tenure, including property titles and communal landholdings can be accelerated.

Between 2018 and 2019, the number of Syrian refugees returning from Jordan increased by over 300%, a trend that will likely continue when the coronavirus pandemic recedes (UNHRC & UNDP, 2020, p. 34).⁶ The EU must work on the conditions that await returnees, rather than wait for an unlikely political transition to arrive.

The 2020 ENI strategy names the need to strengthen the capacity of communities in Syria to meet the needs of continued "self-organized, spontaneous returns of Syrian internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees" (European Commission, 2020, p.

12). However, it allocates just part of a EUR 12 million budget line to the areas where returnees are concentrated and limits the scope of assistance to social integration efforts (European Commission, 2020, pp. 15 & 21).

Without preemptive and multi-sector planning, efforts to support returnees will be woefully piecemeal and insufficient. The UN is increasingly adopting the type of integrated approach this paper advocates. Its Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans (3RP) are developed on an annual basis by the humanitarian-focused UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for coordination within host countries. The 3RP's "Regional Strategic Overview" for 2021-2022 sets a goal of increasing coordination with the response in Syria as well as addressing barriers to return with the Syrian Government (UNHRC & UNDP, 2020, p. 36). The EU has committed to working in line with the 3RP and should follow suit (European Commission, n.d.).

MEETING THE TASK AHEAD

The malleability of the humanitarian-development nexus and peacebuilding language prevalent in EU strategy documents risks facilitating a superficial confidence in EU programming. As Syria begins to recover, no doubt in fits and starts, observers must apply sustained scrutiny on the actions of all parties to the war. Stated commitments to nexus goals must inspire, not preclude, ongoing and comprehensive analysis of the EU's commitments to the Syrian people. As it stands, EU opposition to Syrian development and minimal aid to

reconciliation programs protracts the Syrian crisis and refugee displacement. This strategy is weakening Syria and neighboring host countries, including Jordan, which are growing increasingly dependent on the EU.

The EU bears great responsibility to both Syria and Jordan, having contributed to the crisis through policies of military intervention and refugee deterrence. The impacts of these policies are experienced by millions of people. The EU must work to answer their needs directly, above and beyond its own economic and political hopes for the region. It can do this best through funding broadly-targeted development programs in Syria and focused aid to those most impacted

in Jordan. As the EU Council concluded, “special responsibility for the costs of reconstruction should ... be taken by those who have fueled the conflict” (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 9). Only if this message is heeded and only if the EU leaves behind its wartime footing, can the formidable demands of reconstruction be met and durable solutions be found.

Significant support to Syria will expand refugees’ choices, stabilize the region, and improve the lives of those suffering a decade of war. By setting a strategy aligned with the Triple Nexus that considers the refugee crisis as part of the wider crisis, the EU can play a powerful role in breaking the stasis that refugees and those living in Syria endure.

ENDNOTES

¹ States involved in direct military action include Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and former-EU member, the United Kingdom.

² The last Jordanian national census (2015) estimated the total number of Syrians living in Jordan at around 1.27 million, some 650,000 of whom are registered with the UNHCR (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2015 & UNHCR, 2021).

³ Humanitarian aid for services “including healthcare, food, multi-purpose cash assistance and other basics such as shelter, water and sanitation, education, psychosocial support and protection” have comprised around 15% of total EU assistance to Jordan since the beginning of the crisis (European Commission, 2021b).

⁴ The EU has dedicated EUR 1.7 billion in assistance to Syria.

⁵ The EU dismissed a 2018 Russian proposal for reconstruction to allow refugee return and boycotted an autumn 2020 conference on return hosted by Syria and Russia.

⁶ In total, the UNHCR verified the return of more than 260,000 Syrian refugees between January 2016 and November 2020, a figure that likely excludes many undocumented returns.

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Mapping the development effectiveness of the Triple Nexus approach in a protracted refugee context

THE CASE OF ROHINGYA

REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH



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The present study analyzes the situation of the Rohingya refugee population living in Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh to examine the development effectiveness of the Triple Nexus (humanitarian-development-peace) approach in a protracted refugee crisis context. As such, the study tries to identify the relevance of development effectiveness principles to the said approach.

In this study, all the Rohingya people from Myanmar who are living in the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar were considered

Case Study:
Bangladesh

as a single case since they constitute a distinct ethnic group and live in a similar pattern of camps with common lifestyles, vulnerabilities, problems, and daily sufferings. Similarly, all the programmatic interventions into the situation of the Rohingya refugees under the Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (JRPRHC) from 2018 to 2020 were reviewed through the Triple Nexus approach. Data was collected from official reports and documents, newspapers, journal articles, and personal communication with government officials.

Bangladesh is shouldering a large share of the burden of the global refugee crisis by allowing more than one million Rohingya refugees to live in Cox's Bazar. A massive refugee settlement is often a situation that is vulnerable to potential conflict (Bryant & Wake, 2018). The rise and spread of anti-refugee sentiments in the host communities are creating a hostile environment for the refugees. As immediate repatriation is not likely to happen and the Rohingya people may need to stay in Bangladesh for a longer period of time, the hostile environment could easily turn into a conflict situation if the ongoing tensions between Rohingya refugees and host communities remain unaddressed.

The Bangladeshi government is not interested in long-term planning and multi-year focused international support to build an enabling environment for peaceful co-existence between the host and Rohingya communities. In addition, the international community is still not very concerned to hold the Myanmar government accountable for the refugee

crisis. Many allies of the Bangladeshi government such as China, India, Japan and Russia are taking the side of Myanmar on the issue because of their huge strategic, geo-political and economic interest in the Southeast Asian country. China and India practically always disagree with each other on regional geo-political affairs, but on the Rohingya issue, both countries have expressed their support for the Myanmar government, as both countries have huge infrastructure projects in the Rakhine state of Myanmar.

ROOT CAUSES OF THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

The targeted military crackdown and communal violence driven by military-endorsed Buddhist fundamentalism are the immediate root causes of the humanitarian crisis involving the Rohingya refugees. The torture of the Rohingya population in the Rakhine state of Myanmar has been going on since 1962. Women were excessively affected by the sexual violence perpetrated by the Myanmar military against them. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees has labeled the Myanmar government's cruelty towards the Rohingya people as "ethnic cleansing."

The Rohingyas are a Muslim ethnic group from the Rakhine state (former Arakan) of Myanmar (Lewis, 2019), where they have been living for a thousand years (Mohsin, 2020). Their ancestors were mainly Arab and Persian traders who settled in the Arakan in the ninth century or earlier (Farzana, 2015; Sahana et al., 2019). Due to this origin, their language, ethnicity, religion, and history are different from the mainstream Burmese culture. When

Burma obtained independence in 1948, the Rohingyas were excluded from citizenship. Their situation worsened further in 1962 when the military grabbed power and tried to create a Buddhist State.

Since 1977, after each violent military crackdown and communal violence between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, Rohingya people have been fleeing to Bangladesh. The Myanmar government had intentionally omitted the Rohingya people from the list of the country's 135 official ethnic groups (Ganesan & Hlaing, 2007) and had deprived them of their citizenship rights by declaring them as “Illegal Bengali Immigrants to Myanmar” through the 1982 Burmese Citizenship Law. At the same time, the Bangladesh government issued identity cards to the Rohingya people as “Myanmar Nationals” in handling the refugee crisis. Since August 2017, the increased targeted violence in the Rakhine state has forced over 800,000 Rohingyas to flee into Bangladesh. In just two months, from August 25, 2017 to October 25, 2017, 605,000 Rohingya people have arrived in Cox's Bazar.

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES AND THE HOST COMMUNITY

Protracted refugee situations often gradually generate problems for host communities (Jacobsen, 2002). However, earlier refugee studies focused on refugees as their first concern while the adverse impacts of refugees on host communities were rather often neglected (Chambers, 1986). Even if refugees' impacts on host communities were analyzed, they are

seen in terms of host country or host populations rather than host communities.

Cox's Bazar, with an area of around 2,500 square kilometers, is currently hosting 1.1 million Rohingya refugees. Living in 34 camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf upazilas or sub-districts of Cox's Bazar are 877,710 people and 189,292 families. 55% of which are children below the age of 18, 52% are women, 14% are women-headed households, and 1% are persons with disability. Around 300,000 refugees are also living in host communities.

After the massive Rohingya refugee arrival in 2017, Cox's Bazar was turned into the world's largest refugee settlement. Rohingya refugees now cover more than one-third of the total district population (UNDP, 2018). The Ukhiya upazila of Cox's Bazar has hosted the majority of the Rohingya refugees and the host community there has been turned into a minority. The Rohingya refugees constitute 76% of the total population in Ukhiya (ACAPS/NPM Analysis Hub, 2018).

The Rohingya influx is adversely affecting the livelihood of the host community due to deforestation, inflation, and competition for opportunities (Khatun & Kamruzzaman, 2018). Cox's Bazar has lost 1.7% of its forest area due to the creation of makeshift shelters for Rohingya camps (Abrar, 2018). It is home to large areas of protected forest with important wildlife habitat including the globally-endangered Asian elephant: Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary, Himchhari National Park and Inani National Park.

Around two-thirds of the host community in Cox's Bazar have claimed that they had been adversely affected by the refugee arrival (UNDP, 2018). In 2019, 335,900 people in the host community were in need of humanitarian assistance (Strategic Executive Group, 2019). Seven in 10 families in the host community in Ukhiya and Teknaf are struggling to get enough food for survival (Baldwin & Marshall, 2018). Around 75,000 people in the host community have become more vulnerable to poverty immediately after the refugee arrival (Karim, 2017) due to a ban on fishing on the Naf River along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and a decrease in tourism activities. Local farmers have lost 10 to 15% of their animals due to the reduction in available grazing land that have been occupied by Rohingyas (UNDP, 2018).

Cox's Bazar is the main tourist destination in Bangladesh, which enables people to visit the world's longest sea beach. While the hotel business may not be affected that much by the arrival of Rohingya refugees, the local people and small businesses - who rely heavily on tourists to sell their artisan crafts, dried fish, tourist guide and tourism-related services - are losing income and earning opportunities. Local poverty has increased by around 52% due to the arrival of the Rohingya refugees (World Bank, 2019).

The influx of poor Rohingyas who are willing to work for very low wages has contributed to the reduction in the wages of the local day laborer. The average wages of all workers have decreased by 14% in Teknaf and by 6% in Ukhiya after refugee arrival (Ahmad & Naeem, 2020). The average daily wage was Taka 402 before

the refugee arrival in 2017 and it dropped to Taka 303 in May 2018 (World Bank, 2019). The contract-based day laborers from the host community are losing jobs because Rohingya refugees who live outside the camps are ready to offer their services for much less wages.

When the Rohingya refugees started arriving in 2017, people from the host community were the first to respond. Even before the local government and donors stepped in, it was the host community which helped the Rohingya people by protecting them and offering them food and shelter for months. With the prospect that the Rohingyas' stay could be permanent, the attitudes of the host community are becoming unfriendly and their sympathy is turning into hatred.

In 2018, around 85% of the host community in Cox's Bazar reported that they do not feel safe having a Rohingya community nearby (Xchange Foundation, 2018). In 2019, the host community stated their perception that Rohingya refugees are creating many problems, including security threats (64.9%), social problems (65.3%) and environmental imbalances (69.8%), saying that they are a burden to the community (76.7%) and to Bangladesh (Jerin & Mozumder, 2019).

Two-thirds of the host community also perceived the Rohingyas as ungrateful to them and believe that Rohingya moralities and values are incompatible with their own (Jerin & Mozumder, 2019). Such an attitude, it must be pointed out, is very similar in the European refugee context (Wike et. al., 2016). Nearly 75% of the host community acknowledged that the

Rohingyas are causing disturbances in their lives (Jerin & Mozumder, 2019). Such high level of negative attitudes in the host community indicate that the Rohingyas may have to face more adverse forms of confrontation and hostility from the host community in the coming years.

The host community used to enjoy free medical check-ups, healthcare support, stipends and counselling provided by different non-government organizations and international agencies. The termination of such services after the refugee crisis has been making the host community resentful of Rohingya presence. The refugees' access to water, food, and health services coming from humanitarian agencies are often exaggerated in the eyes of host communities through misinformation. The perception of the host community is that the government and NGOs are giving too much attention to the Rohingya refugees. In the long run, such perceptions of the host community could generate discriminatory attitudes towards the refugees. The lack of social interaction is also driving tensions between host and refugee communities.

While host and refugee communities always have mistrust towards each other (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012), such discriminatory attitudes in the case of the Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar can spark tensions leading to conflicts between these two communities. In fact, conflicts are already evolving (Strategic Executive Group, 2019) but remain under-researched and are not being effectively addressed by humanitarian agencies.

NEXUS PROGRAM FOR ROHINGYA HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN BANGLADESH

The study examines the Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (JRPRHC), which is a nexus program, though it was not officially declared as such before 2020. The third JRPRHC (2020) has acknowledged its focus on the humanitarian-development nexus, in which humanitarian support is predominantly provided to Rohingya refugees and the development assistance is provided to the affected Bangladeshi population in the host communities. The JRPRHC uses collective strategic objectives and coordinated response mechanisms to address the immediate life-saving needs of the Rohingya refugees and to mitigate the refugees' impacts on the host communities.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and UN agencies are implementing the JRPRHC in close coordination with the government of Bangladesh to improve protection and assistance for Rohingya refugees and their host communities in the Teknaf and Ukhiya upazilas of Cox's Bazar.

The following UN agencies, supported by various donors, are at the frontlines of JRPRHC implementation: the IOM (International Organization for Migration), WFP (World Food Program), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), and UN Women (United Nations Entity for

Sectors addressed in the 1st Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis with number of partners



Aa

Sectors addressed in the 1st Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (1st JRPRHC) with number of partners
Source: Researcher's own data

Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women).

In the JRPRHC, a coordination structure was established under a triple leadership consisting of the UNHCR, the UN Resident Coordinator and the IOM. An informal operational coordination platform, the Inter-Sectoral Coordination Group (ISCG) supports this triple leadership. In Bangladesh, power within the humanitarian system remains centralized within a few UN agencies (UNHCR, IOM, WFP and UNICEF).

Initially, at the request of the IOM, INGOs accepted the role as Site Management Agency (SMA) for the camps and then the INGOs brought in their partner NGOs as camp-based implementation agencies. By analyzing the national and local NGOs involved as INGO partners, the study found that most of the partner NGOs are development-oriented organizations

without any prior experience of working in a refugee context. The NGOs and INGOs negotiate their role in the JRPRHC within the parameters set by donors and the government.

The first JRPRHC was launched on March 16, 2018 with an appeal for USD 951 million, to assist 1.3 million people including 884,000 Rohingya refugees and 336,000 host community members, until the end of the year 2018. It had brought together partners from the UN system, INGOs and national NGOs to address 12 thematic sectors or clusters.

The second JRPRHC was launched in February 2019, requesting USD 920.5 million to provide life-saving assistance to 1.2 million people, including Rohingya refugees and local host communities. The program only received USD 650 million.

The third JRPRHC was launched on March 3, 2020, with the aim of raising USD 877 million for 117 partners (48 INGOs, 61 national NGOs, and 8 UN agencies) to respond to the needs of approximately 855,000 Rohingya refugees and over 444,000 vulnerable host communities. The third iteration placed stronger emphasis on areas that have most impacted host communities, including public service infrastructure and delivery, access to sustainable livelihoods, rehabilitation of the environment, and energy initiatives.

After the detection of the first Covid-19 case in Bangladesh on March 8, 2020, the third JRPRHC has incorporated a Covid-19 response plan as an addendum in order to protect both the refugees and host communities. The government of Bangladesh, however, suspended all but essential activities in WW all 34 Rohingya refugee camps between March to August in 2020. Since August 24, 2020, humanitarian activities have

Appealing Organizations in the JRPRHC

Types of Appealing Organizations	JRPRHC (2018)	JRPRHC (2019)	JRPRHC (2020)
National & Local NGOs	18	8	16
International NGOs	26	32	29
United Nation Organizations	11	8	9
Total	55	48	54



Table 1. Appealing Organizations in the JRPRHC (2018-2020).
Source: Researcher's own data





been implemented in line with Covid-19 mitigation measures and site management staff have been reduced to 50% of the pre-pandemic presence.

In Cox's Bazar, the number of INGOs working with the refugees under the JRPRHC has decreased somewhat after the initial surge in 2017. The staff of new humanitarian actors have been facing challenges in receiving working permits and visas in a timely manner. However, there is still a very large number of INGOs and UN agencies present, creating a huge need for coordination.

EVALUATION OF THE JOINT RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE ROHINGYA HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

To evaluate the development effectiveness of the JRPRHC, the study used five criteria based on internationally-agreed development effectiveness principles and the OECD-DAC Nexus Recommendation: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, development impact and sustainability.

The JRPRHC covers many policy recommendations on the OECD-DAC Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Recommendation (OECD, 2019), such as collaboration between actors, complementary and coherent responses, protection, prevention, do no harm and flexible financing mechanisms, which are very important in the Rohingya refugee context. Although the JRPRHC started with addressing only a single pillar (humanitarian intervention), now it could be considered as a double nexus (joint humanitarian and development) intervention. The peace component to

prevent conflict between refugees and host populations is practically absent in the JRPRHC. If the peace component is incorporated in the JRPRHC, it would be transformed into a Triple Nexus intervention and would have a more meaningful impact.

Relevance and Country Ownership

In a refugee context, the study considers government commitment to refugee protection and the host community's supportive attitude and positive perception towards refugees as proxy indicators for country ownership.

Although the JRPRHC is still being implemented in close coordination with the government of Bangladesh, it appears that the Bangladeshi government is withdrawing ownership and is refusing to take responsibility for supporting the Rohingya refugees.

In April 2020, Bangladesh has announced that it will no longer accept Rohingya refugees or rescue boats in international waters. In 2017, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said, "We have the ability to feed 160 million people of Bangladesh and we have enough food security to feed the 700,000 refugees." In 2019, she referred to the Rohingya as a "threat" to the national security of Bangladesh and the regional security of South Asia. This change of tone within two years could be seen as proof of the loosening of country ownership. The Bangladeshi government has shown very little interest in promoting the local integration of Rohingya refugees. In 1978, 1991, and 1992, the Rohingya people were provided refugee status in Bangladesh

but in 2017, the Bangladeshi government did not provide legally-protected refugee status to them. They were classified as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals or FDMNs.

The INGO and NGO space to work with Rohingya refugees has been shrinking due to government restrictions, which were imposed as a reaction to the failed attempts at Rohingya refugee repatriation in August 2019. The Bangladeshi government has imposed some restrictions such as the prohibition of mid-term to long-term-oriented projects, on cash-based work in the camps, and on cooperating with Rohingya volunteers.

Moreover, tension in host communities is rising from the perceived preferential treatment given to Rohingya refugees by the government and international agencies, both of which sense that the host community's negative attitudes and perceptions towards the Rohingya refugees are rising.

Relevance, meanwhile, can be tracked using the country's national and international legal obligations as party to relevant international conventions and treaties and using existing domestic policies, rules and regulations pertaining to refugee issues. Even though Bangladesh is acting as a host country for refugees from Myanmar, it is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, or a party to the Statelessness Conventions of 1954 and 1961. There is no specific domestic law or national policy for the protection of refugees in the country.

Nevertheless, Bangladesh has ratified many international conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention, which state the obligation to protect refugees. For example, the Child Rights Convention obliges state parties to take care of the rights and interests of children refugees, including their birth registration. Moreover, according to the principle of non-refoulement, a customary international law, even countries that are not parties to United Nations conventions are "obliged not to return or extradite any person to a country where the life or safety of that person would be seriously endangered" (Naima, 2002; Duffy, 2008).

After the August 2019 attempt to return Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh faced criticisms from national and international human rights organizations for early repatriation. Since then, both the government and the host community have distrusted UN agencies, national NGOs and INGOs, believing that the latter have intentionally obstructed the return process of the Rohingya refugees. They believe that the UN agencies, national NGOs and INGOs consider the refugee issue relevant only for its benefits to their organizations.

At first, the JRPRHC was focused on humanitarian action. After the lack of progress in the process of voluntary return to Myanmar, however, the refugee population is expected to remain in Bangladesh over a long period of time. Majority of the donors consider the nexus approach as extremely relevant in the Rohingya refugee context of Bangladesh.

Although donors are currently focusing on medium-term development plans - on health, education and skills development - for the Rohingya refugees, the Bangladesh government is not interested in a multi-year-based nexus program.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of any nexus program pertains to providing or fulfilling its desired outcome. The Bangladeshi government and donor priorities, however, are not aligned in defining the desired outcome of the JRPRHC and the Rohingya refugee crisis. The collective desired outcome would be the safe return of the refugees to their home. Since 2017, the Bangladeshi government has maintained a focus on returning the Rohingya to Myanmar and submitted three proposals at the United Nations General Assembly to address the Rohingya crisis.

There has been, however, little pressure on Myanmar from the international community to accept the returning Rohingya people. The international community still focuses on providing humanitarian aid rather than talking about repatriation and justice for the Rohingya people. The JRPRHC has no activity to hold Myanmar accountable for Rohingya refugee-related problems. It seems ineffective in supporting the Bangladeshi government in organizing international solidarity to make Myanmar responsible for taking actions to end the crisis.

To be effective, nexus programs require “deliberate and consistent integration of conflict sensitivity and enhancing local

capacities for peace (Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019).” In this context, the JRPRHC has yet to focus on building the “local capacities for peace” with a conflict sensitivity approach. The JRPRHC seems effective in addressing gender-based violence and providing gender-responsive assistance for Rohingya women and girls, however.

It has been stressed long ago that providing both humanitarian and long-term development assistance to both refugee and host communities can reduce tensions and conflicts between them (Jacobsen, 2002; Ikanda, 2008). Nevertheless, the JRPRHC delivers humanitarian assistance only for Rohingya refugees and development assistance only for host communities, even though the second JRPRHC had acknowledged that around 336,000 people from the host communities require humanitarian assistance. The JRPRHC often rushed into emergency responses without involving the affected host communities.

The Rohingya humanitarian crisis is highly linked to a health crisis, especially for children and women who are suffering from malnutrition and water-borne diseases. Nevertheless, health services provided by the JRPRHC are generally viewed as ineffective by the Rohingya people, who have high levels of distrust of, and skepticism towards, its quality. The perception of inadequate treatment under the JRPRHC is driving the Rohingya people to take loans and seek alternative healthcare outside of their camps. According to the third JRPRHC, current health facilities in the refugee camps are insufficient to treat non-communicable

diseases or NCD, malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV-AIDS.

According to UN agencies and INGOs, the third JRPRHC was effective in addressing Covid-19 in the camps. However a study (Lopez-Pena et. al., 2020) shows that Covid-19 response plans included in the JRPRHC were unfamiliar to the Rohingyas and had led to confusion and tension. By February 14, 2021, all 34 Rohingya refugee camps have confirmed cases of Covid-19, totaling to 396 cases. The JRPRHC has conducted around 28,000 tests among Rohingya refugees in the camps, or around 7% of the total adults.

The study infers that Covid-19 cases could be much more prevalent in the refugee camps because most Rohingyas are unwilling to report symptoms and approach health facilities for Covid-19 tests due to fear that if they tested positive, they would have to leave the camp for unknown isolation places or that they will not be allowed to stand in line for food baskets. There was also a lack of Covid-19 interventions in the host community by the JRPRHC.

Despite many gaps and weaknesses, the JRPRHC is still the only effective multi-sectoral emergency humanitarian response mechanism currently available to provide life-saving services, build shelters, arrange food supplies, and offer emergency healthcare, water, sanitation, and hygiene services for the Rohingya refugees.

Efficiency

To evaluate the efficiency of the nexus program, this study focuses mainly on the timely and appropriate implementation process of the JRPRHC per year. The efficiency of the nexus program depends significantly on complementarity and coherence among emergency relief, development and peacebuilding actions as well as coordination among actors. If a nexus program is deemed as inefficient, it indicates that an amount of investment fails to perform as expected.

Despite the involvement of a large number of organizations, this study considers that the JRPRHC implementation process is fairly efficient. According to the UN and INGO reports, all organizations have implemented the JRPRHC through proper coordination, collaboration, planning, monitoring and evaluation (UNHCR, 2020). On the other hand, local NGOs have opined that the response to the host communities by the JRPRHC has suffered from an uncoordinated approach, resulting in a negative pressure by the government of Bangladesh on JRPRHC actors to increase their support to Cox's Bazar.

The lockdown and travel restrictions that were imposed to curb the spread of Covid-19 have reduced the efficiency of the JRPRHC by delaying the implementation plan. Delayed completions indicate delayed development impacts and reduced development effectiveness.

The absence of a peace component has also reduced the efficiency of the JRPRHC. A few organizations of the JRPRHC were efficient in informing their staff about

conflict sensitivity in this refugee context. The JRPRHC implementation process focuses too much on interagency-centric coordination approaches rather than on people-centered approach, especially in the host community context. Besides, often the pre-defined focus areas of the donors in the JRPRHC - for example, any organization that works with the gender-based violence cluster has to build women and girls' safe spaces - do not really allow flexibility for transforming affected people's ideas into action.

The efficiency of the JRPRHC also depends on changes in financing - such as flexible multi-year funding and simplification of financing mechanisms - which has not improved progressively and remains mostly pre-defined with the annual pattern. Only 60% of the total requested in the third JRPRHC (2020) has been financed. The second JRPRHC (2019) was able to receive only around 75% of the requested fund.

According to the OECD-DAC Nexus Recommendation, donors should allow field-based staff to redeploy funds as new circumstances and opportunities arise. Majority of the donors supporting the JRPRHC, however, are still reluctant to adopt this recommendation.

The nexus is a largely UN- and donor-driven agenda, and the implementation approaches do not sufficiently involve civil society actors (Redvers, 2019). This statement is also valid in the Bangladesh case if we map the operating INGOs and UN agencies involved in the JRPRHC. Discussions and meetings of the JRPRHC

have largely been restricted among the government, UN agencies, INGO and donor officials.

According to the nexus approach, risks must be shared across donors and implementing partners. In the JRPRHC implementation process, risk, accountability, and responsibility of the service delivery are transferred to UN agencies or INGOs from donors, and then the UN or INGOs transfer the implementation responsibility to national or local NGOs. National or local NGOs continue to be treated mainly as subcontractors in the JRPRHC, rather than as partners.

Development Impact

Development impact pertains to the likely economic, social, and environmental consequences of a nexus program. In a refugee context, development impact can be used to mitigate future conflicts and identify opportunities to enhance benefits for local communities and refugees.

It would still be very early to evaluate development impact in the context of Bangladesh, considering the very recent introduction of the nexus approach through the JRPRHC. The study, rather, focuses on identifying trends in enhanced benefits from the recently completed JRPRHC.

The JRPRHC is the only option currently available for the survival of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Despite many challenges and gaps, the JRPRHC has been satisfying 60% to 70% of the current

Funding pattern of the Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis




Table 2. Funding pattern of the Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (2018-2020).
Source: Researcher's own data

emergency needs while trying to address the long-term development needs. The refugee situation in terms of physical needs has improved over the previous years, even as there is little progress in terms of better livelihood and quality education. However, the situation in the refugee camps is still unsatisfactory in terms of protection, safe drinking water, insufficient shelter, health, fuel, etc.

The presence of more than 100 international and national NGOs in Cox's Bazar for implementing the JRPRHC is impacting the local economy by driving up market prices, especially for fuel, transportation, fish and meat. After the arrival of Rohingya refugees, many people came to Cox's Bazar for jobs in the JRPRHC offered by national and international NGOs. The latter needed accommodation to continue their jobs in the area, and this situation has increased house rents.



According to the host community, the best school teachers are employed by the JRPRHC to work in the refugee camps, leaving schools in the host communities with less capacity and fewer human resources. There is not enough accommodation for tourists because most of the hotels are occupied by humanitarian workers who are employed on a contractual basis, leading hoteliers to increase rent. This indicates that the JRPRHC has to be more careful in trying to fulfill compliance with the nexus principle of “do no harm.”

Many international organizations are delivering services similar to those of local NGOs - for example, health or education services - among different refugee camps and host communities under the JRPRHC. The local NGOs which are not part of the JRPRHC are also delivering services similar to those provided by JRPRHC partners to host communities. Due to the JRPRHC, the retention of experienced staff has become a challenge for local NGOs who are unable to compete with better remuneration and benefits offered by the INGOs and big national NGOs. This has hampered or delayed development impact in the host community as many local NGOs have to limit some of their development activities due to the absence of experienced staff.

Sustainability

The sustainability of nexus programs in protracted crises mainly depends on fast, flexible, predictable and long-term financing along with the enhanced local capacity for managing peaceful co-existence between refugees and the host community until the desired safe return

of the refugees are ensured. Donors and aid agencies have acknowledged that protracted crises require such kind of financing, because the average humanitarian crisis lasts more than nine years (Sida, 2019).

The JRPRHC has yet to develop a long-term exit strategy considering that the protracted crisis will last for the next 10 years with strong peacebuilding actions. Nevertheless, development aid is still very slow in addressing peacebuilding and the Bangladeshi government is interested only in short-term humanitarian programs.

Bangladesh is dependent on international donors to handle the refugee crisis. The main donors contributing to actions on the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh (the US, UK, EU, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden and Australia) are expected to continue their engagement over the next few years. Australia has introduced elements of nexus programming, including multi-year funding, in its humanitarian assistance plan for Myanmar and Bangladesh. This envisages that international donors are willing to sustain the JRPRHC with a nexus approach as long as it is relevant, although the Bangladeshi government seems uninterested in any such approach.

Humanitarian action often fails to build national capacity in countries affected by protracted crises (CIC, 2019). The capacity-building initiatives that do take place in the JRPRHC mainly focus on building capacity to administer short-term UN- or INGO-financed projects rather than the longer-term institutional capacity of local actors. Majority of capacity support was around

compliance with donor and government requirements.

CONCLUSION

The refugee crisis in Bangladesh calls for a humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) or Triple Nexus response to simultaneously support both the Rohingya refugees and host communities and to contribute positively to enhancing local peace and reducing tensions between host and refugee populations.

The JRPHRC as a humanitarian response is plainly insufficient to address the refugee crisis in Bangladesh, but such a response is still needed by the Rohingya and the host communities. In fact, the JRPHRC is highly relevant for the survival of the Rohingya people living in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and it must be continued. Nevertheless, government and donor priorities have to be properly aligned for the desired outcome on the Rohingya refugee crisis.

The current JRPRHC would be more effective if it adopts a Triple Nexus approach. Although donors are willing to update the JRPRHC with the nexus approach, the Bangladeshi government seems uninterested in accepting it. The lack of required financing is the key challenge to improve the efficiency of the JRPRHC. The sustainability of the JRPRHC needs long-term financing and enhanced local capacity for peacebuilding.

The study considers that upholding country ownership is one of the most important factors to implement a nexus program in any protracted refugee crisis

situation. As imminent repatriation is not likely and the Rohingya may need to stay in Bangladesh for years to come, upholding country ownership would be crucial to ensure the government's commitment to protect the Rohingya refugees. The actions of the international community for the safe return of the Rohingya refugees are highly relevant to maintain country ownership. Without increased international or donors' pressure on Myanmar to accept the Rohingyas' return, country ownership and relevance to the Rohingya crisis is not expected to improve in Bangladesh.

The situation of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is yet to be seen through a peacebuilding lens. However, the realities of increased tensions in and around the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar clearly point to a need for peacebuilding efforts to prevent future conflicts between Rohingya refugees and host communities. The JRPRHC needs to provide more attention to the principle of "do no harm."

While the JRPRHC has supported the host communities who are most directly affected by the refugee crisis, resources appear relatively scarce compared to the scale of needs. In seeking to meet the needs of the refugee population, the concerns of host communities must not be ignored or overlooked in the JRPRHC.

The feelings of confusion, tension and distrust towards health services and reservations surrounding health service providers' capacity to provide adequate care under the JRPRHC are widespread among the Rohingya refugees. These perceptions have the potential to

negatively impact JRPRHC efforts to manage health risks, among others.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommends that in the context of protracted Rohingya refugee crises, where short-term humanitarian aid (relief, recovery and rehabilitation), mid- to long-term development interventions (health, education, social services, economic opportunities, and skills development) as well as essential peacebuilding actions (enhancing social cohesion, mitigating current tensions, preventing future conflicts) are simultaneously needed, the HDP (humanitarian, development and peace) or Triple Nexus approach aligned with development effectiveness principles should be the central operational framework to enhance benefits for both local communities and Rohingya refugees.

Tensions between the Rohingyas and host communities must be prevented through the Triple Nexus approach. Besides, Triple Nexus-programming should mainstream the use of the "do no harm" principle within the aid system. The ongoing tensions between Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox's Bazar indicate that peacebuilding must be part of the ongoing JRPRHC as a nexus response for improving refugee-host relationships, and local NGOs should be the key nexus partner for refugee-host relationship-building.

The study recommends that proactive strategies such as improving infrastructure for both communities, promotion of peaceful co-existence, awareness for

respecting human rights and facilitating dialogue among local authorities, host community leaders and refugee representatives, training for community leaders in conflict resolution skills or peace education should be explored to improve refugee-host relationship for peaceful co-existence until the time of repatriation. Nevertheless, to improve the refugee-host relationship, it is very important to identify the positive and negative impacts of the refugees on the host communities. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 - promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies - should be considered as a 'Nexus Enabler' in a protracted refugee crisis.

Bangladesh has moved from a refugee-friendly approach in 2017 to a refugee-avoiding approach in 2020 in responding to the Rohingya refugee crisis, which shows that the national interest of Bangladesh is gradually prevailing over the humanitarian concerns of the Rohingyas. To shift the government towards a refugee-friendly approach, donors and other development actors should collectively devise a long-term Triple Nexus program for the entire Cox's Bazar that will benefit both the local community and refugees. This long-term Triple Nexus program should focus on voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees as the exit strategy. Besides, donors should include complementary elements to convert the existing humanitarian-funded projects into nexus programs.

The study also recommends converting the JRPRHC into a model Triple Nexus program with flexible, predictable and long-term financing options. Bangladesh,

through refugee relocation, repatriation and surveillance-focused policy approach, has been treating the Rohingya refugee crisis as a short-term challenge which could be acted on as a key barrier for implementing the Triple Nexus approach. This is also the reason for the short term (single-year) nature of the JRPRHC. The future JRPRHC should at least focus on the medium term (three-to-five years). The joint-analysis for the future JRPRHC should include the long-term impacts of the protracted refugee crisis on host communities. The nexus approach through JRPRHC should build local capacity to extend infrastructure and workforce in Cox's Bazar to adequately respond to the long-term needs of Rohingya refugees and host communities.

The Bangladeshi government should uphold ownership of the JRPHRC with the Triple Nexus approach to continue humanitarian support as well as to introduce development and peacebuilding assistance to the Rohingyas. At the same time, the international community - donors, civil society organizations, and other development actors - should pressure the Myanmar government to stop its repression against the Rohingyas and to create an enabling environment for their safe and dignified return.

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Examining the Effectiveness of the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus in the Lake Chad Region



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Lake Chad is located at the intersection of four countries—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—and is home to an estimated 30 million people of multiple and overlapping cultures and ethnicities (World Bank, 2016).¹ Once one of the largest bodies of water in Africa, Lake Chad has been drastically reduced in size since the 1960s due to a variety of factors including overuse, climate change, poor enforcement of

Case Study:
Lake Chad

*environmental legislation, and weak water resource management (World Bank, 2016).*²

Since 2009, the radical revivalist Islamic movement Boko Haram³ has waged an insurgency from the less developed region of northern Nigeria. In 2013, the U.S. government designated Boko Haram a terrorist organization. A year later, in 2014, Boko Haram was identified as the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Delman, 2015; Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015; Searcey & Santora, 2015).⁴

At the height of the conflict in 2014–2015, Boko Haram controlled about 20,000 square miles of land in northeast Nigeria alone (20% of Nigeria) where close to 1.8 million people were living. (National Public Radio, 2015). In 2015, a coalition of affected and concerned countries—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin—belatedly launched the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to coordinate and expand unilateral and bilateral military efforts against the insurgency. The cooperation facilitated by the MNJTF helped to turn the tide against Boko Haram militarily, but the group proved adaptive and resilient, resorting to suicide attacks and guerrilla tactics. The United Nations Children’s Fund or UNICEF (2019) noted that “more than 3,500 children, most of whom were aged 13–17, were recruited by armed militant groups between 2013 and 2017 and have been used in the ongoing armed conflict in northeast Nigeria.”

This ongoing crisis has had devastating consequences for over 17 million people in the Lake Chad region, more than half of whom are women and children and

depend on humanitarian assistance. More than 2.4 million people have been forcibly displaced and are now living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees, either in camps or in host communities across the region.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2018) have described the many underlying causes of the Lake Chad Basin crisis as: high inequality, perceived social injustice, lack of social service provisions, historic marginalization, inadequate economic opportunities, high levels of poverty, rapid demographic growth and the impacts of climate change and land degradation.⁵ Finding ways to scale up development interventions and improve their efficiency to address these structural deficits is critical. Marcy Vigoda, chief of the partnership and resource mobilization branch at OCHA, has noted that:

“Ultimately the solution to the crisis needs to be a combination of continuing to address immediate humanitarian needs, strengthening the resilience of people in the region and looking at solutions for sustainable development, and then supporting political processes toward ... reconciliation, re-establishment of basic services, supporting local government, etc.”⁶

THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

This chapter examines the UN Humanitarian Programme in the Lake Chad Basin (UNHPLCB). It is supported by a number of donors through the OCHA.⁷

OCHA's role is to augment national and local coordination capacities, and to promote coordination structures that are complementary to established national mechanisms and capacities.

This programme came about following a series of meetings aimed at finding lasting solutions to the crisis in the region. It is a response to crisis-affected settings, combining the predominant and sometimes necessary means of hard-security interventions and soft-security measures associated with political and development responses. The programme covers the period 2014-2021 with operating two strategic plans: 2014-2017 and 2018-2021.

The mission of OCHA which coordinates UNHPLCB, like elsewhere in the world, is to coordinate emergency response to save lives and protect people in humanitarian crises. It also advocates for effective and principled humanitarian action by all for all. It is designed to cover the humanitarian pillar of the Triple Nexus with the following objectives:

Transformed coordination for a more efficient and tailored humanitarian response

More credible, comprehensive and evidence-based situational analysis

An effective, innovative humanitarian financing system that meets the needs of crisis-affected people

International acceptance of centrality of international humanitarian and human rights law, access and protection that results in meaningful action for affected people, especially internally displaced people

Leadership to drive transformative change for a more responsive and adaptable humanitarian system. (OCHA strategic plan 2018-2021)

The five strategic objectives are broadly organized around OCHA's five core functions, which contribute to the major outcomes and outputs in OCHA's Results Framework. For example, Strategic Objective 1 is linked to the Results Framework outputs on Coordination, and Strategic Objective 2 is linked to the Results Framework outputs on Information Management. The two management objectives are aligned with the Results Framework outputs on Management and Enabling Functions, and the "Creating a Better OCHA" document. The strategic objectives promote synergies across OCHA's core functions and reflect the interdependent nature of humanitarian coordination.

The Humanitarian response in the Lake Chad region is led by the governments of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger but under the coordination of OCHA in accordance with United Nations General Assembly (GA) Resolution 46/182 of December 1991, which states: "The leadership role of the Secretary-General is critical and must be strengthened to ensure better preparation for, as well as rapid and coherent response to, natural

disasters and other emergencies” (OCHA, 2017).

Flowing from the Management Plan of OCHA (2014-2017), the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria adopted in June 2016 the Abuja Action Statement to better protect civilians from violations and abuse. The countries agreed to enhance regional coordination and exchange of best practices through greater engagement by states and humanitarian actors with regional institutions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The four countries agreed at the summit to develop a capacity building program (e.g. training) for security forces and the MNJTF on key international humanitarian standards, international protection and human rights, civilian and humanitarian character of refugee and IDP sites, and sensitize humanitarian and military actors on civil-military coordination to protect and promote humanitarian principles. They also resolved to establish the nexus between humanitarian response and development to support durable solutions such as local integration and reintegration, through joint and coordinated planning between humanitarian and development actors to ensure the inclusion of refugees, IDPs and returnees in development planning (Abuja Action Statement, 2016). The four Lake Chad countries have also made significant steps to implementing this agreement.

In line with the commitments made at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit,

the humanitarian community in the Lake Chad region continues to strengthen the role of government counterparts and other local actors, including civil society and the private sector, in the response.

In February 2017, some 170 representatives from 40 countries, the UN, regional organizations and civil society organizations gathered at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. The conference was co-hosted by Norway, Nigeria, Germany and the UN and followed a civil society meeting with large participation from local organizations working in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Chadwick, 2017).

The conference was convened by the key stakeholders as a way of raising awareness for the UN-Humanitarian Programme under OCHA's coordination. It was considered crucial by participating Lake Chad Basin countries and key stakeholders to provide and protect education to safeguard the rights of millions of persons affected by conflict in the region and pave the way for a peaceful development in the region. At the meeting, Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende noted, "Our goal must be to ensure quality education for all, for girls as much as for boys. It is of critical importance also to enhance the protection of women and girls, who often carry the main burden of crisis and conflict, and ensure that women are involved in ongoing processes related to peace and development in the region."

The Oslo conference was also conducted to raise funds for the UNHPLCB under OCHA's coordination in the four countries

as expressed by the Foreign Minister of Germany, Sigmar Gabriel, who said: “With today’s pledges, humanitarian agencies can now concentrate on their work – to save lives and offer help to those in urgent need. Germany contributes EUR 120 million over the course of the next three years to those efforts. We will provide EUR 100 million for humanitarian assistance and EUR 20 million for stabilization efforts in the region. In the long run, we have to strengthen our partnership with the countries involved to address the root causes of terror, displacement and poverty. For that purpose, we established today a Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilisation with our counterparts from the region.”

At the conference, 14 donors pledged USD 458 million for relief in 2017 and an additional USD 214 million was announced for 2018 and beyond. Pledges were made by the European Commission, Norway, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, France, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea. Humanitarian partners agreed to further scale up their response to reach the most vulnerable groups threatened by famine, including children with severe acute malnutrition. Special attention was given to the protection needs of women, children and youth, as well as the need for longer-term support and durable solutions for the displaced populations (Humanitarian Aid, 2018).

Given the amount of funds raised, the UNHPLCB was expanded significantly in 2017, reaching over six million people with assistance and protection, and effectively

averting a famine. Assistance was made to reach more people than before as aid organizations increased personnel, previously unreachable areas became accessible and donors’ support grew (OCHA, 2018). But needs in the affected sub-regions remain acute, and persist at a large scale into 2019 and beyond. Without continued assistance, hard-hit communities risk sliding back into distress. Eight months into 2018, only 40% of the USD 1.5 billion needed to assist 7.8 million conflict-affected people in the region was received (African Union Commission & Lake Chad Basin Commission, 2018).

In 2017, Chad continued to face several protracted crises. Some 4.7 million people, or one third of the population, required humanitarian assistance. In line with the New Way of Working (NWoW), OCHA steered the humanitarian community to develop a multi-year response framework covering 2017-2019. The framework is aligned with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the National Development Plan. Humanitarian and development partners identified six collective outcomes to be achieved by 2019.

OCHA was instrumental in the creation of a Humanitarian-Development Forum, which met in June to focus on strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus initially in the Lac, southern and eastern regions of Chad. OCHA supported the humanitarian coordinator (HC) and the humanitarian country team (HCT) in developing common positions on policy issues, including assistance to people formerly associated with Boko Haram.

In 2017, Niger faced several crises, with at least 1.9 million people needing humanitarian assistance, including about 250,000 severely malnourished children. In the Diffa region, 250,000 IDPs and Nigerian refugees were uprooted due to the Boko Haram-induced conflict.

OCHA supported the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) set up by the International Rescue Committee and rolled out by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the Diffa region, in cooperation with the Danish Refugee Council and ACT-ED, a French NGO. The RRM enabled humanitarian actors to respond rapidly to the most urgent needs at the onset of new displacements via multisector assessments and joint response operations.

In the same year, protection monitoring activities were strengthened substantially, and OCHA supported the functioning and delivery of the Protection Cluster and its sub-clusters (child protection and gender-based violence). Data collection tools and a database were set up under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Regional Directorate for Child Protection. A protection strategy was initiated in 2017 while OCHA helped the UNHCR and CARE International to develop an action plan to improve accountability to affected people for the Diffa region. OCHA's efforts to elevate the profile of the humanitarian situation included the USG/ERC visiting Niger as his first official mission. These efforts led to the 2018 HRP receiving more than 80% of the USD 288 million required (OCHA, 2017).

The conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military in northeast Nigeria has affected more than 8.5 million people in the most affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The conflict led to forced displacement, acute food and nutrition insecurity, and serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

To improve the quality of humanitarian response in hard-to-reach areas in Borno state, OCHA established local coordination groups in 12 deep-field locations, and it trained partners on coordination, humanitarian principles and basic protection from sexual exploitation and abuse principles.

OCHA supported the development of key strategies, including the 2018 HNO/HRP. It also facilitated the establishment of four humanitarian hubs in hard-to-reach areas and the massive scale-up of humanitarian assistance, averting the risk of famine and enabling the rapid containment of a cholera outbreak. In the Lake Chad region, funds pledged by donors for humanitarian assistance in 2018 was USD 980.7 million. Of this figure, USD 914.3 million was disbursed representing 93% performance (OCHA, 2019). This enabled the implementation of targeted humanitarian activities and programmes, reaching millions of people with food assistance and providing children with life-saving nutritional support.

The OCHA-managed Nigerian Humanitarian Fund became operational in May 2017 and raised USD 48 million in contributions and pledges, USD 24 million of which was allocated to

various organizations in support of the humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria. OCHA facilitated an additional USD 31 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). By the end of 2017, through joint and sustained coordinated humanitarian response, over 70% of the HRP—the fourth largest single-country appeal—was funded.

In the same year, about 2.9 million people (12% of the population) were affected by multiple crises fueled by violence and conflict in the Lake Chad Basin area of Adamawa, far north, north and east regions. Due to the increasing humanitarian needs, OCHA scaled up its presence in 2017 by opening a country office in Kousseri, in addition to its presence in Maroua. This scale-up enabled OCHA to strengthen coordination structures and swiftly respond to new emerging crises.

OCHA helped to develop key strategic documents, including the 2018 HNO and HRP, a HCT protection and access strategy, and a HCT joint note to guide the return of internally displaced persons. OCHA Cameroon supported the HCT in enacting key outcomes from the World Humanitarian Summit, such as multi-year planning and an increased use of cash programming. OCHA coordinated humanitarian agencies to develop proposals for a CERF allocation of USD 10 million to fund humanitarian response in the far north (OCHA, 2017).

In 2018, another conference was held to discuss the situation in the Lake Chad region with similar objectives as that of 2016 for the UNHPLCB under OCHA's coordination. The event was partly in

response to a call from the United Nations that an estimated USD 1.6 billion was required to help 10.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in the region. The conference, again co-hosted by Nigeria, Norway, Germany, and the UN, followed the Oslo conference in 2017, which had raised a much-needed USD 672 million (Chadwick, 2018).

Participants at the 2018 conference agreed that a coherent, multi-year approach is needed, which integrates all available instruments to tackle the protection crisis and the root causes of the conflict. This was direly necessary to pave the way for the sustainable and resilient development of the region, and thus contribute to a better future for the affected people. The conference also highlighted the regional dimension of the Lake Chad crisis, and the crucial role of local actors, cross-border cooperation and ownership at all levels (Humanitarian Aid, 2018).

Also in 2018, member-states of the Lake Chad Basin-affected countries, with the support of the African Union and UNDP, as well as other international partners, adopted the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience Strategy (RSS) for areas affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (African Union Commission & Lake Chad Basin Commission, 2018). This RSS was subsequently adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council in December 2018.


The UNHPLCB in the course of the year 2018, focused on solving problems within the scope of humanitarian and development programming solutions, emphasising the need for adequate

coordination and transition of actions and caseloads from humanitarian to development actors (Culbert, 2019).⁸ The narrower double-nexus interpretation is consistent with the language of the Agenda for Humanity and NWoW,⁹ which describes this approach as best suited to “contexts where short-term humanitarian action and medium- to long-term development programming are required simultaneously in areas of vulnerability.” The Strategy aims to make development funding available ‘earlier’ and processed quickly (OCHA, 2018).

There is currently a multi-year strategy that provides the overarching framework for a humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria for three years from 2019 to 2021. Within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states, the 2019 plan focused on the needs of 6.2 million of the most vulnerable women, men, girls and boys. The Humanitarian Needs Overview remained an annual exercise to ensure that changes

in the context are analysed and reflected.¹⁰ Funding for the UNHPLCB is raised annually and on a multi-layer programming basis, usually from donors and benefiting countries. For instance, OCHA (2021) reveals that in Nigeria, the humanitarian community reached about 5 million people with multi-sectoral responses across the BAY states. This success was achieved despite access challenges, funding shortfall and unprecedented crises posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which increased the number of people in humanitarian need to 10.6 million from 7.9 million in January 2020. But at the same time, Figure (1) below shows that as of 31 December 2020, only 51% of the USD 1.08 billion required for the humanitarian response in Nigeria had been received, reinforcing a declining trend in funding since 2017.

In Chad, with 6.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, OCHA targeted 3.8 million for relief. Figure (2)



Funding for humanitarian needs in Nigeria




Figure 2. Funding for humanitarian needs in Nigeria, 2020.
Source: UN OCHA


demonstrates that funding received from donors was USD 288.5 million, against a USD 664.6 million target for total funding requirements for humanitarian needs in 2020, leaving a gap of USD 376.2 million.¹¹

In 2019, the humanitarian response in Cameroon was the least funded in Africa, with only 43% of the requested amount funded. This acute underfunding of the humanitarian response is leaving millions of people without vital humanitarian assistance and protection, reinforcing the cycle of vulnerability and violence. For 2020, the humanitarian response plan required USD 391 million. The plan prioritizes life-saving assistance and protection while addressing the root causes of the conflict and looking towards lasting solutions that promote recovery and resilience.

OCHA is supporting more than 140 humanitarian partners in providing emergency assistance in the crisis-

affected regions. OCHA has enlarged its presence, with sub-offices in Buea (southwest) and in Bamenda (northwest), in addition to its head office in Yaounde (centre region), its sub-office in Maroua and a satellite office in Kousseri, both in the far north region. As of September 2020, USD 290 million was still required to complete the needed amount.¹²

Niger had a better performance in funding received for 2020. Of the 3.8 million people targeted by the OCHA program, 2.2 million were reached. Of the total USD 516.1 million funding required, the humanitarian response plan received USD 362.7 million representing 70.3% and leaving a gap of USD 153.4 million. The top five donors are: Germany, USD 117.1 million (32.3%); USA, USD 92.1 million (25.4%); European Commission, USD 43 million (11.9%); CERF, USD 23.7 million (6.5%); and the United Kingdom, USD 14.1 million (3.9%).¹³



Lake Chad

THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION



The search for livelihood goes on

Credits: UNDP West and Central Africa



Education for children affected by conflict becomes difficult

Credits: UNDP Chad



It is crucial that OCHA and the global donor community increase official development assistance to affected countries in the Lake Chad region given the funding shortfalls discussed above.

In terms of achievements, between 2016 and 2017, stepped-up humanitarian assistance by the UNHPLCB has saved millions of lives. Assistance is reaching more people than before as aid organizations increased personnel, previously unreachable areas became accessible, and donor support grew. This feat was achieved by reaching two million people with food assistance every month as well as providing life-saving nutritional support to hundreds of thousands of children (UN, 2017).

Also, the UNHPLCB in Nigeria alone has provided life-saving assistance to over 5.5 million affected people (1.4 million women, 950,000 men, 1.8 million girls and 1.4 million boys) in 2018. While it helped stabilize living conditions for millions of affected people, significant humanitarian needs remain as the conflict continues. At present, it is estimated that more than 800,000 people are still in areas that are inaccessible to international humanitarian actors. In 2020, despite COVID-19 challenges, aid workers had already provided around 5 million people with life-saving assistance in the BAY States.

Furthermore, some displaced people have begun returning to their villages in all countries affected by the crisis in the Lake Chad region. They are mostly breadwinners who return to their field to resume fishing or pastoralism to

support the rest of their families staying in displacement sites. Between 2016 and 2018, around 51,000 people have gone back to their villages, mostly in island areas in the southern basin of Lake Chad.

As of March 2021, over 30,000 households have been provided with access to healthcare, education, justice, alternative livelihood options, and over 1,800 houses, market stalls, and waterlines constructed to support communities and enhance cross-border economic activities in restive parts of the Lake Chad Basin impacted by acts of violent extremism (UNDP, 2021). This positive trend is expected to continue.

EVALUATION OF UN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME IN LAKE CHAD BASIN

The objectives of the UNHPLCB response to the conflict in the Lake Chad region are being largely achieved in spite of the escalation of conflict in the region in the past decade.

In 2019, OCHA continued to coordinate the humanitarian response in Cameroon to support 131 partners. In the far north, OCHA took over the coordination leadership from the Office of UNHCR in late 2018, meaning it could marshal more inclusive coordination mechanisms that ensured better coordination between humanitarian and development programming. In the northwest and southwest, OCHA supported new coordination structures following the cluster approach activation in the region in October 2018; reinforced public advocacy and reporting; and supported a gradual and safe increase in access through a transparent approach that

involved building relationships with the Government, diaspora, communities and non-State armed groups.

In Chad, OCHA recognized the importance of addressing chronic vulnerability and structural deficiencies, such as lack of social protection driving humanitarian needs. It was pivotal in consolidating a collaborative framework with development actors. Based on lessons from the previous joint analysis exercise, OCHA brought all stakeholders - Government, development actors, humanitarians and civil society - together. This resulted in defining a road map for more effective humanitarian and development programming in Chad.

OCHA advocated for easing restrictions on humanitarian actors' movements to ensure a principled response to the needs of extremely vulnerable people. It also facilitated dialogue with Government counterparts to mitigate the impact of a presidential decree to regulate the presence of national and international NGOs and working modalities in the country. When large numbers of people were displaced following extensive flooding, OCHA's leadership was critical for several inter-agency assessments and responses. OCHA supported the work to enhance Chad's preparedness and to build national capacity and structures with a CERF allocation of USD 10.9 million.

In Niger, OCHA adapted to a volatile environment by redirecting and pooling resources, including closing its Zinder presence and opening 26 new sub-offices in Maradi and Tillaberi. Government forces conducted multiple military operations, and the state of emergency limited the

movement of people and vehicles in conflict-affected areas. Therefore, OCHA advocated for the respect of humanitarian principles and the protection of affected populations. It allocated USD 16.9 million from the CERF to support response efforts in Niger.

Dramatic floods not seen in 100 years affected more than 250,000 people, destroyed 19,000 houses and flooded nearly 8,000 hectares of agricultural land, further exposing people to food insecurity, malnutrition and epidemics. OCHA monitored the implementation of the human country team strategy for emergency response preparedness, and it consulted with regional and national early warning systems to inform decision-making.

In Nigeria, OCHA, strengthened field coordination in Local Government Areas, supported the development of a 90-day emergency plan to respond to the most urgent needs of new arrivals in Borno State, and coordinated contingency, preparedness and response planning for the 2019 elections and floods response. Following the military's suspension of two key international NGOs in September 2019, OCHA provided a platform for collective action and leadership to enable the timely resumption of the INGOs' activities. The Nigeria Humanitarian Fund allocated USD 26.7 million for humanitarian action in the country (OCHA, 2019).

The UNHPLCB in the Lake Chad Basin is undoubtedly helping to address the root causes of the conflict in the region in line with the vision of the Triple Nexus. For instance, since August 2015, 1.6 million

people (378,000 women, 348,000 men, 510,000 girls and 404,000 boys) have returned to or are closer to their homes and have attempted to begin to rebuild their lives, indicating that conditions in some locations have improved to a relative extent in the region. In Nigeria, Adamawa State has seen the highest number of returns at over 750,000, and Borno State over 650,000. Government-facilitated returns also started, including in coordination with military efforts underpinned by Operation 'Last Hold'.¹⁴ To further boost this operation, Cameroon, Nigeria and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on refugee returns in March 2017, which has enabled the safe return of displaced persons to both countries.

However, on the flip side, funding is tied to either humanitarian, development or peacebuilding activities, so there is little funding specifically for nexus programming. The UNHPLCB operates on the core principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity, and operational independence. Humanitarian actors in the region have voiced concerns over the risk that humanitarian assistance is being politicized and instrumentalized by peace and security actors (Centre for Humanitarian Action, 2019). This, for all intents and purposes, could result in a loss of neutrality in the eyes of local actors and could potentially reduce access to areas in need of humanitarian assistance. In the same vein, development sectors also seek to strengthen state institutions, and are as such, political projects. This raises the possibility of misalignment between humanitarian and development purposes. Humanitarian funding is, in particular, often ring-fenced to ensure it is used only

for humanitarian purposes. This funding methodology remains incompatible with the Triple Nexus long-term multi-stakeholder approach. There also remains a mismatch of funding timelines. Humanitarian funding is planned on an annual basis, whereas development and peace programming are typically planned for one to five years. As such, most funding mechanisms remain incompatible with the Triple Nexus.

The protection of civilians remains at the centre of UNHPLCB response in the region. Villages, towns and even sites hosting displaced people recurrently come under attack, hitting civilians the hardest. Kidnappings, fatal attacks, sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation and abuse continue to occur. Children have been abducted and forced to carry out bomb attacks, while women and girls are at a higher risk of sexual violence. Economically disenfranchised families are enduring extreme hardship and are exposed to exploitation and abuse.

Most of the displaced people have sought refuge in communities or in informal settlements, surviving in harsh conditions with low prospects of returning home. While hundreds of thousands have returned to or near their homes in recent years, resuming normal life is far from easy due to the destruction of their homes, schools, health centres and other infrastructure.

The Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria adopted in June 2016 the Abuja Action Statement to better protect civilians from violations and abuse. The countries have made significant steps to

implementing the agreement. However, renewed commitment is needed by all actors to enhance the protection of the internally displaced, refugees and other affected populations.

Food shortages and pasture deficits are recurrent across the largely arid Lake Chad Basin. Conflict has compounded the cyclic crises. Prolonged displacement, insecurity, looting and destruction, shuttered markets and security measures have wrecked livelihoods (OCHA, 2018).

The implication of the above scenarios, therefore, is that humanitarian action alone cannot address the root causes of persisting challenges and vulnerabilities. The conflict-hit areas in the region are also suffering the chronic effects of under-investment in social services, poverty, environmental degradation and climate change. Schools, health centres, roads, water supply are non-existent or inaccessible. A humanitarian response is being linked up to development initiatives, and greater investment in development especially at the local level must complement humanitarian action.¹⁵

The UNHPLCB is helping to guarantee the rights of millions of people, such as the right to life, education and other basic needs, even though much still needs to be done. Some schools that were destroyed as a result of the conflict have been rebuilt, hospitals that were burnt have been reconstructed and put back into use. Houses and communities that were destroyed have been rebuilt and displaced persons have been resettled through the program in some countries.

In partnership with development and humanitarian communities, governments have begun to articulate concrete, measurable collective outcomes. These include three- to five-year installments towards the advancement of the 2030 Agenda in the region in line with the New Way of Working.

The UN and its partners have already rolled out the NWoW in Chad, where they agreed on collective outcomes with the government in 2017. An example of the NWoW in Chad is the building of community resilience and promoting local development. Guidance has been provided to partners in designing complementary humanitarian and development interventions, and major donors in Chad have started implementing joined-up approaches in their development programming. As of 2017, Chad has also become eligible for the peacebuilding fund and this pillar is now being reinforced in the NWoW.

OCHA is tasked with monitoring the Chad Nexus Plan, with indicators of progress being drawn from existing information sources. Chad drafted a three-year Collective Outcomes plan in 2016, making it one of the earlier implementers. The Collective Outcomes process was driven by the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator, along with several government bodies, humanitarian and development agencies, and donors. Humanitarian clusters were also involved in an elaboration workshop to develop the Nexus Plan.

In Nigeria, the Buhari Plan, as part of the UNHPLCB, combines humanitarian action

with recovery and economic development. The UN Country Team (UNCT) is working on a strategy to operationalize the NWoW in the northeast. In Niger, the government has set up a humanitarian-development committee and is resolved to transcend the humanitarian-development institutional divide. In Cameroon, the Recovery and Peace Building Strategy adopted by the government has set out short-, medium- and long-term humanitarian interventions, as well as resilience and development actions.

The task of reporting on the collective outcomes, even at a basic level, has been challenging. Some of the existing reporting cycles for indicators do not match the annual reporting periods, nor are they collected on comparable geographic areas. Food security and nutrition heavily depend on weather and annual crop yields, potentially obscuring the impact of international assistance in improving medium-term food security. The outcome of increasing access to basic social services has been considered so broadly as to be impossible to track, particularly given the shortage of national-level data (Culbert, 2018).

Nigeria's security provisions and civil-military coordination mechanisms are quite conservative, making it difficult for aid agencies to reach populations in need. The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) has been a key provider of air transport for humanitarian goods and humanitarian-development-peace personnel. But too often, these enabling services are underfunded and therefore limited in the support they can provide

to humanitarian-development and peace operations on the ground (Perret, 2019).

This initiative also has to overcome many logistical problems. For instance, in some settings, such as northeastern Nigeria, it is impossible for development actors to operate. In that area, there has been a major emphasis on the need to link humanitarian aid and development, but insecurity on the ground has meant that development projects have been slow to start.

There must be respect for the fundamental differences between humanitarian and development approaches. Humanitarian approaches tend to focus on supporting those most urgently in need. In contrast, development work operates inside broader objectives of promoting ‘the economic and development welfare of developing countries,’¹⁶ whereby the focus on the poorest and most vulnerable people is at times diluted.

For example, education supports children and young people’s lifelong learning. It gives them the necessary skills to build a better future for themselves and their families, and to contribute to peaceful and prosperous communities. Yet too often, overall humanitarian education funding is lacking in emergencies. For instance, UNICEF in 2018 called for USD 41.7 million to meet the education needs of children in the crisis but received just 8% of this amount in the first half of the year (Humanitarian Aid, 2018).

What has worked? Adopting regional and cross-border approaches in the region has proven to be helpful. Local authorities from

the four Lake Chad countries are receiving assistance to collaborate on issues such as prioritization and the harmonization of programming approaches. For instance, the World Bank, Africa Development Bank, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Germany have further encouraged the formulation of regional frameworks to tackle common issues of governance, livelihoods, inequalities, trade, return and reintegration, and climatic, environmental and economic transformation.

There have been several lessons learned from the work in Nigeria. It was shown to be important for donors, the United Nations and aid agencies to engage with the state level government in Borno to develop a Return Strategy and Policy Framework to avoid forced returns and promote durable solutions. To support this approach, the European Union developed an integrated funding package for Borno State. If this package is carefully implemented, it could yield significant results for the region’s nexus program.

Fabian (2019) observed that throughout the Lake Chad Basin, humanitarian assistance is not delivered in a vacuum but rather where development work and peacebuilding are also taking place. To support affected populations, joint analysis and planning are essential at the community level and beyond. This is especially the case for organizations such as the UN with a dual mandate, with nexus programs offering a great opportunity in this regard.

Nigeria’s Regional Refugee Plan (2019/2020) focuses on Lake Chad Basin countries that are hosting refugees from

Nigeria, including Cameroon, Niger and Chad. It was drawn up, for the first time on a two-year basis, under the shared responsibility of the UNHCR and UNDP. The aim is to create lasting solutions for both refugees and host communities, an approach that makes good sense. The host communities' local populations are often living below the poverty line and in conditions where there is great gender inequality and inadequate access to a basic social infrastructure.¹⁷

More than a year after the completion of the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment, the Cameroon government has yet to officially sign off on the accountability framework. This means that budget allocations, as well as legal policy reforms necessary to enable the envisaged outcomes, have not been activated. If the Cameroon government does not prioritise or advance nexus objectives, many of their development partners may also be unlikely to do so (Poole, 2019).

CONCLUSION

The UNHPLCB under OCHA's coordination is positive and should be continued as part of the ways to achieve the humanitarian and other purposes of the Triple Nexus in the region. It is critical that stakeholders urgently scale up development interventions to strengthen resilience, help people and communities recover as quickly as possible from desperate conditions, and prevent further deterioration of the crisis. To date, several approaches have been adopted, but they have had limited success. The current UN humanitarian coordination by OCHA offers hope for greater success. This is

because, over the years, OCHA has been able to put in place strategies that have extracted strong commitments from relevant stakeholders in the region to usher in an era of peace, stability and development (UNDP, 2021).

Several experts argue that the nexus approach is a good option for the region. It has the potential to provide better coordination of humanitarian assistance, development support and peacebuilding efforts continuously and with increasing intensity.

Groups working to provide solutions must operate beyond a limited mandate as a humanitarian or a development organization. Rather, they should be seen and accessed according to their capacity to work with local populations to meet their needs. This requires that local people be at the centre of all efforts. In light of the experience with the programme, this means that strategies must be developed to strengthen their coping strategies and skills as well as their participation in decision-making. This approach will create an environment where relevant issues are raised and addressed, ones that relate to their rights to life and dignity and ones that ensure workable solutions are put in place to have these rights realized.

The good news is that there is significant political support and goodwill across all levels of the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding constituencies to work collaboratively to reduce needs and vulnerability during and after crises. However, how the Triple Nexus will work in practice is still not clear. Funding and financing tools, instruments, policies and

approaches have not had time to adapt to the nexus. This remains a hard nut for all development actors to crack in the months and years ahead.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

For the UNHPLCB to succeed in the Lake Chad Basin, the following recommendations need to be considered:

IMPROVE COHERENCE AND COORDINATION. Although effective mechanisms exist in all four countries to coordinate humanitarian response efforts, they do not exist for longer-term development programming. Improved coordination is essential for effective, efficient and targeted resilience programming, and to ensure that lessons are learned and shared across the entire region. It requires that the governments of the Lake Chad Basin set up and/or strengthen development coordination mechanisms. It also requires that the international community allocate additional resources to support governments in this area.

GENERATE NEW PRACTICAL IDEAS FOR ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION. There is universal recognition that economic opportunity is essential to recovery and resilience and to avoid further political instability. However, there is a deficit of ideas about how to achieve these conditions within the urgent timeframe and at the scale that is required. The crisis must be analysed in its broadest sense as well as in relation to the various groups affected: host communities, internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, vulnerable groups, gender and age groups.

One critical concern is the large number of young people in the Lake Chad Basin, where almost two-thirds of the rapidly growing population is under 25 years old. Addressing this problem requires an urgent, local, national and sub-regional vision and practical strategies involving the private sector as a central actor alongside government, communities, international agencies and civil society organizations.

PROMOTE NON-TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PEACE. Based on the experience with the UNHPLCB programme in the Lake Chad region, it is important to explore the use of non-traditional peace brokers by promoting the participation of women in peace negotiations and rebuilding processes that capitalize on their non-alignment in conflict situations to address the humanitarian crisis.

LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND. The UN humanitarian response must be extended to areas affected by the conflict as well as in areas not affected. Otherwise, tensions are likely to build up and the conflict will spread to so-far-unaffected areas. The focus on a comprehensive approach should not distract from the fact that humanitarian needs in the region remain high and must be met fast. It is particularly urgent to get access to communities that are currently cut off from humanitarian aid.

INCREASE ODA TO FRAGILE STATES OF LAKE CHAD UNDER OCHA'S COORDINATION. The donor community should consider increasing official development assistance to Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon to step up

humanitarian support to millions of victims and affected persons in the region. Such assistance should not be in the form of loans but grants.

Recommendations for the implementation of the Triple Nexus include:

INCREASE HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS SIDE BY SIDE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION. Given the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin, there is still an urgent need to scale up humanitarian actions which should be done alongside development cooperation, so as to be able to achieve the Triple Nexus vision in the region.

THE NEED FOR INVESTMENT IN ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR A COHERENT RESPONSE. Country-level actors who lead prioritisation processes and coordination efforts currently have limited influence and tools to mobilise resources and stakeholders behind collectively agreed priorities. Investments should be made in reducing some of the barriers to a more coordinated response at a very practical level.

RESOURCING COUNTRY TEAMS. Guidance is needed on how nexus approaches should fit with existing planning, prioritization and resource mobilization processes. Serious consideration should be given to whether top-down approaches or organic context-driven collaborations for specific problems or locations are appropriate. Support should emphasize fostering and incentivizing collaboration and complementarity and supporting the scaleup of initiatives that demonstrate results.

FUNDING WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH COORDINATION. The workload associated with coordination across the nexus is largely unfunded outside the humanitarian community. Investments in gathering information, on who is doing what and where, and the identification of geographic, sectoral and temporal gaps, would help to improve evidence-based decision making and rational coverage of priorities.

ENDNOTES

¹ Lake Chad directly borders Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Hydrologically, parts of the Central African Republic are in its active basin, and some of the aquifers connected to the lake are in Libya (World Bank, 2016).

² The landlocked lake declined from over 22,000 km² in 1960 to about 1,700 km² in January 1985 but has since increased again to an average of approximately 8,000 km² during the 2000–2015 period (World Bank, 2016) See also: World Bank, “Restoring a Disappearing Giant: Lake Chad,” March 27, 2014b.

³ Boko Haram roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden.” The group’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’i Wa’ati Wal Jihad (“Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad”).

⁴ In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) engaged in more attacks than Boko Haram (1,071 compared with 452), but the latter’s attacks were more lethal (killing 6,644 compared with 6,073) (Delman, 2015; Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015; Searcey & Santora, 2015).

⁵ The paper is a product of a joint mission conducted by OCHA and UNDP in the Lake Chad Basin region from July 2 to 13, 2018. Led by Aliou Dia, with the participation of Stephanie Julmy, Salvator Nkurunziza, Antoine Haarman, Phil Vernon, Pia Hussein and Rodolpho Valente, the joint mission travelled to Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria to identify sustainable development solutions and areas of opportunity to increase the region’s resilience. Its findings and recommendations were submitted in preparation for the follow-up High-Level Conference on Lake Chad Basin from September 3 to 4, 2018, in Berlin, Germany.

⁶ The Agenda for Humanity includes a set of financing-related commitments under the core responsibility to “invest in humanity”. Humanitarians have mobilised behind the 2016 Grand Bargain, a set of 51 commitments for reforming humanitarian financing. Development financing actors have focused on the challenge of mobilizing the huge resources required to meet the ambition of SDG through the Financing for Development (FFD) agenda.

⁷ OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.

⁸ Case study research findings in CAR noted that during the humanitarian country team/UN country team (HCT/ UNCT) meeting to define the collective outcomes, the humanitarian/resident coordinator (RC/HC) clearly stated that they should be used to focus the work of development stakeholders on the causes of humanitarian needs, in order to reduce the humanitarian caseload and funding requirements (Culbert, 2019).

⁹ See the ‘New Way of Working’ set up by the United Nations and the World Bank to deliver the nexus approach: World Humanitarian Summit, Commitment to Action, May 2016. See also OCHA, Collective Outcomes: Operationalizing the New Way of Working, April 2018.

¹⁰ The multi-year strategy provides the overarching framework for a humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria for three years from 2019 to 2021. Within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, the 2019 plan will focus on the needs of 6.2 million of the most vulnerable women, men, girls and boys.

¹¹ See: <https://www.unocha.org/chad>.

¹² See: <https://www.unocha.org/cameroon>

¹³ See: <https://www.unocha.org/niger>

¹⁴ See: <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-humanitarian-response-strategy-2019-2021-january-2019-december-2021-december>

¹⁵ See: <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/lake-chad-basin-emergency-revised-requirement-and-response-priorities-september-2018>

¹⁶ See: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>

¹⁷ Fabian Böckler is an expert for disaster risk management with Plan International, an independent development, and humanitarian organization that advances children's rights and equality for girls. E-mail: fabian.boeckler@plan-international.org

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An illustration depicting a conflict zone. In the foreground, a woman with a yellow headscarf and a purple top looks forward with a somber expression, holding a young child. The background shows a brown building with many windows, some of which are dark, suggesting destruction. Above the building, several blue helicopters are flying in a purple and orange sky. The overall style is flat and graphic.

Violent Extremism Perpetrated by Boko Haram in the Far North Region of Cameroon

**A GENDER CONFLICT ANALYSIS
SHOWCASING THE LIMITATIONS OF
HARD POWER**

 **CHARLES BONWEN LINJAP**
Investment Watch (I-Watch)

This study is an appraisal of the holistic effects of violent extremism on gender within the context of ongoing insurgencies perpetrated by Boko Haram (BH) militants on trans-border communities in the Far North (FN) region of Cameroon amidst other severely affected Lake Chad Basin (LCB) Countries despite the presence of an International Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF). The focus of our study is anchored on the inter-linkages with the triple nexus pillars (humanitarian,

Case Study:
Cameroon


peace and development) in alignment with the effective development cooperation principles (compliance with the national development agenda, focus on results, inclusive partnership, and accountability and transparency in processes) regarding conflict and fragility in the FN region of Cameroon. The outcome of the study is predicated based on data gathered from vital facts and data regarding gender issues generated by Boko Hart am insurgencies within affected communities in the FN region of Cameroon with significant consequences on Internally Displaced People (IDP) and Refugees from 2013 to present.

In a nutshell, our study conducted an in-depth review of the ongoing violent extremist insurgency perpetrated by BH militants using young girls, women and child soldiers as frontline attackers in

their desire to create an Islamic Caliphate within the LCB. The outcome of the study highlighted the fact that hard power is prioritized over soft power despite the existence of the Human Labor-Intensive Approach dubbed as the HIMMO model that has successfully created tens of thousands of jobs for the youth and women in affected communities as an alternative peace-building model in the LCB and Africa. Also worthy of acknowledgement are several DAC member countries (France, United States of America, Germany, United Kingdom, etc.) which provided support to the LCB countries through the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The content of this study is articulated around the following core segments:

- Background of the conflict;
- Impacts of the conflict on Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV);
- Analyses of development cooperation towards addressing SGBV, advancing



the military and security objectives of the LCB, and the triple nexus pillars; and

- Conclusion and recommendations.

Thus far, the BH conflict has significant impacts on the security, military, political, economic and social development of the Far North region with severe damages on both men and women. The interventions of the donor community, in partnership with the LCB countries, have developed some meaningful interest to address the root causes of the BH conflict through the HIMMO model. These could be replicated in likeminded war-affected communities in Africa as a long-term peace-building model.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

In March 2014, Cameroon witnessed the first frontal attack of the Boko Haram (BH), even as their presence in the country's Far North (FN) region was signaled as far back as 2009 (Heungoup, 2016). Moreover, starting in 2011, beyond seeking refuge in Cameroonian territory after launching attacks in Nigeria, members of BH regularly bought foodstuffs from different markets in the FN region.

They also infiltrated former youth networks involved in drug trafficking, smuggling of motorbikes, and trafficking of adulterated fuel in the region. The illegal trade in fuel is a big source of income for the youth, and the failure to provide alternative sources of gainful employment for them has further exacerbated the conflict. Five liters of fuel could fetch as far as USD 100 in revenue in BH territory (IWR 2019).

From July 2015 to March 2016, BH carried out more than 50 suicide attacks in Cameroon, using little girls and women as suicide bomb agents, which has killed more than 230 people and wounded 500 others.

To date, the BH insurgency has had adverse effects on the economy of the FN region which was already the poorest region in the country even before the war. It also led to the influx of 65,000 Nigerian refugees into Cameroon and caused the internal displacement of more than 241,000 people by 2019.

As the poorest region with the lowest literacy rate in the country, the Far North became a breeding ground for the recruitment, indoctrination and radicalization of the youth by Boko Haram. Cameroon's response against BH on the outset of the conflict prioritized hard power over the use of soft power to combat radicalization amongst the youth.

The BH conflict has morphed into sporadic attacks at the border communities between Cameroon and the easternmost region of Nigeria since 2019 to present. In 2019, the conflict in northeastern Nigeria and the Far North region of Cameroon entered its 11th year.

Cameroon is affected by four concurrent, complex humanitarian situations: Boko Haram violence in the FN region; growing humanitarian needs resulting from hostilities in English-speaking Cameroon regions (North West and South West) with spillover effects in the West and Littoral regions; consequences of the influx of refugees from the Central African Republic

into the eastern regions (Adamawa, North and East) and the Covid-19 outbreak affecting the entire country. Humanitarian needs are compounded by structural development deficits and chronic vulnerabilities that further challenge the long-term recovery of affected people.

Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency and the government's military response have killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions across the Lake Chad region, which straddles Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Although major military campaigns in 2015–2016 succeeded in reducing the group's territorial control, BH has proven remarkably adaptive in its tactics. The end of 2018 once again saw an uptick of attacks in Nigeria's Borno State and in the frontier village communities of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

The principal focus of this study is the consequences of the BH conflict on children, women, the aged, and the youth of Cameroon's FN region and their connection with the triple nexus pillars and the effectiveness of development cooperation.

In a nutshell, the BH insurgency against Lake Chad Basin countries is fundamentally driven by the lack of vital government social services and decent employment for the youth in the frontier communities of the four countries close to the North easternmost part of Nigeria, the epicenter of the armed conflict. Failure to integrate soft power measures—like ensuring basic social amenities such as education, health, vocational training, adequate food, potable water, paved roads and decent employment opportunities -- would mean

that the BH insurgency will continue for a long while, with spillover effects not only in the Lake Chad Basin but also in West Africa because of likely sporadic BH terrorist attacks in the coming years.

Talking of stabilization among the ranks of the affected countries today is more of a delusion rather than a genuine effort to resolve the root causes of the conflict. This would need more soft power measures over the excessive use of hard military power, which has been the situation for the past 11 years. The surging support granted by the international community towards excessive training of soldiers and investment in military hardware and ammunition has immensely contributed to the establishment of dictatorships in the affected countries. It also generated other pocket armed conflicts and the rapid proliferation of illicit weapons in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

The lukewarm attitude towards vigorously addressing the root causes of the BH conflict has contributed to the forced displacement of millions of people, including mostly refugees and tens of thousands of Internally Displaced People (IDPs), beyond the current capacity of humanitarian response. The present humanitarian assistance interventions in the Cameroon's FN region is highly focused on refugees at the Zamai-Minawao refugee camp with very little attention provided towards tens of thousands of IDPs created by the BH war. It is very likely that the BH is still recruiting most of the young boys and girls who are IDPs because they are severely affected by economic hardships. This is creating a permanent cycle of a protracted conflict with immense impact

on children, women, the aged and the youth in general.

IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT: SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (SGBV)

Contrary to common perception, girls and women have overwhelmingly comprised the majority of those facing security threats in BH-affected communities since 2014. While boys and men are more exposed to arbitrary arrests, forced recruitment and physical violence, girls and women are particularly vulnerable due to the combined effects of gender discrimination and socio-economic vulnerability caused by the crisis, which lead to specific threats against them, and gender-based violence in particular (OCHA, 2020).

The BH conflict has led to the following consequences for both men and women: loss of life, loss of relatives, displacement, abandonment or cessation of livelihood activities, dislocation of families, forced indoctrination of the Qur'an among BH hostages, and destruction of property. It is important to note that more than 240,000 IDPs since 2018 are living in host communities with very little resources to meet their daily subsistence needs (IWR, 2019). A vast majority of them also have never received any form of livelihood support from the humanitarian community.

The BH conflict has led to discrimination and stigmatization between affected communities and host communities where female IDPs from affected villages are treated as nasty, wicked and traitorous. Most of them are not even allowed to trade in market squares and to fetch potable

water for their children. It is worthy to mention that only female IDP returnees from affected communities are allowed to register with the Civil Administrator's Office as a precondition to resettle in a host community. On the other hand, male IDP returnees are confined in camps under military control with very limited interaction with their families and the wider public.

Concerning sex-related war crimes, the BH conflict has created several SGBV, including rape by the warring factions, humiliation through open group sex in BH prisons, forced and early marriages, enrolment of young girls and women as female suicide bombers extra-judicial killings of women, unwanted pregnancies, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs), pimping, prostitution, and denial of opportunities towards women, among others.

A vast majority of SGBV survivors are undocumented and they seldom report sex crimes (IWR, 2019). There are few psychosocial support services provided by the humanitarian community to fully cater to SGBV survivors and their victims. SGBV survivors often end up as single mothers of children whose fathers are gone without a trace. Most of the single mothers have meager livelihood support to provide daily subsistence to their children.

Young girls who are former BH hostages also testified about the fact that once their imposed husband dies on the war front, the BH immediately imposes new husbands on them. According to humanitarian workers, victims of sexualized violence are scared to report cases of SGBV

because they want to avoid confrontation with the perpetrators of the crime, and by inference, they prioritize livelihood support over legal assistance.

Amidst the delivery of humanitarian SGBV services, there are a wide variety of actors, both state and non-state, that are structured into a consultation thematic framework on SGBV issues at the regional and departmental levels under the coordination of the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs (MINPROFF). Thus far, existing programs for SGBV survivors are delivered but with very limited outreach towards host communities and affected trans-border communities. These programs include: integrated program services (psycho-social, medical, economic, and legal assistance, sexual and reproductive health services, etc.) and limited promotion of Income Generating Activities (IGA).

In terms of intervention gaps regarding SGBV issues, the following can be identified: weak coordination mechanism; limited training of civil society actors; insufficient financial resources to assist survivors; failure to provide provisional shelter for vulnerable IDPs like children and women; failure to take into account the real needs of IDPs; and high administrative charges to establish identity papers. The most common among other emerging issues affecting IDPs is the lack of birth certificates and of the National Identity Card which are vital basic requirements to establish Cameroonian nationality. This has created more Stateless IDPs than expected.

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION TOWARDS ADDRESSING SGBV, THE MILITARY-SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF THE LCB, AND TRIPLE NEXUS INTERVENTIONS

Since the onset of the BH conflict, the donor community has responded by providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to LCB countries on specific causes according to their respective interests. Thus far, existing reports on the BH conflict have little explored the amount of funding resources mobilized towards addressing specific causes with respect to: (a) countering SGBV; (b) advancing the military and security objectives; and (c) promoting the triple nexus pillars (humanitarian, peace and development).

Concerning the fight against SGBV, designated United Nations agencies (UN Women, UNFPA, UNICEF) alongside International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) like Plan International and Intersos, in partnership with local civil society entities and under the coordination of the United Nations Humanitarian Bureau (OCHA), are responsible for addressing SGBV issues in war-affected communities of the FN region (UN Women, 2019). In this regard, some DAC countries have provided minimal funding to address SGBV issues under the oversight of the Government of Cameroon (GoC).

Thus far, the donor community has granted more security and military assistance to the GoC compared to relatively modest funding resources granted towards addressing SGBV issues, peace-building, and the local development agenda of

affected communities. For instance, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), despite a steady increase in international assistance, the humanitarian response remains under-funded, lacks gender-sensitive assistance and is still hampered by insecurity. In 2016, donors provided only 53% of the USD 739 million needed that year. The cost of the humanitarian response plan for 2017 rose to USD 1.5 billion which was a reflection of the deterioration of the situation. While more funding is only part of the solution, donors need to adequately finance LCB countries upon implementing the triple nexus approach (ICG, 2017).

In addition, France and other DAC countries have deployed a huge logistics and military hardware arsenal to assist LCB countries in the fight against BH. The French contribution is structured through information sharing, military training, logistics assistance and supplies. The contingents of Operation Barkhane—5,100 French troops deployed in the whole Sahelian belt extending from Mauritania to Chad—provide regular assistance to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in conducting counterterrorist trans-border operations and strengthening the coordination of international military capabilities in the region. Aside from technical support, France also played an important role from a political point of view, facilitating the relations between Nigeria and the Francophone states involved in the common struggle against armed jihadist groups.

Within the framework of the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the United States of America has

Cameroon

THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN



A soldier belonging to the Emergence 4 Unit deployed at Poste de Mabass, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016.

Credits: CRISIS GROUP/
Hans De Marie Heungoup



Hans De Marie Heungoup with a displaced family from Fotokol in Kousseri, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016.

Credits: CRISIS GROUP/
Hans De Marie Heungoup

A child going to school at Minawao refugee camp. March 2016.

Credits: CRISIS GROUP/
Hans De Marie Heungoup



immensely provided both military and logistics assistance, including supplies of the MNJTF, through the deployment of drones from the Niger and Cameroon air bases. Thus far, the US has provided a total USD 363 million towards military assistance to the MJTF between 2015 and 2017 (Casola, 2020).

The situation is further aggravated by the lack of transparency and accountability in terms of the quality and quantity of military assistance granted to the GoC as military procurement transactions are forbidden from public contract-bidding processes and scrutiny as per the laws in force. It is alleged that some of the military hardware assistance and ammunitions granted to the GoC by superpowers like the US, Germany and Russia are currently diverted to suppress civilian uprisings in other parts of the country like in English-speaking Cameroon which is currently witnessing a war of separation with French-speaking Cameroon (IWR, 2019).

Aside from this, ongoing attempts to stabilize the LCB has received diversified support from DAC countries towards the MNJTF, the humanitarian, peace-building and development programs under the coordination of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) dubbed the Regional Stabilization Facility. The RSF is regularly supported by Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France and other DAC countries as a mechanism for the international community to deliver as one to avoid wasteful duplication of efforts and resources within the LCB (Amabo, 2020). This instrument is a regional cooperation mechanism between the LCB

and the African Union in seeking long-term stabilization for the region.

Additionally, the RSF mechanism has a civil-military cooperation dimension on both the local and the State level as a strategy to foster stabilization in the long run. The donors ensure that the programs are developed in alignment with the country's national development strategy and the humanitarian intervention plan. In Cameroon, the RSF programs are currently implemented in Amchide and Limani, and will soon be scaled up in the entire FN region. Thus far, Germany's support for RSF programs stands at EUR 40 million. In addition, other DAC members—Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and France—have equally invested millions of euros into the RSF but with very limited beneficial impacts on IDPs living in urban and urban hinterlands in Maroua, Mora, Mokolo and Kousseri.

Within the Framework of the RSF, the donor community has additionally provided funding for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which is currently engaged in fighting BH. Regarding support for the MNJTF, it has received thus far a sum of EUR 50 million in 2016 from the European Commission. This was meant to meet its logistical and material needs and to cover some of its human resources costs. These include land and air transport requirements; secured communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; equipment for the command headquarters and camps in the sectors of operations, and bonuses for the troops. Other donors include the UK, which has provided USD 3.5 million.

Prioritizing military assistance without addressing the root causes of the conflict and the failure to address the local development needs of the affected communities by the donors has only contributed to further protracting the conflict.

Thus far, the joint force has brought some dividends. Working together has enabled forces from different countries to learn from each other, promoted the idea of cross-border cooperation and improved tactical coordination. Short MNJTF offensives in 2017 and 2018, along with a more sustained operation in 2019, also reversed militant gains, freed captured or trapped civilians BH controlled areas, and facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid. To make the joint force a more effective part of efforts to tackle the region's jihadist insurgencies, Lake Chad countries should: build up its planning, coordination and intelligence sharing; in conjunction with the AU, step up human rights training and monitoring of abuses in order to improve MNJTF units' compliance with international humanitarian law and emerging AU standards on conduct and discipline; and enable the MNJTF to better support the AU's 2018 Regional Stabilization Strategy which aims to improve services and create new livelihoods in conflict-affected areas. To successfully stabilize LCB communities affected by the conflict, stabilization efforts should not only depend on hard power measures but also on whether states can improve living conditions to inspire more trust among residents of affected areas. LCB countries should boost development planning, communications capacity, intelligence sharing, human

rights compliance and civil-military coordination. They should also ensure that they reach a consensus with donors on financing key development programs in war-affected communities (OCHA Services, 2020).

Despite existing challenges to stabilize the affected communities of the LCB countries, it is worthy to underscore the necessity to replicate the best practice from the Human Labour-Intensive Approach dubbed as the HIMMO model, which is gender-sensitive and has provided tens of thousands of gainful employments to the youth and women as long-term peace-building and development agenda for IDPs in the FN region of Cameroon. Thus far, modest attempts have been made by DAC countries in partnership with the GoC to create gainful job opportunities for both young girls and boys in war-affected communities in collaboration with Local Municipal Councils through the HIMMO model.

For instance, the French Development Cooperation Agency (AFD) in collaboration with the European Union (EU) has been working alongside the GoC since 2015 to allow populations to rebuild their communities and to return to employment. This project, which is also supported by the European Union via its Emergency Trust Fund, has offered 3,500 young adults jobs in municipalities affected by the BH conflict (AFD, n.d.).

According to the GoC's latest survey, three in four inhabitants earn less than Franc CFA 1,000 a day (EUR 1.5) in the FN region. This project approach involved mobilizing marginalized populations – youth and

women – in projects for basic amenities (well drilling, building rural roads) in their communities. A third of their salary is directly paid to a savings account opened with a microfinance institution, which allows them to rebuild part of the capital they lost during the BH crisis. At the same time, support is also being provided by CARE International, which is working with young people and women in order to help them develop an integration project which will turn their savings into a more sustainable activity once the project is completed. The GoC and the AFD have obtained additional financing from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund to continue these dynamics. This agreement now allows the HIMMO model to be extended to 20 new community projects.

Even better, the HIMMO model can be replicated in the LCB countries as a long-term stabilization agenda to pacify the region. The HIMMO model ensures that young girls and boys can access decent

Agence Française de Développement and European Union Project

Young boys and girls working on a project funded by the Agence Française de Développement and the EU.



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Image 2. Agence Française de Développement and the EU.

Source: Agence Française de Développement. Retrieved 2021 from <https://www.afd.fr/en/carte-des-projets/contributing-creating-job-opportunities-youth-and-economic-recovery-far-north-region>

jobs to provide for their daily subsistence needs and in return deter them from illicit trade and enrolment as BH agents. If properly replicated, the HIMMO model will reduce dependence on humanitarian support.

In addition, the donor community has made significant contributions towards assisting refugees and IDPs in the FN region even, though much is desired by the IDPs in terms of accessing adequate affordable shelter and fertile farmland for their livelihood support. The donor community and some International NGOs are currently developing a community mediation program with a special focus on training female mediators to participate in the resolution of conflicts as required by United Nations Resolution 1325 (UN Women, 2019). Building long-term peace in the region requires involving women and young people in all community-driven, peace-building initiatives as highlighted by ongoing second chance education opportunity and mediation training provided by the UN Women and local civil society actors as midterm and long-term strategy to pacify the BH conflict-affected communities.

Addressing the root causes of the conflict such as rampant youth unemployment, feminized poverty and limited access to vital social amenities will require that LBC countries and the donor community including civil society, should mobilize additional funding resources towards addressing the development needs of the war-affected communities.

Despite success stories we gathered from the HIMMO model, it is worthy to highlight

the fact that development cooperation financing in Africa is still confronted by several challenges as outlined thus:

The majority of donor finance continues to be fragmented, and is provided as project aid, not budget support. This situation breeds a climate of lack of transparency and accountability. If funding remains off-budget, it reduces the potential for regional organizations, their member-states, and stakeholders to know what goes into the budget and who is funding what. This reduces the potential of member-states to assess to what extent the budget finances policy priorities.

The amount and timing of the contributions by member-states to the budget of the African Union and Regional Economic Commissions are not reliable.

Due to earmarking and project-focused funding, donor preferences become more central to the agenda of regional organizations. In combination with donor conditionality, this can create incentives for regional organizations to signal regional reforms, rather than strengthen core functions.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The BH conflict had significant impacts on the security, military, political, economic and social development of the Far North of Cameroon region with a severe damage on all genders—most especially on

women, girls and children. Resolving the root causes of the conflict will require additional funding resources from donor countries to LCB countries in order to address unemployment and lack of basic social services in affected communities. Prioritizing soft power measures over militarist or hard measures will quickly accelerate the pathway towards stability and prosperity in LCB countries.

The interventions of the donor community in partnership with LCB countries have developed some meaningful interest to address the root causes of the BH conflict. One of the means is the HIMMO model, which could be replicated in similar war-affected communities in Africa as a long-term peace-building model.

Addressing the economic malaise and hardship of war-affected communities through soft power measures over excessive militarization will gradually create more decent jobs for girls, boys and women with roll back effects on BH enrollment of the youth and women, and also in the reduction of illicit trade in fuel, drugs, arms and food. Efforts should equally be made towards engaging the youth and women in community mediation processes with their local leaders as a long-term solution in defusing the BH conflict.

Upon consideration of the aforementioned issues, we are strongly making the following recommendations towards key stakeholders:

01 To the Government of Cameroon (GoC) and LCB countries

Integrate the gender-sensitive HIMMO model into national and local plans and budgets as a long-term strategy to pacify the affected communities in order to reduce dependence on humanitarian support and illicit trade with BH.

Provide resettlement assistance (shelter and farmland) towards IDPs severely affected by the BH conflict.

Strengthen regional and local coordination to effectively address SGBV humanitarian issues for the benefit of SGBV survivors.

02 To SGBV Stakeholders

Mobilize additional funding resources to address SGBV issues in the FN region of Cameroon and LCB countries as a whole.

Ensure that livelihood support is granted towards SGBV survivors living in BH-affected communities.

Strengthen the second chance education program for SGBV survivors as basic functional and life skills.

03 To Donors

Step up funding resources towards the HIMMO model to address issues of gender disparity in jobs and participation in local governance processes.

Strengthen transparency and knowledge-sharing regarding funded projects in the Far North region using the open budget data model.


Ensure funded projects are integrated into the Short-Term Budget Framework (STBF) and the Short-Term Expenditure Framework (STEF) of the Lake Chad Basin Countries National Budgets to encourage greater transparency and accountability with citizens and relevant state institutions.

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Cyclones, Humanitarian Response and Conflict in Mozambique

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The Triple Nexus discourse calls attention to the significant and still-increasing amount of international aid that is allotted for humanitarian actions. In this context, the Triple Nexus discourse must highlight development actions primarily and peace actions secondarily—this approach emphasizes the need to address the root causes of conflicts so that international aid may be utilized towards the achievement of more long-term and sustainable humanitarian goals.

This paper discusses a conflict involving the government of Mozambique and a terrorist organization, Al-Shababa.

Here, addressing the root causes of the armed conflict would mean development actions, but also significant peace, if not security, actions—especially coming from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the organization of 16 countries in the region. This paper makes the case that addressing the root causes of the armed conflict will make it easier for humanitarian actions to be performed in the future, when it is projected that the need for such actions will increase because of climate change and its consequences.

AL SHABABA, IDAI, KENNETH IN MOZAMBIQUE

The conflict between the government of Mozambique and the armed radical Islamic Al Shababa, which has been designated as a terrorist organization since 2017, has made humanitarian response more difficult particularly in the aftermath of Cyclones Kenneth and Idai which hit the country in 2019.

For many years, Mozambique has been marred with conflict between the government party Frelimo and the opposition party Renamo. The country gained independence from Portugal in 1975, followed by fierce civil war between Frelimo and Renamo between 1977 and 1992. The civil war contributed to the loss of nearly one million lives and the displacement of five million people. The opposition party Renamo is demanding a free and fair elections, citing limited development and exclusion from political processes in most parts of the country.

In 1992, the two parties signed a peace-pact in Rome which led to a democratic

transition. As noted by the Africa Development Bank, Mozambique became one of the fastest growing economies from 2004 to 2015 with an 8% growth rate per annum (2019). As noted however by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, the conflict between the two parties resurfaced in 2013 (2020).

In 2016–2017, the conflict was no longer between the government and the opposition parties. It was already between the government and the radical Islamic militia group that emerged in Northern Mozambique—the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammaa (ASWJ), which translates to People of Sunnah Community and also referred to as Ansar al-Sunna or Al-Shababa in the local context. The situation in Mozambique became more complicated as the government is faced with resolving the conflict with the opposition and dealing with terrorism. The gains of the Frelimo-Renamo peace accords have also been eroded as the country currently has one of the lowest Human Development Index of 0.437 with half of its 29.5 million population now living in poverty, with high rates of illiteracy and youth unemployment.

Al Shababa is internationally known as Al Shabaab, which means youth, even as it does not have connections with the Al Shabaab in Somalia, which has also been designated as a terrorist organization. Its base of operations, Cabo Delgado, is rich in natural gas reserves (Giles and Mwai, 2021).

In a March 2021 report, Amnesty International claims that the group's "abuses have been horrific. The group's fighters deliberately kill civilians, burn

villages and towns, and commit heinous acts of violence with their machetes with such regularity that residents use two separate words, 'beheaded' and 'chopped,' to differentiate between the methods of murder; the first is a beheading, the second a quartering, as one would cut apart an animal being butchered." The group has abducted girls to become wives for fighters, and boys to become fighters (Amnesty International, 2021, p. 5).

The attacks launched by the group has increased since 2017: from three in 2017, the attacks became 19 in 2018, 34 in 2019 -- and 570 in 2020. As of August 2020, estimates place the number of deaths at 1,842. Almost 670,000 people, meanwhile, were internally displaced by the end of 2020. The increase in the number of attacks raises the possibility of external funding, possibly connected with the Islamic State (Azikiwe, 2020; Giles and Mwai, 2021).

Commentators critical of the label "terrorist" point out the social and economic factors behind the rise of the armed group: unemployment and abject poverty among the locals, despite the immense wealth generated from the gas reserves in their area, as well as the wealth of the country's elite. There has historically been underinvestment in the predominantly Muslim region, even as not all insurgents are Muslim (Hanlon, 2021; Clamp, 2021).

The alienation of the country's marginalized and disenfranchised youth is an incubator for violence. Almost 45% of the Mozambican population is under 15 years old, while one-third of the total

population is aged between 15-35 years old. Mozambican youth living in rural areas are increasingly alienated from their own cultural roots and traditions, while exposed to trends and images emanating from other parts of the world, dangling the prospects of a better future. This causes profound frustration and increases their sense of marginalization and powerlessness leading them to resort to violence and organized crime.

In the Niassa reserve and the Limpopo National Park, young people driven by hunger and lack of money earn their livelihood by engaging in illicit cross-border trade of rhino horns. The urban youth are also inclined to engage in violence against the state, which they hold responsible for their social and economic distress.

In March-April 2019, Mozambique was hit by Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, which packed gusty winds ranging from 180 to 220 kilometers per hour, accompanied by heavy rainfall. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the cyclones caused 648 deaths and 163,927 displacements. Over 2.2 million people needed humanitarian assistance, particularly in the northern and central provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambézia, Inhambane, Cabo Delgado and Nampula.

The cyclones and floods were the most devastating disasters in recent history in terms of human and physical impact, as well as its geographic extent. A total of 64 districts and 19 counties were directly affected, while almost the entire country

suffered from adverse socio-economic effects. The disaster interrupted the delivery of basic services such as water and electricity, damaged roads and bridges that are essential for commercial activity, and destroyed houses, shops and other buildings.

The country needed about USD 282 million to respond to the disaster. The SADC mobilized resources through its various instruments, and a call for donations was issued. SADC also invited other humanitarian actors to come and help the countries affected, including Zimbabwe and Malawi. SADC's appeal was based on the humanitarian requirement of USD 323 million, targeting 2.802 million people in need of shelter, food, clothing, potable water, medication. The coordination for the disaster remained weak. Despite being informed of its early warning systems, the SADC does not have resources at its disposal and resorted to launching an appeal for funding. While the SADC

Five highest funding contributors to the 2019 Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)




Table 1. Five highest funding contributors to the 2019 Mozambique HRP.
Source: Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group (July 2020)



has enough mechanisms to intervene, it lacks capacities and adequate funding to implement these mechanisms.

Significant humanitarian support was gathered to help the victims of cyclones Kenneth and Idai in Mozambique. Humanitarian action in the worst affected areas, however, was made more difficult by the on-going conflict in the area. Areas such as Cabo Delgado were difficult to access due to the militia groups' control. In these areas, people had limited information on the disasters or the advent of disasters such as cyclones, making preparations impossible and casualties high. Humanitarian aid by development partners such as Action Aid, Oxfam, and Plan International has difficulties in reaching those areas due to the armed conflict.

The negative impact of climate change is now a growing reality for Mozambique. The country is frequently ravaged by natural disasters generated by hydro-meteorological, geophysical or biological processes, or a combination thereof. These include cyclones, floods or drought, landslides, earthquakes, storms and epidemics. These facts must be considered in preparing for the country's future.

SADC'S RISDP AND SIPO

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has two instruments available to help Mozambique address the root causes of the armed conflict: the Regional Strategic Indicative Development Plan (RISDP), and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defense, Politics and Security (SIPO). This paper will focus on

evaluating these instruments in relation to Mozambique.

The SADC was founded by member states in 1992 to achieve economic development, peace and security, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through Regional Integration (SADC, 1992).

The RISDP falls under the development pillar while SIPO is under the peace pillar of the Triple Nexus. These are the SADC's two primary strategies when working with member states in making humanitarian, peace and development actions. There are protocols and mechanisms which were put in place on issues such as climate change, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and development. There are also climate adaptation programs under the two strategies.

The RISDP is a comprehensive development and implementation framework guiding the Regional Integration agenda of SADC. Its first implementation was from 2005 to 2020 and has been reviewed to focus on 2030 as a supporting mechanism to achieve the new SADC vision 2050. It is designed to provide a clear strategic direction concerning SADC programs, projects, and activities in line with the SADC Common Agenda and strategic priorities, as enshrined in the SADC Treaty of 1992.

The goal is to ensure holistic integration in the region, eradicate poverty through sustainable development in a peaceful environment and attain other economic and non-economic goals. It has 12 thematic

areas with detailed milestones and target outputs.

Meanwhile, the core objective of SIPO is to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will realize its objectives of socio-economic development, poverty eradication, and regional integration. It guides the implementation framework for the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (1999). This Protocol is based on the over-arching objectives and Common Agenda of SADC as stated in the SADC Treaty and is directly linked with the RISDP.

As noted by Ibrahim, by coming up with the SIPO, the regional bloc knew quite well that an enabling environment characterized by peace is the panacea for regional integration and development (2015). The SIPO is implemented through five key areas: (1) the Political Sector: national government and state/foreign affairs, (2) Defense Sector: military matters, responsible for peace, stability, and security, (3) State Security Sector: intelligence, concerned with threats against governments and Member States, (4) Public Security Sector: protection of civil society, including emergency management, justice, immigration, and organized crime, and (5) Police Sector: law enforcement agencies responsible for transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking, unlawful possession of firearms, and stock and property theft (SADC, n.d.).

The SIPO through the support of its Organ for Politics, Defense and Security has extended to elections mainly setting

guidelines for member states for free and fair elections, election observing and setting up SADC Election Advisory Council. SIPO has a directory on the Organ, for Politics, Defense and Security, which has played a major role in DRC, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

The RISDP and SIPO are mainly supported by resources mobilized from development cooperation, as external development finance and foreign donor agencies have played a critical role in the evolution of SADC. Since 2005 up to 2020, foreign donors have provided more than 60% of SADC's current budget. From 2014 to 2015, 79% of the budget was from foreign donors, and from 2015 to 2020, SADC

received 70% of support from foreign aid (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).


In SADC terminology, countries and agencies are considered as donors or International Cooperating Partners (ICPs). They include bilateral agencies or countries and multilateral institutions. Among these bilateral agencies and countries are England, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the USA. Meanwhile, included as multilateral institutions are the European Commission and the World Bank with additional funding being provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UNDP and other UN agencies and the South

Commitments to SADC (not actual disbursements) at the early stages of SIPO and RISDP in 2019

	TIFI	FANR	SHD	INFRA STRUCTURE	SECRE TARIAT	OTHER	TOTAL
Belgium		1.6	34.4				5.0
Canada	6.9				0.3		7.2
Denmark				6.7		35.4	42.1
EC	21.1	39.5	19.6	9.3	15.6	1.9	107
Finland		3		1.4	0.2	3.9	8.5
France		3.2		1.2	4.5	1.5	6.1
Germany	3.6	13.1	1.8	4.4		1.0	28.4
Norway		6.5			4.5	34.4	40.9
Sweden		3.7				39.0	42.7
United Kingdom	48.3	7.5	26.9		7.5	57.1	147.4
Total	79.1	78.1	51	23.0	28.1	174.0	435

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Table 2. Commitments to SADC at the early stages of SIPO and RISDP in 2019s.
Source: FORPRISA Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (December 2020)



African financial institutions such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). There has been an emergence of non-traditional donors from Asia (especially China, but also countries like India and Malaysia).

The SADC, through the Windhoek Declaration of 2006, has received financial and technical support on development cooperation from several development partners and countries such as GIZ, UNDP, World Bank, European Commission, Africa Development Bank, Canada, USA, Norway, Finland, France, Denmark, Sweden, UK, and the private sector, among others.

As noted by Council Records 2011-2012, the expected budget from development partners was USD 51.47 million. However, the actual funding was USD 24.71 million out of the total projected budget of USD 83.52 million. Looking at the SADC support from various development partners from 2015 to 2020, it is projected to be more than USD 500 million. The financing mechanism for programs include: ODA (0.24 of industrial GDP on RISDP); Domestic Savings, Debt Relief; Public Finance; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Development Finance; Portfolio Investment; and other mechanisms such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

The RISDP and SIPO not only assist Mozambique in development projects, but also during elections. Mozambique is hosting elections every five years, and SADC has been instrumental in both monitoring, observation and mediation in times of dispute. SIPO provides a clear mechanism for the intervention of

different SADC departments on peace and security.

In 2013, Renamo and Frelimo signed a peace deal. In 2014, Mozambique held the elections which were monitored and observed by SADC. After President Felipe Nyusi of Frelimo won with a majority in the National Assembly, the Renamo disputed the elections citing electoral fraud and irregularities. In August 2018, Frelimo and Renamo signed another peace deal paving the way for elections in October 2019. The agreement between President Nyusi and opposition leader Alfonso Dhlakama hit the wall following the death of Dhlakama. The October 2019 electoral process saw President Nyusi re-elected. Renamo rejected the elections, which further escalated the conflict in the country.

When it comes to the recent terrorist attacks, however, the SADC is taking a meeting approach instead of an action-oriented approach to deal with the root causes of conflicts. Given the intensification of the conflict, there is a need for mediation to also allow the flow of humanitarian aid to the affected areas.

EVALUATING RISDP AND SIPO

The SADC has been pro-active in peace and security issues. Whenever a conflict arises in a member country, the region is quick to activate its structures as provided in RISDP and SIPO such as the Extra-Ordinary Summit, the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security, and the SADC Troika, among others. On a theoretical level, the SADC has the necessary regional and national structures and instruments

to respond. However, there is a need for political will to support its programs.

Many challenges hinder the attainment of SADC-directed programs on peace, security, and development: the lack of democratic governance in some SADC member states, rampant corruption, protectionism that excludes effective participation of CSOs (especially in rural communities that hinder humanitarian support), restricted participation of citizens, and peace interventions. The rise of insurgency, terrorism, and rebel groups, such as in Mozambique's Cabo region and DRC's eastern region, are causes of concern. Meanwhile, political deficits in Zimbabwe since the new millennium and the increase in unemployment caused irregular migration to other SADC countries.

SIPO and RISDP have limited funding. Most of the funds provided by donors and contributed by SADC member states to operationalize the strategies are not covering the needs. The lack of citizens' participation in policies and programs in the region is another hindrance in achieving development, peace, and security.

Some of the programs supported in the region under the RISDP are the regional integration process, free trade, and support for development of infrastructure, education, science and technology, among others. One practical step undertaken since 2005 is the removal of visas in most SADC countries to allow free movement of people and goods to support trade and human development.

The following are some of the successes of the RISDP:

- 01** Establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2018 that has managed to improve intra-SADC trade. The FTA allows traders and investors to enjoy tariff-free trade in an integrated market of 16 SADC Member States, with a combined GDP of USD 720 billion and a population of 340 million,
- 02** Progress in developing the Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap and in market integration,
- 03** Partnering with other countries on programs and increased foreign direct investment, and
- 04** Supporting the development of infrastructure in the region.

Meanwhile, some of the challenges faced by RISDP include:

- 01** Lack of enhanced competitiveness and productive capacities to utilize the free market which has been established,
- 02** Lack of adequate financial support from the Member States to support SADC Programs,
- 03** Lack of tangible projects being implemented by member states to realize the strategic objectives,
- 04** Inadequate infrastructure and low funding for regional development projects,

- 05** Limited resources to support humanitarian emergencies such as climate emergencies, among others; SADC mostly rely on sourced aid,
- 06** Emerging xenophobia in South Africa, a threat to regional integration and free trade,
- 07** Lack of a clear framework to include CSOs in the development agenda of SADC, and
- 08** Lack of a mechanism and protocol to support youth development in the region such as the SADC Youth Protocol.

When it comes to the SIPO, the SADC has “put in place mechanisms of conflict management and resolution, which have enabled the region to intervene and support the SADC member states,” said SADC Executive Secretary Dr. Stergomena Tax (2020). Among the countries that have benefitted from these mechanisms are the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe. The region hosted an extraordinary meeting in 2020 to offer regional support to Mozambique amidst problems in the Cabo Delgado province.

The success of SIPO can also be seen in the continued solidarity among member states through the establishment of SADC Peace Missions and Regional Training Center for both security and non-security personnel. There has been remarkable and tangible progress observed in the spheres of political governance, election observation, and the establishment of the

SADC Electoral Advisory Council under SIPO.

The challenges for SIPO are similar to RISDP: limited resources to support programs and peacekeeping missions, resistance by member states to follow democratic principles (especially during elections), and new threats of terrorism. Thus, SIPO needs to be reviewed to meet these emerging challenges.

However, SIPO's institutional mechanisms have been helpful in responding to peace, security and development issues including: the Organ for Defense, Peace and Security, SADC Troika, Regional Peacekeeping Training Center, SADC Police, SADC Standby Force, and SADC Electoral Observation Mission.

The SADC Troika, another instrument under SIPO, recommended addressing the acts of terrorism in the Cabo region. At the same time, SADC's regional response on paper addresses some pillars of the Triple Nexus by formulating a regional response for peace and security and responding to humanitarian and development needs of the affected province.

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November 2020 to discuss Mozambique, among other conflicts in the region. The SADC Troika in May 2020 met and deliberated the need to counter terrorist attacks in northern Mozambique. It called for the government of Mozambique to give constant updates on developments in the region affected by conflict. Since then, nothing concrete has happened. In 2021, the President of Botswana has

been meeting countries under the SADC Troika to brief them on the situation in Mozambique, as the militant group has killed more than 200,000 people in 2021. The SADC Troika is set to meet again to come up with concrete measures.

During the October 2019 Mozambique elections, the militants continued their attacks in northern Mozambique. Apart from statements, there was no concrete action by the SADC to counter the tensions among Frelimo, Renamo and militant groups. The SADC has so far engaged in silent diplomacy, refusing to make a stand on elections and good governance. The region mostly treats the conflict between Frelimo and Renamo as an internal matter and the concept of liberation-solidarity between Frelimo and ruling parties in SADC countries slows down practical SADC intervention in Mozambique.

The SADC, apart from having frameworks on paper, does not have a standing army to assist militarily as compared to the East Africa region. In the past, individual countries have deployed their armies to deal with security threats. The East African Community has also not been involved in the Mozambique conflict even as Tanzania and Malawi, which are part of East African communities, are neighbors to Mozambique. The African Union and other relevant international players have also not been involved.

CONFLICT'S EFFECTS ON HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS

More than one year after Cyclone Idai's landfall in April 2019, the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado has deteriorated

due to consecutive climatic shocks, public health emergencies such as COVID-19 and cholera, and growing insecurity. These led to significant displacement, disruption of livelihoods and lack of access to basic services such as health, clean water, sanitation and protection services.

These issues, once localized to Cabo Delgado, have spread to the neighboring provinces of Niassa and Nampula as more people are displaced and forced to move farther to ensure their security. Internal displacement by either violence or environmental disaster forced 530,000 people from their homes across Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa.

In the Ibo district, for instance, there are now more Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) than host community members. In Pemba city, more than 100,000 displaced people have arrived over the past year, on top of its original population of around 224,000. It is important to note that 10% of displaced people are staying in collective sites which lack privacy, are overcrowded, and have limited access to safe shelter, water and sanitation. This is contributing to protection risks, including gender-based violence, rising number of child and teen pregnancies, and increased exposure to exploitation and negative coping mechanisms including transactional sex.

At the same time, attacks by non-state armed groups expanded geographically and increased in intensity in 2020. These attacks significantly heightened the protection risks, especially for women and girls, people with disabilities, older persons and people living with HIV/AIDS. Reports of violations against civilians, including killings, beheadings and kidnappings also increased in 2020.

Insecurity has damaged 36% of health facilities across Cabo Delgado and there are no functional health facilities in the districts hardest-hit by conflict (i.e., Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Muidumbe and Quissanga). This has reduced capacity to detect and respond to disease outbreaks including cholera, measles and COVID-19. It also reduced the capacity to provide critical care, such as sexual and reproductive healthcare, immunization activities, and access to anti-retroviral (ARVs) and treatment for tuberculosis (TB).

As a result of the conflict, an estimated 176,000 people have lost access to their primary water source due to disruption of services from centralized water supply networks. Lack of access to safe water and hygiene facilities is a major concern and also heightens the risk of disease outbreaks. About 45% of health facilities in Cabo Delgado lack access to water while 85% of schools lack adequate hygiene facilities. Further to this, food insecurity is also rising as conflict and repeated displacement, compounded by climatic shocks, has disrupted communities' agricultural activities and livelihoods.

Insecurity, climate shocks and administrative challenges are having adverse impacts on the delivery of urgent humanitarian response to ensure protection and livelihood support. Conflict-related violence has intensified. The rapidly evolving conflict dynamics call for robust approaches to secure humanitarian access, as it has become more challenging to reach affected populations in some districts.

In May 2021, access by humanitarian organizations to Palma remained constrained, while access to the rest of Cabo Delgado was mostly unchanged. At least 25 security incidents were recorded during the month of May across the province, mostly in Palma, Nangade and Macomia districts. Meanwhile, there were at least three incidents of humanitarians being denied access to visit areas in Palma District by government security forces.

Humanitarians were also not able to travel north from Pemba by sea, given the continued ban on maritime movements imposed by the government. As a result, they were unable to visit areas outside of the Afungi perimeter during the month. In addition, according to an OCHS report (March, 2021) delays in the issuance of visas remained a major challenge for humanitarian organizations responding to the Cabo Delgado crisis, with 70 visas still pending at the end of March 2021.

Further exacerbating the crisis are restrictions imposed by security forces that are limiting efforts to reach people in need. Many humanitarian actors have pulled out of smaller towns in Cabo Delgado due to the rising insecurity. They are instead focusing their activities in major population centers that are receiving growing numbers of IDPs. Meanwhile, humanitarians' ability to reach vulnerable populations are further constrained by both poor road infrastructures due the extensive damage of road networks by climatic shocks and the Mozambique authorities' restrictions on movement along some routes (ACAPS, 2020). The conflict has exposed women and children to greater risks of exploitation and abuse,

including sexual violence and forced recruitment (OCHA, 2021).

Because of these limitations to humanitarian actions, best practices undertaken in other areas were not brought to those in need in Al Shababa-controlled areas. Some of these practices include: (1) using the recovery process to implement development plans, (2) greater women participation, as humanitarian actors promoted women's participation in local forums and asserted women's rights to own lands, and (3) integration of disaster risk management activities in humanitarian assistance, as practiced by CARE Mozambique.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While helpful in addressing and managing the Frelimo-Renamo conflict, the SADC, through the RISDP and SIPO, has yet to become decisive in seeking to address the Mozambican government's conflict with the armed radical Islamic group Al Shababa.

This response gap has been disastrous in terms of the lives lost and displaced in affected areas, disruptions in development plans, and commitments to the fight against climate change and its effects. It has also been disastrous in relation to the effects of Cyclones Kenneth and Idai, when they made a landfall in 2019 and thereafter.

The cyclones affected Al Shababa-controlled areas disproportionately harsher, and humanitarian response to the disaster found a hard time reaching

the populations most in need because of the conflict.

Despite this complex crisis, it is commonly argued that national planning and coordination, combined with international humanitarian response and development cooperation, has made possible a forward-looking recovery that lays the foundation for long-term development (Wiles, Selvester & Fidalgo, 2005). This is in contrast with Sudan and Somalia, where the World Food Programme reported a complex drought/civil war situation that has necessitated a narrow focus on humanitarian food distribution with little linkage to development and conflict transformation (2004/2006).

It is therefore necessary for the SADC, through the RISDP and the SIPO, to address the conflict presented by the emergence of Al Shababa in Mozambique. There is a need for both peace-security actions under the SIPO and development actions under the RISDP.

In order to restore peace and stability in Cabo Delgado, and for its resource wealth to benefit the people of the region, there is a need for the adoption of a comprehensive strategic approach that addresses the root causes of the crisis. This approach imbues the Triple Nexus elements and, in the context of Mozambique can include the following priorities:

01 RESTORE SECURITY. The government must prioritize the restoration of security in Cabo Delgado. There can be no development while there is an on-going civil war and a strife which threatens any effort at development.

02 ENSURE TRAINING. The Mozambican armed forces require proper counterinsurgency training and logistical support to deal with local insurgent groups. Development Cooperation in this area is ongoing with the United States having provided such kind of support, while the European Union considers assisting on the same.

03 PROMOTE PEOPLE-CENTERED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION AND THE COUNTRY. Poverty, landlessness and joblessness are the root causes that push the Mozambican youth to join terrorist groups.

04 ADDRESS THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS. This should be another top priority, as the impacts of the crisis are feeding the insurgency, creating a vicious and self-perpetuating cycle. In a communique circulated in May 2021, the G7 ministers urged the Mozambican government to “continue to work with the international community to resolve the humanitarian impact of the insurgency and to tackle the root causes and drivers of conflict and instability, and to prevent a further escalation of violence.”

Other recommendations, especially in relation to the Triple Nexus, are the following:

01 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SADC COMMON AGENDA. This should emphasize promotion, consolidation, and maintenance of democracy, peace and security, and promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth to eradicate poverty in the region. Development and implementation of people-centered policies (pro-poor strategies) in SADC member states in line with SADC Vision 2050 and reviewed SIPO and RISDP 2020-2030.

02 SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT IN YOUNG PEOPLE, WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITY. This can be achieved through creation of decent jobs and effective participation in developmental processes and inclusion of CSOs, and citizens in peace-building and policy-making processes.

03 ADDRESSING SADC DONOR DEPENDENCE SYNDROME. Most donors manipulate policy and economic decisions because of their investments in the region, which then compromise the sovereignty and independence of the states. This, even as international support is called upon in taking security actions in the present conflict.

04 STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY FOR SADC MEDIATION, CONFLICT PREVENTION, RESOLUTION. The focus must be on addressing the security challenges in Mozambique and DRC and allowing unhindered humanitarian flow. Increased use of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms, Peace Support Operations, Peacekeeping (SADC Army), Peacebuilding, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Efforts.

05 INCREASED POLITICAL WILL FROM KEY STAKEHOLDERS. There must be greater efforts by the government at its various levels and aptitude for cooperation from various development actors to utilize the triple nexus approach in structuring interventions within Mozambique in response to the worsening humanitarian situation.

06 GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF CSOs. To implement the Triple Nexus, the role of civil society must be clear and platforms for genuine and open engagement of civil society in discussions on the implementation of the nexus must be created. For instance, there is absence of a formalized seat for civil society at the UN Country Team (UNCT), unlike at the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

07 KNOWLEDGE GENERATION ON THE EFFICACY OF THE TRIPLE NEXUS APPROACH. This is especially crucial in dealing with the humanitarian situation in Mozambique. There is scant information and analysis on this, yet given the country's fragility and vulnerability, research could proffer lasting solutions to the people.

08 ENHANCED EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS. There is a need for an SADC Protocol on Disaster and Risk Management as guided by SIPO. Scale up capacity building of communities and governments on climate issues, and ensure access to information, effective management of natural resources, management of conflict, and the human rights-based approach to good governance.

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
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Development Cooperation Projects to Improve Education Access and Quality in Afghanistan



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Afghanistan is in the midst of a protracted conflict and state of fragility. The Taliban has intensified its attacks on national security forces and its bombings against the civilian community, even as peace talks between it and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have started in September 2020.

Security is deteriorating, especially in Kabul, the capital of the country. While the USA has massively decreased the number of its troops, the conflict is escalating and the number of civilian casualties remains high, exceeding 10,000 each year since 2014. Based on the records of the United

Case Study:
Afghanistan

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the country's civilian casualties totaled 10,392. Meanwhile, internally displaced persons increased from 369,700 in 2018 to 462,803 in 2019.

Despite the return of 505,000 refugees, mainly from Iran and Pakistan, in 2019, the country's worrying situation characterized by high unemployment rate, increasing life expectancy, and low revenue shows a bleak future for the returnees.

Despite the peace talks, people have been living in fear, without a glimpse of hope that peace may eventually come. President Ashraf Ghani is the first president of the country with a world-class education and the experience of living in the modern world. His government, however, failed to attract the people's trust, and the majority

of the people continue to live in poverty. The Covid-19 pandemic has worsened the situation, and the country's gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen (see Table 1).

After decades of relative stability, a long period of conflict in Afghanistan started when president Daud Khan was overthrown in 1978. Soviet Union forces' subsequent invasion in 1979 resulted in a nine-year guerrilla war among insurgent groups, Soviet forces, and the mujahedeen that killed more than 870,000 Afghans, wounded 3 million others, displaced a million internally, and forced more than five million to flee the country. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the mujahedeen started fighting against one another, which led to a civil war and civilians being subjected to violence, robbery, imprisonment, and rape. The

Gross Domestic Product

● Estimated data

Main Indicators	2018	2019	2020*	2021*	2022*
GDP <i>billions USD</i>	18.40	18.88	19.01	19.69	20.83
GDP <i>constant prices, Annual % change</i>	1.2	3.9*	-5.0	4.0	4.5
GDP per capita <i>USD</i>	506	507*	499	506	523
General Government Gross Debt <i>in % of GDP</i>	7.4	6.1	7.8	8.9	9.4
Inflation Rate <i>%</i>	0.6	2.3	5.4	4.8	4.3
Current Account <i>billions USD</i>	2.24	2.21	1.80	1.53	1.65
Current Account <i>in % of GDP</i>	12.2	11.7*	9.5	7.8	7.9

Aa

Table 1. Gross Domestic Product.

Source: IMF – World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020

schools closed due to the conflict and people remained uneducated in many parts of the country.

The Taliban came out of the chaos, and civil war quickly covered the country. Their repressive policies led to poverty, human rights abuses, ethnic persecution, murder, internal displacement, and migration to neighboring countries. After the Taliban fell, many Afghans were hopeful that violence would end. However, the country became more unstable, security deteriorated, and now the violence is at the highest level. Though there has been tangible progress in certain areas, most people still live below the poverty line.

Based on the research of Creative Associates International, the following are the causes and factors that play important roles in creating and sustaining the conflict in the country: (1) continued threats to religion and dignity, (2) ethnic repression and political exclusion, (3) incompetent and illegitimate government, (4) history of foreign intervention, (5) presence of foreign troops, (6) the role of the elite in sustaining discontent, (7) destroyed social and physical infrastructure, (8) manifestation of ethnic, party, and personal interests, (9) manifestation of hatred, prejudice, and violent behavior, (10) veteran and war-related status and wealth, (11) access to small weapons and the illegal black market economy, (12) environmental degradation, and (13) migration of internally displaced persons.

At the same time, low literacy, lack of access to quality education, poverty, and lack of economic and job opportunities provide the underlying conditions that exacerbate

the risk factors. The protracted war in the country has caused the deterioration of all infrastructure and the dropping out of youth from schools. This means the lack of teachers, school buildings, accessible and quality education materials and books. All these contribute to the factors for low literacy in the country.

Based on a research by Human Rights Watch and OXFAM, the recommended solutions for ending conflict include: the government taking serious steps to establish the rule of law at all levels, end corruption and the culture of impunity and patronage, institute police reforms, facilitate access to quality education, and promote the kind of entrepreneurship that promotes national products and industries, especially in the agriculture sector.

EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Considering education as an underlying infrastructure for development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the country, the following three projects - that have interconnected objectives pertaining to education - will be subjected to evaluation in this paper, including the projects' alignment with the Triple Nexus (humanitarian-development-peace).

01 Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP I and II) by the World Bank, which ran from January 31, 2008 to January 18, 2018

02 Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan (EQRA) by the World Bank, which has been running

since September 28, 2018 and will end on December 31, 2023

03 Afghanistan Second Skills Development Project by the World Bank, which ran from June 12, 2013 to June 30, 2018

EQUIP I and II

As quality education is seen as a critical ingredient in poverty alleviation and economic growth, the project's objective is to improve the equitable access to schools and improve the quality of education. The project aims to empower people to be more active citizens in order to actively participate in community activities that champion human rights.

The project's expected outcome is to contribute to educating a more competent and learned citizenry through the following approaches: (1) making education more accessible to students through building schools, providing grants for children's needs, and mobilizing society to raise awareness on the importance of schools, and (2) enhancing educational quality by improving teachers' qualifications through developing college curriculum, needs assessments, self-evaluations, and in-service training.

The implementing organizations carried out the project by providing training to teachers, constructing schools with gender-segregated latrines in a reasonable distance to communities, and providing grants to schools to improve the learning environment. The project mobilized the community through the creation of school Shuras, a method of community-based

decision-making in Islamic societies that is in widespread use in Afghanistan, in order to promote the importance of education, especially for girls.

The project has a direct impact on development and conflict prevention in the country in the long term. It enhanced the literacy and knowledge of citizens and promoted gender equality through increasing women participation in education and enrollment in school and, consequently, in society and economic development, promoting behavioral changes in families and reducing violence against women.

International organizations, such the International Development Association, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and Global Partnership for Education, have offered USD 408 million for this project.

EQRA

Following the EQUIP project, the World Bank and the government of Afghanistan started the EQRA project to increase equitable access, particularly of girls, to primary and secondary education. The main objective is to improve the conditions of learning in Afghanistan by improving school infrastructure in rural areas in the following ways: (1) building new school buildings, (2) providing missed essential elements to rehabilitate existing school buildings, and (3) providing school grants to schools in order to finance access to sanitation, transport, and bridge courses.

In addition to improving school structures, the project also seeks to upgrade

learning conditions through coaching and training teachers, developing a new curriculum, and conducting classroom observation. EQRA aims to improve the school management systems and teacher recruitment by creating a personnel database. It supports the completion of 1,946 new school buildings and the construction of missing elements such as classrooms, boundary walls, water points, and latrines in school buildings. It is providing support to community-based education in rural areas in emergency situations.

The project has trained 154,811 teachers (35% are female) through an in-service training package. It also offered 11,436 scholarships to females in teacher training colleges, provided quality enhancement grants to 11,543 schools, and trained 21,277 school principals and administrators (16% are female). Moreover, the project has been able to refurbish or rebuild 1,758 school buildings, reopen 258 schools via strong social mobilization and community relations, and train additional 84,831 teachers through the In-Service Teacher Training course methodologies. (USAID, 2019)

International organizations' pooled funds totaled USD 298 million. The International Development Association provided USD 100 million, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund gave USD 100 million, while the Global Partnership for Education contributed USD 98 million (World Bank Report).

Second Skills Development Project

The project's objectives are to (1) increase graduates' employability and earning potential from Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutes by improving the skills delivery system, and (2) improve TVET teacher skills and competencies and curriculums in selected priority trades.

Students will be taught Information and Communication Technology, Accounting, Business Administration, and Agronomy and Horticulture as these courses are seen as capable of delivering the practical skills needed to support Afghanistan's current situation. As a result of the program, 40,000 students will have increased employability potential in the job market. Their employment will help them increase their earning potential as well.

This project's main objective is to create strong education institutions with continued programs that help the youth contribute to the country's economic development. The project has created a safe environment for about 40,000 students and over 600 teachers by equipping institutions with highly-accurate curriculum, safety toolkit, and strategy. It has also helped 150 teachers obtain training outside the country and 400 teachers complete in-service training inside the country. (World Bank, 2018)

This project is related to human capital development. A strong institution with a safe and secure environment for all genders and that respects human rights is expected to produce graduates with high potential for employability.

EVALUATION

EQUIP I and II Evaluation

The EQUIP projects have attained their objectives mentioned in the previous section. The improvements made by the EQUIP projects were measured by the number of students enrolled in schools in the country. The number of enrolled girls has increased from 2.2 million to 3.4 million, while enrolled boys increased from 3.4 million to 5.5 million, even exceeding the target of 5.2 million. This is a significant increase given the severe security concerns of sending girls to schools amidst the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. For the first time in the history of the country, it has more than 8 million children in school.

The project provided training to 841,250 teachers, exceeding the target of 517,000. The project constructed 1,177 schools and 8,541 classrooms to create a better learning environment and a safe place for students. At the same time, 14,992 school Shuras were created, which play a significant role in mobilizing the community, promoting awareness about the importance of education and encouraging the community to send children to school.

Increasing the number of students and trained teachers has remarkably increased the level of literacy in Afghanistan, especially among the youth. The current level of literacy among youth aged 15-24 is 65%. Meanwhile, the literacy rate among men is 55% and literacy rate among women is 29%. Starting from the baseline of an 18% overall literacy rate in Afghanistan, the current literacy showed significant

improvement, especially considering the current and past situation of the country, and the different barriers to women's education.

However, women's literacy rate is still remarkably low compared to that of men. Scaled-up efforts, a stable social environment among other factors are necessary to close the gap, even if this takes time. Despite this, such increased levels of literacy will contribute to creating a more learned and competent citizenry that has the potential to contribute to an increase in employment, social well-being and development of young adults.

In EQUIP I, the authorities implementing the project learned that an increase in the number of enrollment and of students passing the numeracy test cannot by themselves indicate an improvement in access to education. This is because the enrollment figure is not concrete and accurate considering that registered students who do not attend school will be officially counted as registered students for three (3) more years after some students have already stopped attending school. The project readjusted this indicator in the second phase and started assessing the completion of the last grade in each cycle. This was an important step toward better measurement of the project's effectiveness.


According to the World Bank report, the projects have had a remarkable outcome despite the worsening situation in the country. There has been an increase in the number of students who completed the last grade of each stage (3, 6, 9 and 12), exceeding the target in all grades.

This is shown by the following figures of increases: Grade 3 by 134%, Grade 6 by 134%, Grade 9 by 116% and Grade 12 by 218%. The increase for girls in Grade 12 was 70.4%, which is substantial.

Another strength of the projects that plays a great role in reducing conflict and promoting awareness on education was creating the School Shuras. The project created and trained School Shuras to better assess the necessity of schools based on local needs, help school management and encourage people to send their children to school. The Shuras also helped monitor the results of the project especially in areas with severe conflict where the implementing organization cannot easily monitor the result of their work.

In considering the situation of education in Afghanistan, the projects have not only paid attention to school students, but also to different components required to improve access to education. It has offered school quality enhancement grants to 16,588 schools in order to establish libraries and laboratories and buy computers for better management of schools, which will improve the quality of education in the long term.

The projects have also worked on improving the knowledge and education of school teachers and principals in order to develop the quality of education and school management. Providing the training for school teachers and principals to learn the basic methods of teaching and the skills that are required for school management and tutoring will smoothen the path for teachers to go the distance



and further develop their skills and quality education to students.

EQRA Project Evaluation

Due to Afghanistan's highly patriarchal social structure, a gender-synchronized approach to education is vital to ensure that educational reforms are fully supported throughout rural and urban regions. If Afghan males are not willing to accept new gender norms, educational reforms for women will fail. Educated males are more likely to accept that educating women holistically improves the communities' socio-economic development and child health outcomes.

At present, more than 70% of Afghan women are illiterate. In the rural regions of Afghanistan, however, where more than 74% of the population lives, the illiteracy rate of females climbs to 29%. In rural Afghanistan, there are various barriers to female education from households, communities, and schools. National policies in place also impede families from enrolling girls in school and ensuring their attendance. The issue of female education in rural Afghanistan has highlighted the importance of multi-tiered approaches when attempting to alter traditional perceptions of the role of females in society.

One of the ways of addressing the root causes of violence against women and promote gender equality and a balanced society is to focus on girls' access to education that empowers them to participate in society. For instance, when there were less to no girls educated in rural areas, health workers and election team

members were all men. After decisively sending girls to schools, however, both genders have participated in most forms of community service.


The EQRA project is focused on girls' education. It provided grants to schools for management improvement and sanitation for female students, and sought to increase female teachers. Furthermore, it supported the improvement of school infrastructure and the creation of village-based schools that massively increased student enrollment and effectively eliminated the gender gap in enrollment.

Estimates using the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) show that having primary education leads to higher earnings than having no education at all, and that the average income of persons with tertiary education is almost double than those of persons with no education. Majority of Afghans earn less than USD 2 a day. However, those who finish their studies earn at least 5,000 Afghani or more than USD 63, which is already a big amount that can help families cope. Access to education then leads to higher earnings, and higher earnings advance the well-being of families and further enable families to send their children to school.

One of the strong points of the project is that it addresses gender inequalities by:

Targeting 17 provinces of Afghanistan that include a large number and percentage of out-of-school children, particularly girls,

Adults, 15-64 years of age; monthly income in AFS



Aa

Table 2. Earnings by Sector of Employment, Education, and Gender. Source: Estimates using ALCS 2014

Constructing new school buildings or expanding and improving existing schools by creating gender-segregated latrines, and

Providing grants to over 1,000 schools to promote general health and hygiene, and provide access to transport facilities particularly for girl students and female teachers.

The project has achieved the target of 4,413,492 enrolled students (of which 1,657,785 are females) in 2020 and has moved closer to the end target of 5,018,429 students attending school regularly in 2023. In addition, it is working to reduce the number of out-of-school children in selected provinces from 2,289,880 to 1,089,880 (of which 643,029 are female) from September 2018 to December 2023 (World Bank, 2018).

Skills Development Project Evaluation

Through the Skills Development Project, the TVET institute curriculum for five trades - Information and Communications Technology, Accounting, Business Administration, Agronomy and Horticulture - has been revised to reflect global best practices and local labor market needs. Corresponding learning materials have been developed, printed, and are being piloted, as of this writing. An additional two trades - Construction and Auto-Repair - were revised and completed. These professions and skills are urgently needed by Afghanistan’s labor market.

Due to the low quality of education in schools and the low capacity of public universities, only one-third of high school graduates get admitted to public universities. Moreover, many young people who are family breadwinners



cannot go to college and study the courses that they desire. In this situation, skills development through technical and vocational programs fill the gap, enabling more than 30,000 students to graduate with the basic skills required by the current job market in Afghanistan.

There are many areas for improvement in the projects. (1) There should be indicators for the quality of education, as it has been observed that many high school graduates do not have sufficient knowledge of math, and of reading and writing. (2) Qualifications for teachers should be increased, and qualified teachers should be distributed equitably across the different parts of the country. (3) Education should be equitably provided to students and citizens all over the country, not only in certain provinces. (4) Parent and early childhood education should be promoted, as these are crucial in promoting children's education in general. (5) There should be a proper balance between general education that is currently being provided and the specialized education that is needed to produce specialized graduates.

At the same time, despite improvements in education in Afghanistan, significant problems persist in the sector. While recognizing the “encouraging” and “heart-warming” figures about education development in recent years, Naderi (2018) claims that “the quality of education fell to the margins.”

He cites the following factors: “overcrowded classrooms, crumbling school buildings, the continuation of ‘rote learning,’ the imbalance in the teacher to student ratio, and theoretically-driven

curriculums.” According to him, while there are huge enrollment figures, there are also huge drop-out figures. Gender disparity also persists, together with corruption in the education ministry.

Most importantly, hard questions still need to be asked about the education sector in Afghanistan, even as development cooperation projects that lay the foundation for education, especially in this war-torn country, are important. After all, while there is universal agreement about education as a basic right, and even as a crucial ingredient to development, education as a field of ideas is an intense site of contestation.

An important issue is the development vision that guides the education projects and which the latter serves. For example, while the Afghanistan National Development Strategy for 2008-2013 commits to the general objective of attaining “high rates of sustainable and equitable economic growth,” it concretely states that Afghanistan’s “economic vision is to build a liberal market economy.” To achieve this, the strategy says that the country will “develop an enabling environment for the private sector to generate legitimate profits and pay reasonable taxes, thereby enhancing public revenues that can then be invested in public services” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008, 16).

In the World Bank blog, Dixon (2016) states that international aid will be important in the coming years for Afghanistan’s development, even as fragility will most likely persist. More concretely, she pushes for the following measures for achieving economic development:

01 Improve agricultural productivity to increase jobs and incomes. In order to “reduce labor market pressures,” she also calls for “helping Afghan workers find jobs with competitive salaries abroad through formal migration agreements with other countries.” She says that this measure “would increase remittances and address some of the frustrations among youth that can trigger conflict.”

02 Stating that “only extractive industries can provide sufficient government revenues and exports to offset expected declines in aid,” she pushes for the tapping of the country’s “mining and hydrocarbon potential.”

03 There is a need for regional integration - especially in relation to energy transit trade, export in agriculture and extractives, and information technology productivity.

These statements provide a glimpse into the direction of the World Bank’s education projects in Afghanistan, and even the current education system in the country: to produce graduates that will be employed in agriculture, in overseas work, and in extractive industries. Needless to say, these areas of the economy are not commonsensical or straightforward, but are sites of contestations.

With regard to agriculture, there is a long-standing debate between corporate-led and industrialized versus people-powered and sustainable agriculture. Schanbacher,

for example, states “On the one hand, country governments want to retain sovereignty over their local economies, but on the other hand, these corporations have a major influence on government officials and their constituents. What is problematic is that often these [transnational corporations] will extract resources and outsource labor from local community farmers and workers, putting them in a catch-22” (2019, 91).

Critical of corporate-led and industrial agriculture, he forwards the alternative of food sovereignty, following various social movements in the world. According to him, “The concept of food sovereignty argues that food is a basic human right and that food production and agricultural policies should be in the hands of the people who actually produce our food (rather than governments or multilateral organizations).” He also says that “At its core it challenges the neoliberal global order that emphasizes deregulation, privatization, asymmetrical trade agreements, and the dismantling of national governments that uphold this global order” (2019, 45-46).

With regard to migration, Dixon (2016) is precise in saying that labor migration abroad can help “reduce labor market pressures.” Indeed, it can help many people find employment in decent jobs abroad and that agreements should be forged between Afghanistan and receiving countries to protect the rights of migrant workers. At the same time, there is a need to be reminded of debates between those who affirm and those who reject the “labor migration for development” framework.

While labor migration can bring short-term benefits to individuals, families and countries, it does not mean the upholding of the rights of migrant workers and does not bring about genuine development for sending countries. Genuine development, in fact, rests upon the elimination of the problems that bring about what migrant activists and migrant advocate groups call “forced labor export” (Asia-Pacific Mission for Migrants, 2012).

With regard to extractive industries, Feffer (2021) discusses the dangers in proposals for a “green” use of Afghanistan’s minerals: loss of biodiversity, huge carbon emissions, lack of protection for workers’ health and safety, all-around pollution affecting communities, and the emergence of conflict. He attributes this situation to developing countries’ competition for markets.

He proposes that instead of competition, there should be cooperation among mineral-exporting countries -- in the creation, for example, of an Organization of Mineral-Exporting Countries. This organization will enable countries to bargain collectively with developed countries and avoid the dangers of the extractive industry as it currently stands.

In short, there are important debates on development visions and strategies. Education in Afghanistan should not foreclose those debates by serving one particular vision and strategy. It should instead open up discussions on these visions and strategies. Alternatives should be presented and allowed to contest with the dominant ones embodied by the World

Bank and similar financial institutions, as well as the government of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

The World Bank’s projects on education in Afghanistan are much-needed by a country that was destroyed by war. They can be appreciated as laying the foundation of the country’s education sector. The basic rights, including the right to education, of a people that has suffered so much in decades, must indeed be advanced.

The creation and improvement of schools; the increase in enrollment, especially by female students; the training of teachers and principals, especially among females; the involvement of communities through Shuras; and the improvements in technical-vocational education - all of these can be seen as steps in the right direction. They should be continued. In fact, given the immense challenges still facing the education sector in Afghanistan, they should be improved and expanded.

In the course of seeking to lay the foundation for Afghanistan’s education sector, however, there is an urgent need to examine the larger economic development vision and strategy that the education sector serves. This is urgent because such a vision and strategy would permeate - and already permeate - the very design and content of the education sector. Dominant development visions and strategies - especially in relation to agriculture, labor migration and extractive industries - must be examined in relation to alternatives.

Education, as many educators will say, always serves, whether consciously or not, a development vision and strategy. The laying of the foundations for Afghanistan's education sector, currently in its infancy, should not mean a foreclosing of discussions on the country's development vision and strategy but should instead open these discussions and bring them to fruitful conclusions.

In the Triple Nexus discourse, the World Bank's education projects in Afghanistan fall within the development pillar. And development actions in the Triple Nexus discourse are seen as crucial to addressing the root causes of conflicts and ending the latter. Development visions and strategies, however, are not a settled matter. Some development visions and strategies, in fact, may even see their competitors as not really addressing the root causes of conflicts, but of causing and prolonging these.

The World Bank's education projects in Afghanistan therefore provide a nuance to one of the important assumptions of the Triple Nexus discourse about development actions and their relationship to conflicts. These projects need to be discussed in relation to competing development visions and strategies, and the Triple Nexus discourse itself.

Provincial targets for PDO indicator

2016 **BASELINE** 2020 **YEAR 2** 2021 **YEAR 3** 2022 **YEAR 4** 2023 **YEAR 5**
 # of students attending school in 1395, Grade 1-12

	2016	2016	2020	2020	2021	2021	2022	2022	2023	2023
	BASELINE	BASELINE	YEAR 2	YEAR 2	YEAR 3	YEAR 3	YEAR 4	YEAR 4	YEAR 5	YEAR 5
Bakh	388,919	212,548	216,799	4,251	223,303	6,504	223,303	6,504	223,303	6,504
		176,371	180,842	4,471	188,076	7,234	188,076	7,234	188,076	7,234
Badghis	87,542	63,427	64,696	1,269	66,636	1,941	69,302	2,665	72,767	3,465
		24,115	24,726	611	25,715	989	27,001	1,286	28,621	1,620
Faryab	260,158	146,885	149,823	2,938	154,317	4,495	160,490	6,173	168,515	8,025
		113,273	116,144	2,871	120,790	4,646	126,830	6,040	134,440	7,610
Hirat	555,636	294,029	299,910	5,881	308,907	8,997	321,263	12,356	337,326	16,063
		261,607	268,239	6,632	278,968	10,730	292,917	13,948	310,492	17,575
Helmand	140,850	110,460	112,669	2,209	116,049	3,380	120,691	4,642	126,726	6,035
		30,390	31,160	770	32,407	1,246	34,027	1,620	36,069	2,042
Kabul City	990,888	545,115	556,017	10,902	572,698	16,681	595,606	22,908	625,386	29,780
		445,773	457,073	11,300	475,356	18,283	499,124	23,768	529,072	29,947
Kabul Province	216,372	140,927	143,746	2,819	148,058	4,312	153,980	5,922	161,679	7,699
		75,445	77,358	1,913	80,452	3,094	84,474	4,023	89,543	5,068
Kandahar	154,653	118,451	120,820	2,369	124,445	3,625	129,422	4,978	135,894	6,471
		36,202	37,120	918	38,605	1,485	40,535	1,930	42,967	2,432
Khost	188,320	143,510	146,380	2,870	150,772	4,391	156,802	6,031	164,643	7,840
		44,810	45,946	1,136	47,784	1,838	50,173	2,389	53,183	3,010
Kunduz	206,369	126,382	128,910	2,528	132,777	3,867	138,088	5,311	144,992	6,904
		79,987	82,015	2,028	85,295	3,281	89,560	4,265	94,934	5,374
Logar	86,816	64,899	66,197	1,298	68,183	1,986	70,910	2,727	74,456	3,546
		21,917	22,473	556	23,371	899	24,540	1,169	26,012	1,472
Nangarhar	456,832	310,547	316,758	6,211	326,261	9,503	339,311	13,050	356,277	16,966
		146,285	149,993	3,708	155,993	6,000	163,793	7,800	173,620	9,828
Nuristan	36,287	20,112	20,514	402	21,130	615	21,975	845	23,074	1,099
		16,175	16,585	410	17,248	663	18,111	862	19,198	1,087
Ghazni	257,883	169,680	173,074	3,394	178,266	5,192	185,396	7,131	194,666	9,270
		88,203	90,439	2,236	94,057	3,618	98,759	4,703	104,685	5,926
Paktika	105,469	89,726	91,521	1,795	94,266	2,746	98,037	3,771	102,939	4,902
		15,743	16,142	399	16,788	646	17,627	839	18,685	1,058
Uruzgan	51,497	44,103	44,985	882	46,335	1,350	48,188	1,853	50,597	2,409
		7,394	7,851	187	7,885	303	8,279	394	8,776	497
Wardak	108,597	81,044	82,665	1,621	85,145	2,480	88,551	3,406	92,978	4,428
		27,553	28,251	698	29,382	1,130	30,851	1,469	32,702	1,851
Zabul	25,385	19,829	20,226	397	20,832	607	21,666	833	22,749	1,083
		5,556	5,697	141	5,925	28	6,221	296	6,594	373

male
female
target # of students
target increase



Box 3. Provincial targets for PDO indicator "Increase in students attending school regularly in selected provinces, by province and gender"
 Source: World Bank

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 01** Projects that increase student enrollment especially among female students; increase the number and quality of teachers and principals, especially with gender parity; build school facilities; improve technical and vocational education; and involve communities in the process - all of these should be continued, improved and expanded.
- 02** Areas for improvements should be addressed: (a) indicators of quality education, (b) quantity and quality of teachers should be increased, especially to address equity in their distribution across the country, (c) equitable distribution of education across the country, (d) promotion of parent and childhood education, and (e) proper balance between general and specialized education.
- 03** Most importantly and urgently, the development vision and strategy that the education sector serves should be examined, especially in relation to alternatives. Dominant development visions and strategies - particularly in agriculture, labor migration, and extractive industries - should be interrogated and different views should be brought forth. Education should not mean that the dominant development vision and strategy will simply be implemented, but that this will be opened to discussions.
- 04** School Shuras can be used and maximized for the purpose of discussing development vision and strategy in relation to education and schools. Their role in the projects, that of encouraging education and helping in education management, can be expanded significantly and more meaningfully.
- 05** In relation to the Triple Nexus discourse, while there is agreement that development actions are needed to address the root causes of conflict and to end conflicts, there is a need to examine concrete development actions in particular contexts - especially whether they really contribute to genuine development for the people or not, whether they are really contributing to ending conflicts or not.

Acronyms

01	ALCS	Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
02	ARTF	Afghan Reconstruction Trust fund
03	CAI	Creative Associates International
04	COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease 2019
05	EQRA	Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan
06	EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Program
07	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
08	GOA	Government of Afghanistan
09	GPE	Global Partnership for Education
10	ICT	Information Communication Technology
11	IDA	International Development Association
12	INSET	In-Service Teacher Training
13	TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
14	UN	United Nations
15	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
16	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
17	USA	United States of America
18	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
19	USD	US Dollar
20	WB	World Bank



Acronyms.
Source: N/A

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Editor's Postscript

While this research collection was being prepared for publication, the so-called “fall of Kabul” happened. On August 15, 2021, erstwhile rebel group Taliban captured Afghanistan’s capital Kabul, after US-backed president Ashraf Ghani fled the country. This is the culmination of a months-long offensive that started in May 2021 and that saw the Taliban taking hold of the leadership of provincial capitals in the country. This is also the result of an agreement between the Taliban and the US government, reached in February 2020, that stipulates the withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan until the end of August (Mohamed and Allahoum, 2021).

The images from Afghanistan that greeted the world on that day were of Afghans crowding the country’s airport, desperate to ride planes leaving the country. News reports later said that some Afghans died in the rush to leave the country -- run over by a plane, or falling from a plane in flight after hiding in the plane’s wheels. These images signaled to the world the Afghans’ fear of the Taliban and its rule, as the group has been notorious for killings and violent repression (Aljazeera, 2021).

As for the World Bank, it stopped providing aid to the country on August 25, citing the detrimental effects of Taliban rule on the

development prospects of the country, especially of women. The World Bank’s move came in the heels of a similar action by the International Monetary Fund and of the freezing of the country’s assets in the US Federal Reserve Bank of New York by the US government. Since 2002, one year after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the international financial institutions have committed more than USD 5 billion in development and reconstruction projects in the country, while the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank, has gathered more than USD 12.9 billion (Putz, 2021).

It is worth noting that Hartwig Schafer, World Bank’s vice-president for the South Asia region, visited Afghanistan in early June 2021. While the World Bank press release on the visit highlighted the financial institution’s continued support for the country, it also presented the challenges faced by the country at that point: “Afghanistan’s economy is sluggish due to COVID-19, political uncertainty, and a possible decline in international aid... The Afghan government will likely continue to rely on aid in the coming years to maintain critical public services such as health and education, support its private sector and jobs, and finance community programs for

the most vulnerable population” (World Bank Group, 2021).

The recent events mean more than a halt to one of the education programs evaluated in the foregoing paper. They show the importance placed by the paper in seeing development projects within their larger economic and political context, and in raising the issue of contending paths to development. They call attention to the importance of one of the rallying calls of the Triple Nexus discourse: addressing the

root causes of conflict. While Afghanistan under US occupation served as the site for many development projects, such as the education projects evaluated here, it is clear by now that the root causes of the conflict in the country were not really being addressed. The case of Afghanistan shows that there could not be a sustainable, people-centered development in a country under occupation, even as freedom from occupation is only one among the many requirements of such a development.

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Engendering the Nexus

**A CASE STUDY ON HOW TO
MAINSTREAM GENDER IN THE TRIPLE
NEXUS AND ITS OPERATIONALIZATION**

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This text presents the Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict (SAT-GV), a tool developed by the organisation Women in Conflict Zones (MZC) to be applied both in open conflicts and in situations where serious human rights violations are taking place. The SAT-GV aims to improve MZC's performance and contribute more efficiently to the fight against gender inequalities in conflict contexts by making it possible to identify the different levels of human

rights violations, threats, as well as resources and capacities for action.

MZC adopts a concerted, cross-cutting approach to development, peace, and women's rights throughout all its programmes, addressing humanitarian needs with long-term approaches focused on empowerment and human rights (HR) to reduce discrimination and vulnerability, including poverty, insecurity and structural inequality that particularly affect women and girls, thus promoting peace and social justice.

BACKGROUND AND FRAME OF REFERENCE


1. Interpretative Framework

The feminist paradigm conceives of peace as an environment that enables a dignified life free of violence. This definition of positive peace (Galtung, 1969, p. 183) addresses structural violence and gender

justice in line with frameworks such as the:

- Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
- Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (United Nations, 2013)
- Istanbul Convention
- Women, Peace and Security (MPS)¹ Agenda
- Agenda 2030 (Sustainable Development Goals)

This set of norms reinforces the premise, assumed by MZC, that development, security and peace are only possible with equality and HR, emphasizing the importance of women's participation in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and the eradication of Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG), produced both in the private and public spheres.



Armed Conflict in Mali

It is a complex conflict with numerous active armed actors, where foreign armies are perceived with mistrust and have been the subject of allegations of rape (Europa Press, 2013).



Figure 2. Armed Conflict in Mali.
Source: Women in Conflict Zones (MZC)

2. Context

Mali, classified as a country with low human development, is experiencing a chronic crisis with multi-causal origins. Chronic poverty was compounded in 2012 by armed conflict, considered in 2019 as one of the 11 most serious conflicts (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2020). It is a complex conflict with numerous active armed actors, where foreign armies are perceived with mistrust and have been the subject of allegations of rape (Europa Press, 2013).

The signing of the peace agreement in Algiers in 2015 did not end the conflict, which remains particularly active in the north of the country where the Malian government has a weak structure. In 2019, inter-ethnic clashes became widespread, reaching the centre of Mali and the regions of Mopti and Segou, which are being severely affected.

This instability has a serious impact on the lives and security of women and girls. Armed actors use various forms of sexual violence (rape, gang marriages) especially with girls, and other forms of sexual slavery in a context of impunity. On the other hand, increasing poverty reduces women's livelihood opportunities, forcing them to beg or prostitute themselves as a family survival strategy. This situation fuels trafficking mafias, especially in Bamako.

The scenario in which the Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict Settings (SAT-GV) is implemented must therefore be understood from a threefold perspective:

01 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPS): IDPs from different ethnic groups and nomadic peoples are “trapped” and, in the absence of resources, are perceived as

“enemies”, creating a new source of tension.


02 ENDEMIC POVERTY and chronic **FOOD INSECURITY** add to the vulnerability imposed by the armed conflict.

03 DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF VIOLENCE: The generalization of armed and inter-community violence favours VAWG, especially sexual violence.

3. Organizational Approach

MZC is a multi-mandate NGO founded in 1994 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is characterized by an integrated approach. This is due to its commitment to women’s rights: the fight against all manifestations of gender-based violence, women’s empowerment and peacebuilding are central dimensions in all the interventions

Pillars of Human Security



Aa

Figure 3. Human Security
Source: N/A

Strategic Plan, 2015-2020




Figure 4. Strategic Plan.

Source: Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict (SAT-GV)

and processes promoted. In some cases, as an essential cross-cutting element; in others, as a main objective; and in all cases as a strategy in favour of peace, equality, respect and safeguarding of HR, gender justice and democratic strengthening.

The implementation and dissemination of the MPS agenda is central to MZC, alongside the strengthening of resilience and the promotion of human security, especially in its economic, food, security and health dimensions.

MZC began its intervention in Mali in 2007 by addressing the needs arising from the humanitarian situation with a long-term approach focused on reducing vulnerability and risk, on the one hand, and promoting peacebuilding and social justice, on the other.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAT-GV

1. Background

The initiative is based on research carried out between 2015 and 2016 by the EpD (Development Education) area, funded by the Andalusian Agency for Cooperation (AACID) with EUR 78,332.00.

It arises from the realization that VAWG does not emerge out of nowhere at the outbreak of conflict but is embedded in gender inequalities, and poses a threat to women's security and development in line with international frameworks.

2. Description

The SAT-GV is conceived as an instrument to identify different levels of threats and vulnerability, defining these in a broad manner in line with feminist approaches, to help establish proposals for action, and to denounce the "culture of impunity".

It takes the form of a software tool that analyzes data provided by local informants "alerting" them to the increase in situations prone to the emergence/recurrence of violence. It identifies rights violations, threats and vulnerabilities as well as resilience capacities and resources through a battery of indicators built on inputs from specialists and informants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Palestine, Mali and Spain.

It has 46 indicators divided into 3 dimensions:

- Systemic: structural conditions (political, economic, institutional and socio-cultural);
- Emerging trends (IDP and refugees, levels of violence, abuses by armed forces, etc.);
- Intervening factors, which increase/decrease the likelihood of conflict or peacebuilding in the case of active conflict.

SAT-GV Software Tool

It takes the form of a software tool that analyses data provided by local informants. The weighted data are displayed in a graph with different "alarm levels".



Figure 5. SAT-GV Software Tool and Alert Levels.

Source: Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict (SAT-GV)



Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict (SAT-GV) Design




Figure 7. SAT-VG Design.

Source: Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict (SAT-GV)

It includes both statistical data and perceptions of perceived risk by the community or individuals. The weighted data are displayed in a graph with different “alarm levels”.

After its design, it was tested in the field (Colombia and Mali) and a series of training sessions were initiated with local staff, partners and counterparts, key to the implementation and inclusion of communities in the process.

3. Implementing the SAT-GV

Its implementation has made it possible to understand how the dynamics of the armed conflict were affecting VAWG, especially sexual violence. Prior to the conflict, Mali was a transit and destination country for trafficking, especially of women from Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, a marginal option today. Instability has significantly increased

sexual exploitation, making it a provider. MZC has detected a growing presence of Malian women in northern Morocco and Spain, a phenomenon almost non-existent five years ago.

As a first step, it was decided to implement it in Bamako and the Gao region. Initially, Timbuktu, where MZC had been present since 2007, was also considered, but this was not possible due to the destruction of its office by jihadist groups. MZC therefore decided to move the proposal to Sikasso, the second largest city in the country.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, assessments were conducted to contextualize and document the issues, modalities and impacts of VAWG. In Gao, 326 victims were identified (95% women and girls). Of these, 15% reported having been raped and 21% had been sexually assaulted. Physical assaults and early/forced marriages amounted to 17.5% respectively.

Another 16% reported being deprived of resources, and 13% were regular victims of psychological and emotional abuse.

Just over 80% of the victims were minors and most of them had been forced into prostitution.

Other evidence:

- Socio-economic factors, as well as the collection of firewood and the remoteness of the springs, exposed women and children to rape and other sexual assaults.
- Widespread impunity, due to the silence of victims who feared being blamed and stigmatized by their families.
- High vulnerability of the Belá ethnic group, enslaved until recently and still discriminated against.

In order to activate the implementation of the SAT-GV, training sessions were held for a group of informants, who were responsible for collecting information and data. They were selected from among activists with whom MZC had been collaborating:

- members of the anti-slavery association TEMEDT in Gao;
- Coordination of Women's Associations (CAFO) in Bamako; and,
- in Sikasso, the women's associations Woiyo Kondeye, Koule Djakan and Timinandja.

Particularly relevant are the trainings that have been carried out with women's associations in the villages. These associations work for the eradication

Violence Map, 2017-2020




Figure 9. Violence Map in Mali.
Source: Women in Conflict Zones (MZC)

of harmful practices such as female circumcision², early and/or forced marriages and sexual exploitation.

In addition to these associations, there was also an equity champion in the person of Mohamed Ag Akeratane, the country coordinator (UN Women). He is a renowned anti-slavery activist and defender of women's rights, and his role in the implementation of the SAT-GV is key as he has great credibility with national institutions and especially with village chiefs, the power base at the local level.

The training workshops have been interrupted by the intensification and generalization of instability and tension in various regions of the country throughout 2018 to 2019, seriously affecting the proper development of the activities. This situation was aggravated in 2020 by COVID-19 and the coup d'état. This context also made it necessary to take into

account the risks taken by informants and to activate a specific protocol to reinforce their security.

Obtaining the first evidence and mappings has made it possible to propose interventions adapted to local needs through which food aid distribution projects were implemented (2017-2019) together with initiatives aimed at strengthening community resilience to overcome the food crisis through agricultural projects and the promotion of economic activities of women's cooperatives, incorporating actions to strengthen women's human rights and reduce VAWG through the prevention of forced child marriages and trafficking, and care for victims of sexual violence.

These projects aim to contribute to women's participation by supporting the women's movement in actions in favour of peacebuilding and economic empowerment.

Finally, the SAT-GV facilitates the return to the communities with localised data, facilitating awareness-raising, through workshops and theatre³, on the impact of violence. Thus, during one of the workshops in the commune of Songo, one of the men was astonished to discover "but then women feel!", which shows the degree of dehumanization and, consequently, the extreme vulnerability of women and girls.

EVALUATION OF THE SAT-GV

Due to the incidents, we do not yet have final results. In addition, the SAT-GV is under revision. Nevertheless, we can point out some considerations:

01 The initiative is **HIGHLY CONSISTENT** with international and state normative frameworks, including UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the Spanish Peacebuilding Strategy.

02 The SAT-GV is **CONSISTENT WITH THE PREMISES OF THE TRIPLE NEXUS**. The SAT-GV helps to identify the differentiated needs (humanitarian, development and peace) of women and men, helping to determine "the power available to women, girls, men and boys, as well as their ability to access and control resources" (IASC, 2017, p. 17) on the ground. In parallel, it enables the mapping of different levels of threats, risks and rights violations, including sexual violence and VAWG, which are key to the analysis not only because of their prevalence and intensity but also because of their close link to structural conditions and socio-economic factors that contribute to greater/lesser vulnerability to exclusion and violence in both humanitarian and development contexts.

This breaks the humanitarian-development-peace silos, as the proposals developed respond to the most immediate needs, especially those of women and girls and other excluded groups, as well as to the structural, political, cultural and/or socio-economic conditions that place these groups in a situation of discrimination/subordination and as objects of violence. In this way, it

is possible to build bridges between humanitarian intervention and the construction of more equitable and just societies.

03 MAINSTREAM GENDER. Includes gender indicators during data collection and a gender analysis in the subsequent analysis without confining gender issues to a single point in time (Schmeidl & Piza-Lopez, 2015, pp. 7-8).

On the other hand, grassroots participation, especially of women of the Belá ethnic group, has been promoted in all phases of the intervention.

04 STRENGTHENING COUNTRY PROGRAMMING. Having an instrument that generates localised information contributes to establishing more efficient and relevant proposals for action by supporting local capacities for resilience and peacebuilding processes adjusted to local realities.

The initiative thus complements all the projects implemented by MZC in Mali, contributing to the ultimate objective of improving the well-being of the Malian population, especially the most vulnerable groups and women as a discriminated group, and increasing their level of personal, food, socio-economic, community and political security. Briefly, through the SAT-GV the following have been activated:

Programmes for the prevention and transformation of socio-community beliefs and behaviour (theatres, debates and meetings);

Capacity building programmes for prevention, mediation and education against violence and sexual exploitation;

Holistic care of VAWG victims (support and accompaniment centres);

Capacity building on HR, and causes and impacts of VAWG;

Reducing women's socio-economic vulnerability by strengthening women's economic autonomy and productive structures;

Strengthening the presence of women in decision-making spaces (water management committees, health committees, community assemblies, etc).

05 APPROPRIATION by local actors. All local staff involved in the process positively assessed the relevance of the instrument and the potential of its implementation, considering that it is a valid instrument to contextualise the different types of violence, victims, and perpetrators.



**CONFLICT
AND GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE**



CONCLUSION

Peace, development and security are key elements for the feminist agenda. Already in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) special attention was paid to women's participation in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and the exercise of women's HR, especially the right to live a life free of violence, both during conflict and in pre- and post-conflict situations.

For MZC, human security means enjoying development, the absence of violence, fear and threats (peace), and the full enjoyment of human rights. MZC is fully committed to this concerted and cross-cutting approach, dedicating 100% of its resources to its operationalization. This implies, on the one hand, a solid coordination between organizational areas to overcome the intersectoral silo and, on the other hand, long-term programming based on strategic alliances, where community participation and ownership are fundamental.

The SAT-GV is characterised by the use of simple technology and low-cost, easy-to-use equipment, with the key contribution of community members as informants. It allows to unravel the complexity of violence in contexts of armed conflict where violence directly derived from the conflict, and perpetrated by the various armed actors, is superimposed on the violence suffered by women. Thus, although arranged marriages, the exchange of girls and wedding trousseau, on the one hand, and the sexual exploitation of women and girls, on the other, already existed with greater or lesser intensity

prior to the conflict, these modalities take on new forms and intensify with the socio-economic insecurity that forces the adoption of survival and “protection” strategies⁴.

This finding is consistent with evidence that establishes a direct link between armed conflict and gender inequality: 83% of armed conflicts in 2019 took place in gender-discriminatory contexts (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2020).

This is why the fight against gender inequality must become a central element of the Triple Nexus strategy, which implies greater budgetary attention. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020b), despite some growth in funding for gender equality, only 4% of commitments had gender equality as a main objective, and this is expected to decrease with the advent of COVID-19.

During the process, some challenges and areas for improvement were also identified, to which must be added the considerations arising from the complexity and difficulties imposed by the pandemic. Among the gaps identified, we highlight the following:

01 It is necessary to **UPDATE INDICATORS** and include those required by the new scenario. Among them, we highlight the relevance or intensity of the following:

indicators related to the identification and management of trafficking in persons (CEDAW

General Recommendation No. 38);

indicators linked to the reduction of civic spaces (Istanbul Principles, 2010);

hate speech and the rise of fundamentalism and extremism.

02 In the framework of the review that is being carried out with the support of an external consultant (CEIM), it has been detected that it is difficult for local informants to adequately complete a **LARGE NUMBER OF INDICATORS**, some of which are also complex.

03 COVID-19 has severely affected implementation, adding to previously existing difficulties due to widespread insecurity and tensions in the country. **MOBILITY HAS BEEN REDUCED**, making data collection and access to VAWG survivors difficult, especially in marginalized urban and/or remote rural areas, where cases of violence have increased exponentially according to key informants.

04 The intensified insecurity and **ATTACKS SUFFERED BY MZC** interrupted its implementation: The destruction of infrastructure and equipment required reconstructing all lost organizational information and documentation. On the other hand, it prompted the reinforcement of security protocols during 2018-2019. This protocol was revised during 2020 to include

the specificities resulting from the pandemic.

05 The **TENSION BETWEEN** strict adherence to **HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES**⁵ of access to the most vulnerable populations on the one hand, and personal and community **SECURITY** on the other, has not been resolved.

06 Another aspect to improve is the **PROCEDURE FOR REPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS** to national and local institutions responsible for providing protection in a context of state failure such as the Malian one.

07 Finally, the **DIFFICULTY IN FINDING RESOURCES** is a major weakness, so the challenge lies in finding sources of funding to ensure its full development and

improvement, which currently relies on MZC's own resources and the voluntariness of the actors involved, which generates great uncertainty and irregularity in its implementation.

We highlight the complexity of funding initiatives aimed at peacebuilding, prevention and gender equality (GE) which receive very little attention and funding, despite international and national commitments⁶. Thus, although almost a third of DAC members define GE as a main or significant objective, only 19% of EU aid provided to fragile states focused on GE. Furthermore, only 20% of aid allocated to peace and security has a GE dimension (OECD, 2019).

In Spain, the MPS agenda does not have a budget to guarantee its implementation, to which is added its militarised vision⁷. With regard to humanitarian aid, the “prevention” line is the least well endowed,

Evolution of Spanish humanitarian aid, 2014-2019

- Emergency Aid
- Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
- Disaster prevention




Figure 12. Evolution of Spanish humanitarian aid. Source: Oxfam Intermón (2020)

reaching its peak in 2008 and 2009, after which its resources began to decrease significantly.

In 2020, despite an increase in emergency aid to EUR 8.8 million, it was dragged down by the war in Syria⁸, while reconstruction and rehabilitation plummeted from EUR 4 million in 2018 to EUR 711,000 in 2019. Prevention barely reached EUR 678,000.

Focusing on Mali, Spanish cooperation (AECID) (V Master Plan 2018-2021) considers it as a geographical priority. Of the EUR 7 million allocated in 2017, only 0.8% is earmarked for Sustainable Development Goal 16, compared to 30% for humanitarian action, and 6% (EUR 480,506) for GE.

RECOMMENDATIONS

At the organizational level (MZC):

01 This initiative exemplifies how **INTERNAL SYNERGIES** are **REINFORCED THROUGH** research and innovation of instruments that, in turn, feed back information and learning to MZC as a whole, especially in relation to VAWG, trafficking and peacebuilding in which all departments of the entity are involved. It is recommended that this line of work be strengthened, constituting cross-cutting teams and joint programming, transcending the current interdepartmental coordination.

- 02 The **INSTRUMENT** needs to be **UPDATED** to incorporate new dimensions that are now key (reduction of civic environments, COVID impact, etc.).
- 03 It is suggested to **SIMPLIFY THE VOLUME OF INDICATORS**. While a large set of multidimensional indicators is feasible for technical staff to handle, it is difficult to handle for local informants. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security index on MPS is inspiring.
- 04 Likewise, it is recommended to **BROADEN ITS SCOPE** and initiate its implementation in all countries where MZC is present, including Spain. The use of new information technologies and social networks can partially alleviate the difficulty in accessing victims and communities in the COVID-19 context.
- 05 A **COMMUNICATION AND ADVOCACY STRATEGY** is needed based on the information generated by the SAT-GV on the (in)security situation of Malian women and girls and their relevance as peacebuilders. To this end, it would be of interest to create an online platform with an accessible configuration.

To donors:

01 More resources, accountability and political will need to be mobilized to implement commitments on equality, peace and sustainable development, such as the SDGs and SDG16 that would make the Nexus principles a reality.

Despite political declarations, 89 countries, including Spain and Mali⁹, currently have these priorities concentrated in an MPS Action Plan. Only 33% of them have a budget (Peacewomen). Neither Spain nor Mali have allocated resources. On the other hand, preventive actions are scarcely addressed by donors who mostly embrace a militarised vision of security, dispute resolution, and the “protection” of civilians during conflicts (UN Women, 2015, p. 198).

“Women, peace and security is about preventing war, not about making war safer for women.”
(UN Women, 2015)

Specifically, it is recommended to:

Increase support for local feminist organizations and women’s associations involved in peace prevention and peace building.

Allocate increased resources to strengthen gender mainstreaming in the implementation of local violence prevention, recovery and positive peace policies.

Support comprehensive protection for women and girls who are victims of VAWG.

Provide financial support for women’s economic empowerment.

02 Finally, it is necessary to monitor the **RISE OF EXTREMISM AND EXCLUSIONARY POLITICS**, not only in Mali, which threaten the commitments to equality, peace and human security driven by the 2030 and MPS agenda. This rise makes it even more difficult to obtain resources and advance women’s rights, which is increasingly challenged at the global level. On the other hand, it affects the reduction of civic space and the role of civil society organizations in the defense of HRDs. This concern has been taken up in the last meeting of the Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediator Networks in October 2020.

ENDNOTES

¹Composed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent ones, and implemented through National Action Plans (NAPs): Spanish NAP II (2017); EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security (2018).

²100% of the women MZC works with in Sikasso and Bamako have been cut, which is not the case in Gao.

³We refer to the methodology of social theatre or “Theatre of the Oppressed” developed by Augusto Boal, used by MZC as a tool for building global citizenship for the transformation and eradication of VAW.

⁴There is a common belief that marriage protects girls from violence.

⁵These principles are: Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence.

⁶In addition to the 2030 Agenda and the above-mentioned agenda, the European Consensus on Development (2017) recognizes women and girls as key actors in development, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and humanitarian response.

⁷See Agirregomezkorta (2018).

⁸South Sudan and Yemen received EUR 1 million and EUR 810,000 respectively. Mali received EUR 18.7 million, of which EUR 6.5 million was for grants for asylum, refuge and social and health care in Temporary Stay Centres for Immigrants..

⁹More info at: <https://www.peacewomen.org/action-plan/national-action-plan-mali>

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
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The challenge of the Triple Nexus Approach in the reality of the fragile state of Guatemala

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Tzuk Kim Pop/Reality of Aid -Latin America and the Caribbean/IDO Movement

Guatemala survived 36 years¹ of internal armed conflict due to three structural causes: poverty, racism and exclusion of indigenous peoples, and the closure of democratic spaces. The war entered a pacification process due to international pressure and accompaniment, and in December 1996 the Peace Accords were signed.

The country is lagging behind in human development, with a human development index of 0.666 and a chronic child malnutrition rate of 49% (UNDP, 2020). In addition to marked economic, political,

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social and gender inequality, which is accentuated in rural and indigenous territories (Action Against Hunger, 2021).

The social conflict over land², access to justice and democracy shows that public institutions, the justice system and the exercise of governance suffer from ungovernability, fragility and the absence of peace.

The effects of state fragility and the promotion of violence have had an impact on women's vulnerability, the country has one of the most alarming rates of femicide and violence against women, along with impunity reaching 97% of prosecuted cases (CICIG, 2018). The state not only fails to guarantee the right to life, but also fails to place the human being at the centre of development. Social conflict and deficiencies in the population's basic public services can be explained by the high levels of corruption, embezzlement and impunity of the successive governments of "the democratic era", since democracy based on elections and the political party system has proved to be an inexhaustible source of perversion.

There has been a process of co-optation of the state by organized crime³ that has led to the point of having a link between politics and organized crime, which is manifested in the participation of illicit capital flows in electoral campaigns, the election of courts and the definition of political positions in collusion with the interests of these groups.⁴

The economic crisis, ungovernability and violence produce migratory flows and the priorities in the directionality

of international cooperation funds have changed, as the focus has shifted from social projects to projects linked to geostrategic interests of extraction and dispossession of natural resources in indigenous territories linked to transnational companies from Europe, the United States and Canada.⁵

ANALYSIS OF THE TRIPLE NEXUS VARIABLES IN GUATEMALA

The notions of development in Guatemala have been promoted exogenously and obey an agenda of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and more recently the European Union. Guatemala has received almost USD 400 million in Official Development Assistance and USD 40 million in humanitarian and food aid (OECD, 2019). However, there has been a lack of coordination and complementarity between the different agencies of the UN system, and even less complementarity in operational work and methodologies in terms of development and alignment with national priorities (SEGEPLAN, 2019). The relationship between humanitarian action and culture of peace projects, which are the basis of what is known as the Triple Nexus, has also been conspicuously absent.

At the 2019 annual meeting of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) review, it was clearly stated: "... it has not been possible to avoid that, although agencies look to the UNDAF as an overarching framework, their essential interest is in how they contribute to their own programme." And as the report points out, "[h]aving financial resources is not enough to move

towards results.” It also notes that the thematic diversity, the breadth of partner institutions and the lack of alignment of Joint Programmes diminish the chances of making progress towards achieving outputs and outcomes (SEGEPLAN, 2019).

Humanitarian Action

The year 2018 saw clear examples of coordination and complementarity gaps on the ground. A crisis provoked by the violent eruption of the Volcán de Fuego that devastated nearby populations and caused a serious humanitarian crisis exposed coordination problems between the Guatemalan government and UN cooperation agencies (OCHA, FAO, UNDP, and UNFPA). Given the government’s late request for international aid, the evident lack of preparedness of the governmental entity in charge of disaster response CONRED (National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction), and the UN agencies, which worked trying to act simultaneously and in a coordinated manner from the installation of the humanitarian clusters.

The result was improvised and overcrowded shelters in public school facilities in several municipalities. The uncoordinated and centralized aid, the long stay in shelters and the conditioning of the congress of funds for loans. In the case of loans, mismanagement of aid, which was given directly to people not directly affected, proselytizing and political campaigning by public officials were denounced.

Another more recent example is the devastating passage of hurricanes ETA and IOTA through the northern and

Atlantic regions of Guatemala, which caused severe flooding of impoverished indigenous populations, which, in addition to being in the context of the pandemic, was met with a delayed response from the Guatemalan state. One aspect to highlight were the multiple reports of rape of minors and the increase in the situation of gender violence, mainly caused by overcrowding, lack of control and security measures in the shelters, but above all, a clear lack of protocols in humanitarian attention. Once again, CONRED’s late response and coordination with UN agencies and other cooperation organizations was seriously slowed down and actions were limited due to the government’s bureaucracy and incapacity.

The human and material cost was very high and the psychological and physical consequences will be permanent in many cases, especially due to reports of rape of minors and children, as well as increased violence against women. In addition to this humanitarian crisis, actions were not addressed in an inter-agency manner, especially with regard to medium- and long-term development aspects. According to the online magazine *The World Order*, this is compounded by the scourge of government corruption (Canora, 2021).

Humanitarian Action in Guatemala has not achieved full coordination and coherence between development cooperation and the Guatemalan government. It suffices to observe the handling of the recent humanitarian crises caused by hurricanes ETA and IOTA, the so-called migrant caravans and the violent eruption of the Fuego volcano, which have required and

to some extent obliged the agencies of the United Nations system in Guatemala to establish more effective inter-institutional coordination with the governmental entities in charge and counterparts of the Guatemalan government.

In the field of humanitarian crises, greater coordination has been attempted with the creation of clusters through inter-agency participation and coordination. This has not yet taken root in all the structures of the UN system, much less in the necessary coordination with the international cooperation agencies of the different member states of the European Union, the United States and the United Nations, among others.

Humanitarian action in Guatemala has been slow to evolve, given that there is neither a normative framework nor a public policy that directly regulates it, which is why more charitable approaches have prevailed and not the human rights approach that has gained body and space at present by focusing efforts on the attention of human beings, their needs, but above all their rights.

One element to highlight is that humanitarian action is permanently linked to international geopolitical dynamics. For example, the reaction to the passage of Honduran migrants through Guatemalan territory became the perfect excuse for the signing of a Safe Third Country Agreement with the Trump administration, as well as the conditioning of aid to stop the migratory flow to the United States.

The humanitarian crisis provoked by the eruption of the Volcán de Fuego and its

supposed attention allowed the approval of a series of international loans as a national emergency, but the last thing they were earmarked for was “humanitarian” attention to the victims. The basic and internationally recognized principles of non-discrimination and do no harm are not applied in the management of humanitarian crises in Guatemala. Although UN agencies are directly involved, their mandate of neutrality and independence contrasts with national decision-makers who apply criteria of a political and clientelist nature.

This situation has meant that international aid is not adequately complemented by far-reaching programmes and is therefore seriously compromised, especially in terms of sustainability and efficiency. In the end, this situation not only fails to achieve effectiveness and coordination with an adequate development approach, but also exacerbates its impact and undermines the self-management possibilities of the affected populations.

In terms of the analysis of humanitarian action and the actors involved, there has been a growing demand in recent years for improved coordination and complementarity of response plans in a country characterized by multiple vulnerabilities and weak institutional capacity of national entities.

Humanitarian action in Guatemala is a matter of utmost importance, but unfortunately it is plagued by inefficiency and government corruption that seriously compromises its capacity and reach to serve the most disadvantaged people in a country with multiple threats.

Development

In Guatemala in recent years, transnational companies such as Movistar with the Telefónica Foundation, Unión Fenosa and the Spanish company ACS -Actividades de Construcción y Servicios-, whose president is Florentino Pérez, have implemented development projects such as family gardens, school gardens, improvement of schools, improvement of road sections, improvement of forest nurseries, prior to the introduction of mega hydroelectric projects (BBC, 2016). In addition, monoculture and the conduction and extraction of electricity, with the consent and licenses or concessions of the Guatemalan state. These activities are considered as development actions by new cooperation actors: private companies.

In terms of development in Guatemala, there is a national development plan called Plan K'atun Nuestra Guatemala 2032, which was developed in 2014 under the perspective of a long-term plan oriented towards the dynamic integration of the Development Goals and National Priorities with the agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals. This plan does not consider or prioritize the links between development and humanitarian action, given that from its design and methodological approach humanitarian actions are developed in parallel, this participatory formulation exercise exemplifies that although Guatemala has a national development plan there are no links between development and humanitarian action, limiting its scope and comprehensiveness in action. The Plan K'atun Nuestra Guatemala 2032, methodologically developed by

SEGEPLAN with the financial support of the United Nations system (ECLAC/ UNFPA/UNDP) and the subsequent integration with the 17 SDGs and the 2030 Agenda, was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with funds considered as International Cooperation and Development Assistance. According to sources, the funds amount to EUR 50,000.

The plan has had a low capacity for both implementation and articulation with international cooperation and with the UN system itself. This is due both to the volatility of government officials, as there is no effective civil service law and they are frequently removed, which does not allow for continuity of processes in terms of public policy; most of the commitments are governmental and not state commitments.

There is also an entrenched bureaucracy in multilateral institutions that conditions capacities and speed in implementing the much-needed approach of linking the three pillars under a comprehensive development perspective.

Guatemala has been a laboratory for the implementation of development models conditioned exogenously to the agenda and orientations of international cooperation agencies and organizations. Development models have been implemented based on the opening of markets, incentives for large-scale industry, monoculture, latifundia and currently the logic of public-private action, leaving social development, investment in health, education and social security in the background.

In the specific case of the country, due to the weight of the ethnic, cultural and linguistic component of indigenous peoples, there has been an evident process of intentional and institutional exclusion, given that there has been no participation or consultation with indigenous peoples in the construction of their own development model. Guatemala has signed all the international conventions, such as ILO Convention 169 and the UN Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, yet they remain invisible and constitutionally unrecognized. Therefore, there is a separation between the discourse and practice of development where indigenous peoples are not present.

The cosmogonic richness and diversity and the construction of an endogenous bottom-up model have developed alternatively. The influence of the South American model of Buen Vivir and the reaffirmation of the Ut'z Kaslemal (Good Living) of the Mayan peoples of Guatemala is not reflected in the so-called National Development Plan K'atun Nuestra Guatemala 2032, despite the fact that the term K'atun (the name of the plan) belongs to the Mayan numeration. This is strongly conditioned by the farm-state vision inherited from the neo-colonial and quasi-feudal vision that still exists in rural Guatemala.

Agrarian conflict over land, lack of access to the means of production, conflicts over communal land tenure and ownership, and a permanent dispute over effective and culturally relevant models of justice have been widening the gap between rich and poor and promoting exclusionary models of development. This is despite promoting

themselves as inclusive, humanist centres and maintaining coherence and alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals, which ends up being eminently figurative. Development can be seen to be folklorized in images, reports, voluntary reports or government studies.

Suffice it to say that rural development, indigenous territoriality and the recognition and exercise of the specific rights of indigenous peoples are recognized as the most neglected aspects of compliance with the Peace Accords in the official text of the National Rural Development Policy (PNDRI).

In this situation, it is totally inoperative to assume that the development approach is being coordinated and harmonized with the other pillars of the Triple Nexus. It should be noted that development indicators, particularly for indigenous peoples, have regressed and have been further compromised by the effects of the SARS-CoV2 or COVID-19 pandemic.

The new development modality is presented as investment in hydroelectric, energy and monoculture mega-projects (African palm, sugar cane and coffee). Development is guided by the inclusion of so-called new development actors, such as public-private partnerships, which become the spearhead of new forms of investment and continue to promote an extractivist approach (mining, hydrocarbons and water). Under this new conception, the Guatemalan government functions as a wild card for foreign investment and the elaboration of a pro-investment national regulatory framework. This reality is provoking a political and


economic dispute over territory and new approaches to development that are being waged at the community and territorial level by indigenous peoples.

It is important to note that entities such as the UNDP have played a major role, both in the debate on the development approach and in the emphasis on the situation of indigenous peoples. However, the capacity to bring about substantive change has been limited.

The development model has been somewhat imposed from an exogenous point of view and this undermines its sustainability and capacity for implementation in Guatemala.

Peace

In the area of peace, we highlight as an example the low level of implementation of dialogue and peace, which can be seen in the following contradiction: The United Nations system has opted to introduce components to promote justice, inclusive societies and tolerance in its projects in order to reduce discrimination against LGTBIQ+ people, women, indigenous people and other vulnerable groups. However, there have been low levels of coordination with the State of Guatemala and attacks on the institutional framework created in the framework of the Peace Accords have intensified, resulting in a conflict in terms of little or no willingness to implement processes of dialogue and inclusion on the part of the Government of Guatemala and the United Nations system in the country.



Guatemala is sadly a reference point for political and gender-based violence; therefore, institutions that promote spaces for dialogue and peace should be promoted through governmental action and as a priority of the state. However, the reality is quite the opposite. A clear example of this is the Guatemalan government's decision to close, as one of the first actions of its mandate, the institution known as the Secretariat for Peace, SEPAZ.⁶ The mandate of this entity was precisely the promotion of dialogue as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism, the promotion of a culture of peace and the vindication of the victims of the conflict. Another example of the loss of focus on the importance of promoting dialogue and a culture of peace has been the open confrontation with the institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH). This attack has taken the form of legal actions to reduce capacities, the drastic reduction of its operating budget and the weakening of the autonomy policies of a human rights defense entity.

The threats to close the Presidential Secretariat for Women, whose mandate is to watch over women's rights in a country with record figures for gender-based violence, are evidence of the attack on all official and alternative human rights institutions, to the detriment of the Peace Accords and in clear violation of a series of international conventions and treaties.

The fact that the solution to the internal armed conflict was negotiated and sponsored by the United Nations and a number of countries friendly to the peace process, as well as the designation of a special mission to verify compliance with

these agreements known as MINUGUA, gave rise to a new vision of the culture of peace in Guatemala. However, as the timetable and commitments were not fulfilled and the structural causes that provoked the internal war returned with greater force, added to the climate of violence and inequality, there has been an open deterioration that has led to ungovernability and the public perception of living in a failed state.

The fragility of justice institutions to implement the administration of justice in a prompt and timely manner, the non-recognition of legal pluralism, the permanent denial of customary law and the persecution of defenders of life and territory, have created a situation of high conflict and growing insecurity, especially for women, girls and vulnerable groups.

Guatemala is one of the main violators of the specific rights of indigenous peoples, women and other vulnerable groups that provoke conflict and political and social instability. The superficial attitude of the authorities in the face of serious rights violations and the absence of mechanisms for dialogue and peace promotion clearly shows the lack of priority given to such an important issue as mental health and the promotion of a culture of peace in a country that has survived 36 years of war and the aftermath of violence so deeply rooted in the social dynamics.

The Guatemalan government has been undermining the importance and capacity of the commitments assumed as a state within the framework of the peace process that concluded with the Peace Accords,

attacking or disappearing the institutions that emerged from them.

ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA

The government of Guatemala, which subscribes to the 2030 Agenda commitments, in particular Sustainable Development Goal 17, which promotes coordination and partnerships for development, has made little progress on an inter-institutional coordination agenda and even less on the implementation of the Triple Nexus.

There are systemic weaknesses in the Guatemalan state that present it as a fragile state, often incapable of coherently and articulately executing the decisions and proposals assumed or committed to in the international agenda. The heavy bureaucratic burden, the absence of public policies in many areas of public administration, problems of execution and widespread corruption in the state apparatus, including ministries and state secretariats, have further slowed down implementation processes.

In terms of governmental dynamics related to the Triple Nexus approach, given the continuous mobility of officials and those responsible for development, humanitarian action and the culture of peace, organizations such as the Peace Secretariat, currently in the process of being dissolved, the National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction (CONRED), which is the lead agency for humanitarian action and institutional counterpart of OCHA, as well as the General Secretariat for Planning (SEGEPLAN), institutional counterpart

of the UNDP in combination with the Executive Coordination Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, SCEP, which through memoranda of understanding and country strategy promote the thematic plans in parallel and with relative coordination between them.

It is also evident that the vision of government programmes of an assistance-based, short-term and clientelist nature, mostly focused on political and electoral proselytizing, has caused a clear lag in the capacity to implement and connect the Triple Nexus approach in a country that is permanently experiencing humanitarian emergencies, internal and external migratory movements, as well as a climate of violence and absence of peace.

All this suggests that there are serious doubts that the Guatemalan government will be able to successfully implement the Triple Nexus vision in the short to medium term, given the low level of implementation.

CONCLUSION

01 The Triple Nexus approach is not very visible in the actions of bi- and multilateral cooperation entities, as well as their institutional referents that form part of the Guatemalan government, and is therefore clearly unknown to all actors and new cooperation actors (NGOs and companies).

02 Humanitarian aid has clear and evident gaps in inter-institutional coordination for joint attention to emergency situations. There is a lack of coordination processes and alignment of actions in a plan and roadmap to measure compliance.

03 Humanitarian aid lacks coordination both with the Guatemalan government and with other development actors such as companies and/or national or international CSOs, which has been evident in the partial or parallel actions that have taken place in recent humanitarian crises.

04 The main problems faced by humanitarian aid in order to be effective are the government's late action, both in terms of the processes of identification and structured analysis of disaster response needs, the low installed capacity, and on repeated occasions there has been a late international call for aid from the agencies in charge and from the Guatemalan state itself.

05 The scourges of corruption and the politicization of aid have a significant impact on reducing the quality and effectiveness of humanitarian aid, which considerably reduces both the results and the effectiveness of aid programmes financed in whole or in part by international cooperation.

06 In terms of the development component, there are problems of alignment between the National Priorities and the Sustainable Development Agenda, especially in the necessary linkages between humanitarian action and medium- and long-term development actions.

07 The scarce link between development and humanitarian aid has in some cases generated conflicts over communities' need to access resources, as occurred recently in the context of the crisis generated by the tropical storms, where the United Nations system and other cooperation agencies worked in a disjointed manner, generating duplication or, worse still, gaps in support for the neediest communities.

08 Development and humanitarian actions coexist and are often carried out in parallel, without institutional coordination mechanisms and the establishment of a single roadmap. As a result, they often end up having different objectives despite working with the same population, in the same territory or with common funders.

09 In the case of Guatemala, an additional complexity is represented by the ethno-cultural component, as well as the prejudices and stigmatization of the indigenous or native population, and the non-compliance with international agreements such as ILO Convention 169.

10 In relation to the area of peace, considered as the third component of the Triple Nexus, government programmes based on the promotion of the culture of peace have been reduced and in some cases completely closed at the institutional level by the government's own decision, so that their joint implementation in the logic of the Triple Nexus and the dialogue component is minimal.

11 In Guatemala, exogenous development models have been promoted that obey the agenda of multilateral organizations (USAID, 1982) and more recently the European Union, in terms of population control policy, which has had an impact on the use of contraceptive methods and the promotion of companies as new development actors (OECD, 2011). This has had an impact on indigenous territoriality.

12 The Government of Guatemala, despite being a signatory to international agreements and having the responsibility to implement public policies or implementation mechanisms for

the case of the Triple Nexus, clearly lacks political will, has practically no dissemination and is evidently unable to coordinate a strategy for the implementation of this vision.

RECOMMENDATIONS

01 Given the evident lack of knowledge of the Triple Nexus approach in the actions of both international cooperation and governmental entities, and even of civil society organizations themselves, it is clear that a strong process of socialization, promotion, debate and discussion of this approach is required. Actions that must be oriented towards building consensus and agreements with cultural relevance, inclusion and broad participation of indigenous peoples, women, children and young migrants and other vulnerable groups, who under the rights approach become rights holders with the capacity to demand them.

02 Clearly assign the role of duty bearers to government entities for inclusion in the National Development Plan and in the priorities of public institutions directly linked to the Triple Nexus.

03 Create mechanisms for coordination, planning, implementation and joint accountability between international cooperation, governmental and non-governmental entities.

- 04 Attention to agrarian conflicts and indigenous territoriality must be transversal to development and humanitarian actions.
- 05 The promotion of a national policy of a culture of peace, mental health and development education, both in formal education and in community and territorial processes, must become a basis for substantially changing the situation of insecurity in the long term. In this sense, the modification of curricula must incorporate these approaches.
- 06 Given the importance of the Triple Nexus in generating development integrality and the fact that its pillars can make Official Development Assistance more efficient, this should be conditional on the state's commitments to the Guatemalan government.
- 07 Regulatory frameworks must be reformulated to guarantee the rights agenda that allows for the harmonization and alignment of national policies with the commitments of the multilateral agenda, implying the conditioning of funds and resources to the fulfilment of this agenda.
- 08 Promoting a dialogue for the construction of a new state with a vision of endogenous and plurinational development becomes fundamental.
- 09 It is necessary to carry out a prioritization exercise in terms of budgetary and cooperation resources, to focus on programmes that make support for humanitarian actions clearly visible, strengthening national capacities and reinforcing the role of United Nations agencies in humanitarian action processes.
- 10 Advocate that official financial aid should no longer be tied to interests that undermine sustainable development and directly affect the rights of peoples, especially indigenous peoples.
- 11 Demand greater alignment of aid to improve its effectiveness and impact.
- 12 Generate greater ODA control and monitoring processes to ensure transparency and accountability.
- 13 Promote multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms to enable civil society organizations to participate in the implementation processes of the Triple Nexus assistance.
- 14 It is necessary to build models with an endogenous, contextualized, culturally sustainable perspective that can create conditions for the construction of a development model with perspectives and identity.

15 Although the K'atun National Development Plan 2032 was elaborated in a methodological and participatory manner through the System of Development Councils, it lacks a reflection on the model of development with identity and cultural belonging that recovers the model of Good Living - Utz K'aslemal - of the Mayans and favours the vision of the Triple Nexus, particularly with regard to the vision of development.

16 For the implementation of the Triple Nexus, it is recommended that the State of Guatemala assume its full responsibility as the responsible party, as a State policy and as a valid interlocutor between the different actors involved in the effective implementation of the Triple Nexus.

LINES OF ACTION BY THE STAKEHOLDER

International Cooperation (Multilateral Cooperation Agencies)

01 Reorganization of the mandates and coordination mechanisms of the UN system agencies in Guatemala for the cross-cutting application of the Triple Nexus with emphasis on UNDP, IOM and OCHA.

02 Opening of an international cooperation dialogue with the government for the harmonization of the 2030 Agenda, in particular SDG 17, national plans and the Triple Nexus.

- 03** Build a short-, medium-, and long-term roadmap for the integration of an inter-agency agenda based on the integration and complementarity of the development, humanitarian and peace approaches.
- 04** Carry out a budget exercise that conditions the effective implementation of the Triple Nexus to the Guatemalan government and access to cooperation funds.
- 05** From the perspective of the human rights approach, international cooperation agencies and entities must assume their role as duty bearers.

Civil Society Organizations

- 01** Openness to civil society organizations to play a more prominent role in planning, coordination, implementation and accountability that privilege the Triple Nexus in Guatemala.
- 02** Build an endogenous and inclusive development model through a broad dialogue with valid interlocutors from the different indigenous peoples of Guatemala.
- 03** Create alliances in civil society organizations to have greater capacity to influence change in national public policies, development plans and access to financial resources.

- 04** Build a platform for dialogue with the Guatemalan government and international cooperation for the effective implementation of the Triple Nexus in development policies and the implementation of the National Development Plan.
 - 05** Promote and disseminate the Triple Nexus model between civil society organizations, indigenous peoples' representations and structures and the different sectors and platforms of civil society.
 - 06** Civil society organizations must carry out an exercise of enforceability of rights from a human rights approach, becoming true rights holderst.
- 04** Establish a strategy of visibility and inclusion of the different organizations, platforms and collectives from the perspective of the Triple Nexus, in particular the promotion of the culture of peace.
 - 05** Implement international commitments related to the 2030 agenda and in particular SDG 17 in relation to partnerships for development.
 - 06** Assume their role as duty bearers from a rights-based approach, responding to the commitments and obligations of the national and international development agenda to which Guatemala has subscribed.

Government of Guatemala

- 01** The Government of Guatemala and the public bodies involved should promote and implement actions for an effective implementation of the Triple Nexus in actions directly linked to national development.
- 02** Lead and actively participate in the national dialogue for the implementation of the Triple Nexus and its dynamic linkages with international cooperation entities and CSOs.
- 03** Carry out a participatory national budget process to identify public resources for the implementation of the Triple Nexus in development actions.

ENDNOTES

¹Over 200,000 dead and missing; 1 million internally displaced persons and 300,000 refugees.

²The dispossession of indigenous territories, megaprojects, extractivism and monoculture by national and transnational companies has increased, provoking greater conflict and pressure on territories and peoples. This has increased the activity of defenders of life, territory and Mother Earth.

³Organized crime in the country manifests itself mainly in drug trafficking, human trafficking and the proliferation of gangs, kidnapping, extortion and organ trafficking.

⁴In the electoral process of the 2019 general elections, the United States captured and has open proceedings against two presidential candidates, Mario Estrada/UCN and Manuel Baldizón/LIDER, and seven Guatemalan mayors for drug trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering. See Prensa Libre article: Narcotráfico y política, el vínculo que empaña los procesos electorales desde 1986.

⁵A clear example is the America Growth initiative, which will invest USD 60 billion to promote public-private investments in power generation, interconnection and infrastructure.


⁶An entity that formed part of a series of institutions generated and promoted in the Peace Accords.

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Dams and Development in Indigenous Peoples' Communities in the Philippines

 KABATAAN PARA SA TRIBUNG PILIPINO (KATRIBU) YOUTH

One of the central premises of the Triple Nexus discourse is the necessity, in conflict situations, to go beyond actions intended to save lives, alleviate immediate suffering, and maintain human dignity. Beyond that, it calls for genuine efforts to address the root causes of conflicts, primarily through various forms of development action, and secondarily through actions geared towards a long-term and lasting peace.

This paper seeks to add nuance to such discourse by assessing development actions that do not address the root causes of existing conflicts, but instead

exacerbate them, especially in terms of their effects in the field of development and in causing and escalating human-rights violations.

BACKGROUND

The Philippine government's National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in 2000 estimated the indigenous peoples (IPs) population in the country at 12-15 million. This is 15-20% of the current 108 million population of the country, with 60% in Mindanao, 30% in Luzon, and 10% in Visayas (Carino, 2012). IPs, despite their small population, occupy cultural zones that cover 44% of the country's land area (Lalata, 2003). These historical domains are cultivated by major IP groups which are: the Lumad of Mindanao, the Igorot of Cordillera, the Ayta of Central Luzon, the Dumagat of Sierra Madre, the Mangyan of Mindoro, the Tumandok and Ati of Panay, and indigenous communities in Palawan (Sandugo, 2019).

Historically, the IPs retained their relative independence during the Spanish colonization by defending their territories. The Spaniards robbed natives of their land under the *encomienda* system and converted land to produce export-oriented goods on haciendas. Remnants of this system have persisted to the present day through practices such as converting communal ancestral lands into individually titled private lands and dams, among others (Miura, 2016). After the Spanish colonization, bureaucratic processes were retained that enabled the displacement of IPs by mega dams for the production of electricity, to provide irrigation services, and establish flood control.

The government's requirement of formal registrations of land titles has enabled intensive land-grabbing of ancestral lands, which are being titled through legal circumvention by corporations. These are made possible with government policies such as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. Under the IPRA, mechanisms for IPs to own land were created, such as the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) and Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). The FPIC allows the IPs to decide whether to approve or reject development plans in their land areas. Companies are free to negotiate with communities in the presence of the NCIP, while offering large sums of money (Walpole & Annawi, 2011). Evidently, the law gives little security to IPs safeguarding their land and future as they have not engaged in market economics or corporate transactions. Even without a formal land title, corporations are also able to source licenses from the government through fraudulent land reforms such as the Aquino administration's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1988 (Molintas, n.d.).

These laws and policies come in handy for the Philippine government in implementing its economic agenda—which often serve to further corporate interests with regard to access to the country's land, rivers, and mineral wealth, to the detriment of the country's IPs. This agenda runs in conflict with IPs' lives and historical rights to their ancestral lands, the Philippines' cultural diversity and preservation of natural resources and biodiversity conservation—to which IPs are important, the environment, and with national and international recognition of IPs' land rights.

At present, destructive mega dams are among the government's development projects that threaten the IPs and their ancestral domains. These include (Ayroso, 2017):

- The Kaliwa-Kanan-Laiban Dams in Southern Luzon,
- The Chico River Pump Irrigation Project in Kalinga,
- The Jalaur Dam and Pan-ay Dam in Panay island,
- The Balog-balog Dam in Tarlac province,
- The Panay River Basin Integrated Development in Capiz,
- The Pulangi Mega Dam V in North Cotabato and Bukidnon, and
- The Alimit Hydropower Complex in Ifugao.

Often, the implementation of these projects includes intervention by the military and the police. When IPs resist forced evacuations caused by development projects, state forces respond with intimidation, harassment, killings of IP leaders, and militarization their communities under the pretext of “counterinsurgency” and “counterterrorism” operations (Karapatan Alliance, n.d.).

The government's development projects that trample on IPs' right to their ancestral domains and their very lives, as well as the government's use of force in implementing these projects, lie at the root of the conflict between the Philippine government and the country's IPs. The IPs are waging various forms of resistance: holding protest actions, forming organizations, and soliciting the support of the general

public, among others. Some IPs are also joining the rebel guerilla group, New People's Army or NPA, which opposes the government's development projects and its repressive measures and champions IPs' right to their ancestral domains. The NPA operates in the Philippines' countryside, including IP lands, and has been engaged in an armed conflict with the Philippine government for decades now.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROJECTS

This paper seeks to evaluate four dam projects: the Jalaur Megadam project in Iloilo, the Kaliwa Dam project in Quezon, the Chico River Pump Irrigation project in Kalinga, and the Wawa Dam project in Rizal.

The Jalaur Mega Dam is spearheaded by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) (Mongaya, 2016). The contractor for the project is Korean firm Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. (Sornito, 2018).

According to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), the Kaliwa Dam aims to develop a new water source for MWSS service areas (New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam Project, n.d.).

According to the NIA, the CRPIP aims to irrigate 8,700 hectares in Kalinga and Cagayan, particularly 7,530 ha in Tuao and Piat, Cagayan and 1,170 ha in Pinukpuk, Kalinga, and will benefit 4,350 families (NIA-CAR, n.d.).

The 500-MW Wawa Pumped-Storage Hydropower Project is developed by Olympia Violago Water and Power Inc,

**Dams in
Indigenous Lands,
Locations and
Funding**

**Jalaur Mega Dam
or Jalaur River
Multipurpose Project**

Kaliwa Dam

**Chico River Pump
Irrigation Project
or CRPIP**

**500-MW Wawa
Pumped-Storage
Hydropower Project**

Location

Funding

**Affected
Ethno-
Linguistic
Group**

Calinog, Iloilo	PhP 11.2 billion, funded by Korean Export-Import Bank, involving contractor Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.	Tumandok
Sitio Cablao, Barangay Pagsangahan, General Nakar, Quezon and Sitio Queborosa, Barangay Magsaysay, Infanta, Quezon	PhP 12.2 billion, funded by Official Development Assistance. 85% of the project cost will be paid by a loan from the China Export-Import Bank. The rest will be shouldered by the Philippine government	Dumagat-Remontado
Along the Chico River in Barangay Katabbogan, Pinukupuk, Kalinga	PhP 4.37 billion. Will be funded by China through the China Export-Import Bank	Igorot
Antipolo City, San Mateo and Rodriguez municipalities	Php 66 billion. The Olympia Violago Water and Power Inc signed an agreement with PowerChina for the project.	Dumagat

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Table 1. Dams in Indigenous Lands, Locations and Funding.

Source: Mongaya 2016, Sornito 2018, New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam Project n.d., Ranada 2020, NIA-CAR n.d., Olympia Violago Power 2017, Timetric 2018, and Philstar 2017.

(OVPI), which is a joint venture between San Lorenzo Ruiz Builder (SLRB) and Hydreq, an arm of Singapore-based energy and infrastructure investor Equis Energy (Olympia Violago Power, 2017; Timetric, 2018). OVPI signed an agreement with the Power Construction Corporation of China or PowerChina for the design, procurement, and construction of the said project (Philstar, 2017).

The Jalaur Mega Dam and the CRPIP are under the Duterte government’s “Build, Build, Build” program (Sornito, 2018). The CRPIP is the first flagship infrastructure project under the program that is financed by China (NIA-CAR, n.d.).

Data indicate that the majority of mega dam projects are propped by foreign or multi-

national corporations (MNCs) and their associates at the local level in collaboration with various government agencies such as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), National Irrigation Administration (NIA), and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Most of the dams, if not operated through Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements, are funded by Korean Export-Import Bank, China Export-Import Bank, Olympia

Impacts of Dams on Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines

Denial of peoples' right to water

Insufficient or completely no water services provided to indigenous communities within their ancestral lands, due to inefficiency and overpricing

Destruction of sacred and historic sites

Sacred sites placed at risk of being flooded completely (e.g., burial grounds), violating indigenous culture and beliefs

Impingement on IP's "right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies," according to the UN Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples

Displacement

IPs forced off their land due to development projects like dams being built on their communities

Discriminating IPs in talking them to signing documents they don't fully understand - without a Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC); most indigenous communities are denied to their right to education, hence the emergence of indigenous schools such as the Lumad Bakwit Schools

Land Grabbing and Loss of Livelihood

IPs forced to relocate to informal settlements or substandard houses provided by the government due to their lands being taken from them

IP communities struggle with poverty and hunger due to source of livelihood impacted by dams' presence (e.g. low fish produce/harvest)

Militarization and Human Rights Violations

State forces are deployed in IP communities that are prospects for "development projects"

Military presence in IP communities leads to red tagging, harassment, illegal arrests, and killings of IPs, suspecting them as communists

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Table 2. Impacts of Dams to Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines
Source: Researcher's own data

Viologo Water and Power Inc, (OVPI), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Official Development Assistance (ODA) among others.

Dams are constructed to serve as barriers to flowing bodies of water such as rivers. They are used for irrigation, hydroelectric energy, for water consumption of households, businesses and industries. They are therefore used for agricultural, industrial, and for residential purposes. There are dams in the Philippines that are both run by the government and private institutions. Several dam projects are also in the process of being built despite raised conflict and opposition (Ranada, 2015).

Dams often create natural lakes called reservoirs, and one of its purposes is to outsource water during shortages. During the dry season in the Philippines, water shortage problems may hit its peak resulting in a crisis. On the other hand, governments justify building dams during this season due to the persisting water supply shortage.

A case in point would be the events of March 2019, when the water supply shortage in Metro Manila escalated rapidly, putting almost every Metro Manila's resident in a state of panic. Manila Water reasoned that the demand for water supply has increased a hundred and forty million liters per day (MLD), increasing the 1,600 MLD allocation into 1,740 MLD (Rivas, 2019). Due to the unexpected water interruption, several personalities from the government and even ordinary people had different remarks on what was happening. Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez III, on March 13, 2019, made a

statement that if the past administrations could have continued building the Kaliwa Dam project, a water crisis in Metro Manila would not have happened (Rivas, 2019).

EVALUATION

Most of the dams under evaluation were built on indigenous peoples' lands (see Table 1). These lands are where the IPs have dedicated their lives to preserving their culture and protecting the environment.

For the IPs, their territories are not just a source of their economic and cultural activities, but most importantly, a source of life. Land is the material basis of their collective identity, legacy and survival. It is not only limited to their land, but to everything in the immediate environment: the rivers, floras and faunas, forests, living species, and minerals that serve as the foundation for their culture and existence. Land for them consists of their livelihood, and the basis for generation upon generations of culture. It is their home, and the place where their children will grow up and live their lives. Their ancestral land is the bulwark of their identity as indigenous peoples. Land, therefore, is life for IPs—conversely, dams can mean death.

There are at least five detrimental social, economic, cultural and political effects of these dams on indigenous peoples (see Table 2).

Dams, just like any other development projects, should not be constructed without Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) from the affected indigenous communities. It is a form of contract which imposes an ethical requirement for

genuine consultation before an agreement can be reached between the developer/contractor and the affected population. An FPIC protects the indigenous peoples' right to their ancestral lands from development aggression and other forms of plunder, and hence should be genuinely secured.

For the Jalaur Mega Dam, the NIA served as project implementor and claimed to have secured the Tumandok's FPIC for the project. The claim is however erroneous for various reasons. The supposed consent was secured after, not before, the feasibility study for the project was submitted. The indigenous peoples who were consulted were not the ones whose lives and livelihood will be affected by the project, and were organized under the government's National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. The government enticed those consulted by mentioning the project's supposed benefits, while keeping silent on its negative effects. They also promised free education, health services, and jobs, a form of bribery which runs contrary to FPIC principles and procedures. Fact-finding missions in the area have also confirmed lapses in the government's drive to secure FPIC from the indigenous peoples (IPMSDL, 2018).

In the Cordillera region, the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project (CRPIP) violates the FPIC. In a statement released by Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) in March 2019, the CRPIP did not secure any FPIC from the communities affected and also did not conduct consultation to at least establish awareness regarding the project (CPA, 2019). The Local Government Units (LGUs) were also kept in the dark regarding

any information of the project due to the no show documents.

The Kaliwa Dam project also faces the same issues when it comes to the securing of FPIC. In September 2020, the Commission on Audit (COA) warned the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) for its negligence in pursuing the project despite the lack of consent from the affected indigenous peoples and for environmental concerns (CNN, 2020). Additionally, a loan agreement has already been signed and an access road has already been constructed despite the project's issues.

Due to the nature of development projects, IPs are being subjected to discrimination, displacement, harassment and human rights violations. The violation of the FPIC commits to the violation of indigenous peoples rights in all aspects.

Aside from the negative effects of dams on IPs and the environment, they also bring negative impacts to the economy of the Philippines. This is clearly illustrated in the water crisis being faced by the country. A water crisis can be prevented if there is a genuine approach to water distribution. Due to the privatization of water services, however, Maynilad and Manila Water failed to deliver quality public service to water consumers in Metro Manila and neighboring cities. New dam projects are also being pushed through despite the fact that some already existing dams can still be utilized, like the Wawa Dam in Rodriguez, Rizal. Currently, Wawa Dam was left as a recreational area and not a functional one which could add help in supplying water.

PHILIPPINES

DAMS AS DEVELOPMENT AGGRESSION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES



Last December 30, 2020, 9 Tumandoks were killed by the joint operations of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in several barangays in Panay.

Credits: Bulatlat

The fight against the construction of Kaliwa Dam project has long been standing due to the plunder it commits against the environment and the indigenous peoples of Rizal and Quezon.

Credits: Bulatlat



Intensified militarization of communities causes the forced evacuations of Lumad from their ancestral lands.

Credits: Davao Today

Another negative impact of dams on the country's economy is that they could be foreign debt-traps. Dams are built and funded through public-private partnerships and loans. The burden of paying these loaned mega funds to build mega dams are passed on to generations of Filipinos. This, in fact, has been the warning of independent think-tank Ibon Foundation, which claimed that big dam projects will increase government indebtedness. It noted that many of the dam projects, especially under the current Duterte administration, are hybrid Private-Public Partnership projects. The government builds these dams, usually with funds from Official Development Assistance, and then hands them over to the private sector which will operate and maintain them. Filipinos will be made to shoulder the costs of these dams through higher taxes and user fees (Ibon Foundation, 2018).

Also, if the Philippines fails to pay these debts, a piece of ancestral land would be served as a collateral, tying the deal with the loss of one of the country's land territories. The Kaliwa Dam project, for example, has been going on since the Marcos administration, along with the Laiban Dam. Due to the failed implementation, it was only until former President Benigno Aquino III's administration that the dam project was continued and was supported by Japanese funding.

These negative impacts of dams to the lives of the indigenous people are the reasons why they have to resist the projects and protect their ancestral lands which they consider as their life. With their resistance, human rights violations

against IP communities are documented by different organizations (see Table 3). Repression in their communities occurs as the dams are pushed by the government and as militarization intensifies.

In the case of Jalaur Mega dam, the project would displace 17,000 Tumandok individuals and at least 1.2 million residents. This would also deprive indigenous peoples, and those living near the site, their ancestral land and eventually submerge the houses and agricultural lands of the Tumandok people (Ellao, 2021). The construction of the dam poses a grave threat to the rights of the Tumandok indigenous group, although the project has already caused human rights violations to members of various indigenous communities opposing the construction of the project (Ellao, 2021).

Last December 30, 2020, the state perpetrated the massacre of nine (9) Tumandok individuals and the arrest of 16 leaders and members of indigenous organization, Tumandok nga Mangunguma nga Nagapangapin sa Duta kag Kabuhi (TUMANDUK), due to their strong opposition against the construction of the dam that would plunder their ancestral land and territories (Vital, 2021). This incident of intensified militarization and killings of individuals opposing the Jalaur Mega Dam is a prime case of harassment that indigenous groups face on a daily basis (Internet Public Library, n.d.).

The Kaliwa Dam Project would affect around 5,000 individuals situated in the ancestral land of the Dumagat-Remontado. In the case digest by Panaghiusa Philippine Network, it was noted that incidents

of red-tagging have been documented against several Dumagat-Remontado individuals who are active in protests against the project. The military circulated paraphernalia containing the faces and names of the IP activists maliciously claiming that they were members and sympathizers of armed revolutionary groups (Panaghiusa Network, 2020).

In addition to the human rights violations caused by the Kaliwa Dam, two Dumagat tribe members, Puroy dela Cruz and Randy “Pulong” dela Cruz, were two of the victims of the “Bloody Sunday” massacre, a term capturing the killing of several activists in the Southern Tagalog region in a single day, last March 7, 2021. They advocated for the rights of the indigenous peoples and fought against the controversial Kaliwa Dam Project (Macandili & Reid, 2021).

The operation, dubbed “Bloody Sunday” in the media, was confirmed by the Calabarzon police chief Brigadier General Felipe Natividad as compliance with President Duterte’s Executive Order No. 70, which ordered a whole-of-nation approach to ending the communist insurgency in the Philippines (Talabong, 2021). Even after the tragic death of the victims of “Bloody Sunday”, their bodies were held at the funeral home and the relatives had a hard time claiming their remains due to interference from the military (Torres-Tupas, 2021). Their remains were claimed only on March 12, 2021, 5 days after their tragic death (ABS-CBN News, 2021).

In 2019, the CPA and other indigenous peoples groups called for the suspension of the CRPIP due to manipulation of FPIC and the lack of awareness of the affected

communities regarding the provisions of the loan agreement, including the Chinese contractor and Chinese workers that will implement the project. The NCIP also called for the suspension of the project because the construction and earthmoving was already taking place within the domain even though the issuance of Certification Precondition is still pending (Apercu Consultants, Inc., n.d.; Cimat, 2019).

On August 6, 2020, a criminal case was filed against Cordillera people's leader Windel Bolinget and 10 other individuals in Davao del Norte for their alleged involvement in the murder of Garito Malibato on March 21, 2018. According to the Panaghiusa Philippine Network, Bolinget has never set foot in Kapalong, Davao del Norte where the killing happened. It should also be noted that in the local news, the brother of Garito, Datu Delio Malibo, have identified that the paramilitary Alamara was the perpetrator of the said murder.

On December 10, 2020, flyers indicating that Bolinget is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) were posted in the area that leads to his home. Bolinget is known as the chairperson of the local indigenous organization, CPA, convenor of the Katribu National Indigenous Peoples Alliance, and a long-time defender of ancestral lands against mega dams such as the CRPIP (Panaghiusa Philippine Network, 2020).

Due to the Wawa Pumped-Storage Hydropower Project, government soldiers are being deployed in the community of the Dumagat people. According to Arnel delos Santos, the Secretary General of Bigkis at

Lakas ng Katutubo sa Timog Katagalugan (Balatik) and son of slain Dumagat leader Nicanor delos Santos, he and his two brothers had to leave their homes after repeated visits from soldiers. He also said that at least 40 other indigenous residents have reported being harassed by soldiers of the 80th Infantry Battalion since May 2016 (Ayroso, 2016). Delos Santos' slain father was at the forefront of the resistance against the Laiban Dam, a destructive dam to their ancestral domain. It was known that Delos Santos and his group criticized the encroachment into the ancestral land of the said project (Ayroso, 2016).

According to human rights groups in the Philippines, these human rights violations were carried out within the framework of the Duterte government's Executive Order 70 Series of 2018, or the "Whole-of-nation approach" counterinsurgency program which uses at least 18 major government agencies in a campaign to quell and criminalize dissent (Africa, 2020). These 18 agencies, including civilian agencies, became conduits of corruption and suppression by denying the rights of the masses—including IPs fighting for their democratic rights to land and justice. The 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that:

"Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired."
(p. 19)

Human Rights Violation Related to Dam Projects

Human Rights Violation	VICTIMS	DATE	AREA	ISSUE	FUNDER
Displacement and violation of rights to ancestral domain	17,000 Tumandok individuals and at least 1.2 million residents	N/A	Panay Island	Jalaur Dam	Korean Export-Import Bank
Massacre	Roy Giganto Reynaldo Katipunan Mario Aguirre Maurito Diaz, Sr Eliseo Gayas, Jr. Artillito Katipunan Jomar Vidal Garson Catamin Rolando Diaz	December 30, 2020	Brgy. Lahug, Tapaz; Brgy. Tacayan, Tapaz Brgy. Acuna, Tapaz Brgy. Daan Sur, Tapaz Nayawan, Tapaz	Jalaur Dam	Korean Export-Import Bank
Illegal Arrest	Marilyn Chiva Rodolfo Diaz Lauriano Castor Jr. Benito Caballero Wilsio Chiva Luisito Bautista Sr., Marevic Aguirre Aileen Catamin Jucie Katipunan Caro Marilou Sumaria Catamin Eleuteria Calbo Caro Rolen Caro Catamin Rolando Diaz, Sr. Benny Pet Lorana Ferdinand Caspillo Carlito Diaz	December 30, 2020	Calinog and Tapaz	Jalaur Dam	Korean Export-Import Bank
Displacement	Around 5,000 individuals	N/A	Sitio Cabla, Brgy. Pagsangahan, General Nakar, Quezon/Sitio Queborosa, Brgy. Magsaysay, Infanta, Quezon	Kaliwa Dam	China ODA
Killing	Two Dumagat tribe members: Furoy dela Cruz and Randy "Pulong" dela Cruz	March 7, 2020	Rizal	Kaliwa Dam	China Ex-Im Bank/ China ODA
Trumped-up charges	Windel Bolinget and 10 other individuals	August 6, 2020	Cordillera Region	Chico River Pump Irrigation Project	China Ex-Im Bank/ China ODA
Red-tagging	Windel Bolinget	December 10, 2020	Cordillera Region	Chico River Pump Irrigation Project	China Ex-Im Bank/ China ODA
Harassment	Arnel delos Santos and his two brothers	May 2016	Rizal Province	500 MW Wawa Pumped-St orage Hydropower Project	Olympia Viologo Water and Power Inc. (OVPI)
Harassment	At least 40 other indigenous residents	May 2016	Rizal Province	500 MW Wawa Pumped-St orage Hydropower Project	Olympia Viologo Water and Power Inc. (OVPI)

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Table 3. Human Rights Violation Related to Dam Projects.

Source: Researcher's own data

And that:

“States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.” (p.19)

In line with this, IPs have the right to withdraw previous agreements or to protest against projects that bring harm to their lives and identities, notwithstanding the result of previous consultations and other processes conducted to obtain the communities’ consent.

Given the negative impacts of many dam projects on the economy, several experts have said that instead of creating dams, the government should find other alternative water sources to meet their objectives and to meet the needs of the Filipino people. At least three alternatives can be explored

The first is rainwater harvesting. The Philippines is known for the frequent occurrence of cyclonic events, which has caused flooding to several areas in highly urbanized regions such as Metro Manila. Rain water harvesting is the practice of collecting rainwater from a roof then storing it for use. It is environmentally friendly as the harvested rainwater may be used for irrigation, laundry, flushing, process water, and with additional treatment may be used as drinking water (Watercare, n.d.).

According to statements of agriculture secretary Dr. William Dar and ex-environment chief Dr. Elisea Gozun in 2019, the Philippines annually receives

about 2,400 mm of rainfall, and rainwater harvesting may be helpful in solving problems related to lack of clean water sources. In addition, Dar also noted that the Philippines has low investment in rainwater harvesting (Teves, 2019). Utilizing this kind of occurrence in the Philippines will not only solve the problem of flooding but also the lack of water for irrigation and clean water for drinking.

The second alternative source which the state can institutionalize is desalination. It is the chemical process of changing seawater into potable water and can be utilized for municipal, industrial or any commercial use (Thimmaraju et. al, 2018). According to Ferdinand dela Cruz, president and CEO of water concessionaire Manila Water, desalination is not yet economically viable because it requires a lot of power, and our power cost is very high (ABS-CBN News, 2019). In the researchers' perspective, however, desalination is a potential long-term solution that may pose a better alternative to dams, which have lasting negative effects on the environment and deprive IPs of their ancestral lands. Allocating funds for a long-term project and producing scientists that can minimize the cost and create ways to desalinate is the way to solve the long-term water shortage problem of Filipinos.

The last alternative is to increase the efficiency of existing water sources by decreasing system loss or water loss in pipe leaks through upgrades and repairs. In 2017 alone, Maynilad spent Php 260 million for leak repairs (The Manila Times, 2018). Extensively repairing and upgrading the equipment of water distribution

systems would improve the supply of available water simply by diminishing water loss, and—especially in conjunction with the other proposed alternatives—decrease the pressure to build dams to meet water needs.

CONCLUSION

Large-scale dams in the Philippines are touted as projects that will address the water supply shortage, especially in the country's capital, and contribute to national development. These projects are jointly implemented by governments, concerned agencies, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions engaged in public-private partnerships (PPP).

Facts on the ground, however, especially those revealed in the course of project implementation, show the adverse and even disastrous effects of these “development partnerships,” not only on the country's indigenous peoples, but on the Filipino people in general. After all, these projects hinder long-term development, peace, and humanitarian goals. Indeed, large-scale dam projects have become a new scheme and system of grabbing IP lands, in wanton disregard of the alternatives being proffered by various sectors of society.

At the same time, IPs' resistance to these development projects are met with severe repression from the government and the military, further fueling existing conflict. “Counterinsurgency” is often used as a convenient excuse to push through with large-scale dam projects, to the detriment of the rights and lives of IPs, who are

themselves red-tagged and labeled as “communist terrorists” if they oppose the dams.

In summary, the dam projects will not bring genuine development or peace to the people of the Philippines, indigenous or not, as these are rooted in the plunder of lands and wanton disregard for IPs’ basic right to FPIC and self-determination.

While these dam projects idealize the concept of development cooperation, they fail to uphold the basic principle of “do no harm” and, more importantly, that of the Triple Nexus approach that emphasizes solving the root causes of conflict through people-centered development action.

During the program held to mark the Dumagat Day in 2019, Miling dela Cruz, a local leader from Tanay, Rizal, delivered a powerful message on behalf of the Dumagat and Remontado tribes three years into the Duterte regime. She said: “We will die fighting against [Kaliwa-Kanan-Laiban] dam project. We will not leave our communities” (Bulatlat Contributors, 2019). The resistance of the Dumagat was also evident in the banners plastered in the tree hunks and huts in their communities, which stated unequivocally: “We do not want the Kaliwa Dam. Respect our ancestral domains” (Reyes, 2019).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

With the effects of the large-scale dam projects on indigenous peoples, and the worsening of human-rights violations that they bring about, the researchers recommend that the government evaluate development projects in ways that uphold

IPs’ basic rights, are sustainable, and do no harm to IP communities and the Filipino people.

Several key recommendations may be made based on this research:

01 MORATORIUM ON ONGOING DAM PROJECTS. A moratorium should be imposed on large-scale dam projects evaluated in this study while a comprehensive review is being conducted. The researchers call on the international funding institutions of these projects to cut-off their monetary support and to have a better and deeper analysis of what and who these projects are truly for.

02 REHABILITATION OF EXISTING DAMS. As for the dams and watersheds that have already been built, they should be rehabilitated and restored instead of being utilized for environmentally damaging infrastructure projects. All of these should be done with the participation and consent of all stakeholders, especially the IPs.

03 EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES. Alternative sources of water should be explored and implemented. In particular, rainwater harvesting as an alternative water source should be carried out. It requires low investment and will solve water problems faced by the capital region and the entire country. Desalination can also be used as an alternative water source, which

according to experts, may not be cost-effective for now but will create a long-term solution. The last one is the decrease in system loss or water loss in pipe leaks that diminish the water loss.

04 CESSATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST IPS.

Human rights violations against indigenous people should be stopped and perpetrators should be held accountable. Justice should be served for those who were murdered and for the IP communities who suffered displacement and militarization, among others. Victims of numerous illegal arrests, illegal detention, and trumped-up charges should be freed from jail and given justice. Humanitarian actions for communities that are displaced because of militarization and other human-rights violations should be studied and enacted.

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Conclusion

**THE TRIPLE NEXUS
IN VARIOUS CONTEXTS**

The central premises that animate the Triple Nexus discourse - about protracted conflicts, mounting need for humanitarian assistance, and increasing conflicts and situations of conflict in the world - proceed from an analysis of the experiences of many countries. These experiences were then further deepened and theorized, thereby enriching the Triple Nexus discourse.

In the nine country case studies in this research collection, the Triple Nexus discourse is brought back to bear on the experiences of individual countries. This is in accordance with the belief of the champions of the Triple Nexus that what matters after all is its concrete application or localization in various countries and

the difference that it can make in these. At the same time, the various projects that were evaluated here were analyzed using development effectiveness principles spelled out most clearly in the Busan Declaration of 2011: country leadership and ownership of development strategies; a focus on results that matter to the poor in developing countries; inclusive partnerships among development actors based on mutual trust; and transparency and accountability to one another.

This collection brings together research essays from various global regions in the Global South: West Asia (Syria), South Asia (Bangladesh), central Africa (Lake Chad region), West Africa (Cameroon and Mali), southern Africa (Mozambique), Central Asia (Afghanistan), Latin America (Guatemala) and Southeast Asia (Philippines).

Its topics are diverse: a donor's record of international assistance in a situation of conflict (Syria), humanitarian projects - one in response to a refugees crisis (Bangladesh) and another in response to gender-based violence (Mali), a humanitarian project which was later on transformed into a Triple Nexus project (Lake Chad), a military-security response to a conflict (Cameroon), the development and peace instruments of a regional alliance of countries in responding to a conflict in a member-country (Mozambique), an international financial institution's development project on education (Afghanistan), a country's track record in receiving and using international aid for the pillars of the Triple Nexus (Guatemala), and development projects (Philippines).

This conclusion will summarize the main arguments of the nine case studies, draw out their connections with the Triple Nexus discourse, and extract their evaluation of their topics on the basis of development effectiveness principles. Lastly, this conclusion will present observations that cut across the case studies gathered together in this collection.

SYRIA. In "Centering Syria in the EU Funding Response to the Syrian Crisis," Elle Ambler of the Arab Group for the Protection of Nature or APN shows that the European Union, the "largest donor" in the Syrian conflict, has maintained a "steady... strategy" governing its aid on the issue. The EU, according to Ambler, has provided humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan and other countries where refugees from Syria have fled, promoting "local integration" in these countries as a long-term solution to the conflict. At the same time, it has refused to provide development assistance to Syria itself, constituting "a de facto ban on nearly all EU development aid" to the country, as less than 8% of EU aid relevant to the crisis has been directed to Syria itself. This is also consistent with EU sanctions on Syria that have been in place since 2011.

Ambler argues that the EU and other donors - notably the US which is aligned with the EU - should assist development in Syria, for the benefit of the Syrian people, to help bring home the Syrian refugees in many countries, and to mark the end of the Syrian conflict. Her paper is very careful in stressing that while such assistance is important and is indeed being sought, this should be used in a way

that would prioritize the interest of the Syrian people for people-centered and sustainable development - which would also be helpful to Jordan, a longstanding trade partner. The author points out that the EU's priorities in development cooperation in relation to the Syrian conflict stems from its refusal to recognize and help the Syrian government, which is emerging as the victor in the Syrian conflict. She also shows that the EU aid strategy in relation to the Syrian conflict is detrimental to Jordan's long-term development, as it deepens the country's dependence on aid and embeddedness in the EU's geopolitical strategy.

In relation to the Triple Nexus, Syria shows a case where a donor prioritizes humanitarian and development actions in one country, Jordan, over development actions in another country, Syria, because of its geopolitical interests. A donor refuses development actions that are warranted by a Triple Nexus approach and can address the root causes of the conflict. Here, a donor prioritizes development assistance to a country in a way that upholds the donor's political and economic interests, and imperils long-term development in that country. This is also a case where humanitarian assistance oriented towards communities of refugees would be better than development assistance aimed at creating a better labor market for those refugees in the receiving country. This is also a case where the recommendation for development cooperation is clear in the offset in saying that it should go to people-centered and sustainable development, not to "neoliberal economic reforms."

With regard to development effectiveness principles, the paper evaluated projects that were largely implemented in Jordan, not Syria. The paper shows that there is no country ownership by Syria of these projects - even as there may be country ownership by Jordan. In fact, the paper asserts that ownership and leadership of these projects primarily belong to the EU, only secondarily to Jordan and not to Syria at all. The results serve the EU, could harm the poor of Jordan, and are harmful to the poor of Syria. While there is no information about the inclusiveness of the partnerships and the transparency and accountability of these projects in Jordan, these clearly are not present in Syria.

BANGLADESH. S. Jahangir Hasan Masum of the Coastal Development Partnership or CDP, in his "Mapping Development Effectiveness of the Triple Nexus Approach in a Protracted Refugee Context: the Case of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh," present the brewing conflict between the 1.1 million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar on the one hand and the local community in the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh, the world's largest refugee settlement, on the other. This conflict is being caused by the negative economic effects on the latter of the former's arrival, the concentration of humanitarian and short-term development assistance in the former - and Myanmar's refusal to craft a plan for the Rohingya's return, which has triggered negative reactions from the Bangladeshi government that could also fan the flames of conflict. The Covid-19 pandemic is also contributing to the worsening of the conflict.

While the existing Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (JRPRHC) 2018-2020 has been flexible enough to expand its original focus on providing refugees with humanitarian assistance into providing the host community with development assistance - thereby locating it in the dual humanitarian-development nexus - it has to further expand itself. Masum shows that the JRPRHC needs a peace component in the face of the emerging conflict between the Rohingyas and the Bangladeshi communities in the Cox's Bazar district. At the same time, the author holds fast to the analysis that the long-term solution to the conflict lies in an end to the Myanmar government's "ethnic cleansing," quoting the words of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, of the Rohingya - to end the Buddhist state's persecution of a Muslim minority which it tagged as "illegal Bengali immigrants to Myanmar."

Again, geopolitics plays its part on the issue. Masum says that even the Bangladeshi government's allies - China, India, Japan and Russia - are taking the side of Myanmar on the issue. These countries refuse to put pressure on Myanmar to bring the Rohingyas home. The following countries, meanwhile, are supporting the Rohingya's refugee communities: the United States, the United Kingdom, EU, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden, and Australia.

In relation to the Triple Nexus, the Bangladesh case study exposes a refusal to address the root causes of the conflict through peace and development actions - in this case, on the part of the government of Myanmar. This is also a case where the

refusal to address the root causes of the conflict further increases the need for humanitarian and short-term development actions for one community, namely the community of refugees, creates another conflict with another community which necessitates peace actions, and makes necessary humanitarian and development action for another community, namely the host community. The author presents problems in the implementation of the Triple Nexus in the country: the Bangladeshi government's refusal of a multi-year approach to the issue, focus on inter-agency coordination to the detriment of community engagement, and annual budgeting, among others.

It is clear that there was at first, on the part of Bangladesh, country ownership of the JRPRHC; this changed, however, and there is now limited country ownership of the program. The program's results, however, are positive for the Rohingyas and the Cox's Bazar community, even if merely stop-gap; it will fail to provide long-term solutions to the Rohingya conflict. While there is an agreement that the program's implementation involved efficient partnerships, there is also a shrinking space for NGOs in general and local NGOs in particular in relation to the program. There is also limited participation of the communities involved in the process of designing and redesigning the program. The JRPRHC has accordingly limited transparency and accountability.

LAKE CHAD REGION. In "Examining the Effectiveness of the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus in the Lake Chad Region," Leo Atakpu of the Africa Network for Environment and Economic

Justice or ANEEJ evaluates the United Nations Humanitarian Programme in the Lake Chad Basin (UNHPLCB) 2014–2021, which was a humanitarian program that was transformed into a properly Triple Nexus program. He shows how the program was able to respond to the Boko Haram conflict in the region, and to the multiple crises that emerged in the region both related to the conflict and not related to it. According to him, the said humanitarian action is fulfilling its objectives despite the “acute underfunding of humanitarian response” in recent years. At the same time, he shows how humanitarian action alone will not suffice to address the root causes of the conflict and will therefore need development actions.

Atakpu presents the strengths and successes of the UNHPLCB: (1) The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs or UN OCHA played a central role in coordination, which proved to be important in the program’s implementation. It was able to ease restrictions on the movement of humanitarian actors and on the activities of international and local NGOs. (2) Multi-year planning and definition of collective outcomes have been undertaken in response to the conflict. (3) Regional and cross-border approaches have been employed to focus on common issues.

He also presents the challenges faced by the implementation of the Triple Nexus within the program and in the context of the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad region: (1) Funding is within the pillars of the Triple Nexus themselves; there is a lack of funds for the Triple Nexus at the coordination levels. (2) There

were problems in funding timelines, as funding for humanitarian action is yearly while funding for development and peace actions can cover many years. (3) There is a tendency, already noted by observers, for development actions to violate the principles of humanitarian actions. (4) There were difficulties in reporting on the collective outcomes. Atakpu also discusses a problem in humanitarian aid to the region and the continent - the difference between donors’ pledges and actual deliveries, and the overall decline in funding.

In this case study, there is country ownership of the program, even as this can still be strengthened with the inclusion of development actions. The results are positive and life-saving for millions, even as they remain stop-gap and must include actions that will address the root causes of the conflict. It appears that there are inclusive partnerships and as such transparency and accountability in the program.

CAMEROON. Charles Linjap of Investment Watch or I-Watch, meanwhile, discussed “Violent Extremism Perpetrated by Boko Haram in the Far North Region of Cameroon: A Gender Conflict Analysis Showcasing the Limitations of Hard Power.” He situates gender-based violence in the terrorist activities carried out by the terrorist group, and evaluates the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) - a donor-supported military-security response to the conflict - in relation to the issue.

Linjap shows that in the case of the Boko Haram in Cameroon, development and

humanitarian actions were historically downplayed in favor of military-security actions - funded by France, the US, UK and other donors - against the organization. While the latter, including the MNJTF, is necessary, development and humanitarian actions can and must be undertaken immediately and in tandem with military-security actions. At the same time, he recommends human rights training and abuse monitoring in order to make MNJTF compliant with international humanitarian law and African Union standards.

He also mentions the problems brought about by the one-sided focus on military-security responses to the conflict - including the emergence of dictatorships, armed conflict and proliferation of illicit weapons. Complicated by the lack of transparency, military assistance is suspected of being used by the Cameroonian government to suppress the civilian uprising in English-speaking parts of the country. Furthermore, refusal to address the root causes of the conflict only further increases the need for humanitarian actions.

The study also puts forward a project that will help rebuild communities and provide jobs to women and the youth: the Labor Intensive Approach dubbed as HIMMO model, promoted by the Agence Francaise de Developpement. While this can be helpful in the short and immediate term, long-term development paths should be explored. Linjap also recommends the involvement of women in peacebuilding efforts. Similar to Atakpu, he presents problems in development cooperation financing in Africa: (1) the difference between pledges on the one hand and

actual delivery on the other, (2) fragmented donor financing that lacks transparency and accountability, (3) unreliable timing, and (4) centrality of donor preferences to regional organizations.

The program exhibits country ownership, although it is in the long-term interest of the country that development actions be included, even prioritized, in relation to peace-security ones. The results are positive, even crucial, but do not suffice to solve the causes of the conflict, especially the social and economic ones. There are no inclusive partnerships especially with civil society organizations and there is no transparency and accountability; there are even areas where mismanagement can be inferred.

MOZAMBIQUE. In her contribution to this collection titled “Cyclones, Humanitarian Response and Conflict in Mozambique,” Maggie Mwape of the Southern Africa Youth Forum or SAYoF-SADC, discusses how the conflict between the government of Mozambique and the Al Shababa, a terrorist group claiming affiliation with the Islamic State, has hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance to communities in the country’s northern areas in the aftermath of Cyclones Kenneth and Idai since 2019. She evaluates how the Southern African Development Community (SADC), through its instruments, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defense, Politics and Security (SIPO), has responded and can still respond to the said conflict.

According to Mwape, while the RISDP and the SIPO have been instrumental

in managing conflicts in the southern African region, including the armed conflict between the dominant Frelimo party and the opposition Renamo party in Mozambique, these SADC instruments have been less proactive in relation to the conflict caused by the emergence of Al Shababa in 2017. In her words, the two are “taking a meeting approach instead of an action-oriented approach.” Even as she calls for greater international assistance in militarily combatting Al Shababa and providing humanitarian assistance to affected communities, she points out the SADC’s dependence on international donors and the need to move away from this. She highlights the need to address the root causes of the conflict, and therefore the implementation of development actions, as the disastrous effects of climate change, and therefore the need for humanitarian assistance, are projected to increase in the country in the coming years.

The Triple Nexus discourse emphasizes how conflicts make increasing humanitarian assistance necessary, and Mwape shows how this happens in the case of Mozambique: the conflict itself is hindering the delivery of humanitarian assistance to communities that urgently need this. The Triple Nexus discourse also emphasizes the need for development actions primarily and peace actions secondarily in responding to conflicts, and Mwape agrees, citing the deep social, economic and political root causes of the conflict. At the same time, she states the need for military-security actions in countering the terrorist organization. The case of Mozambique therefore shows how terrorism is countered through both

military-security actions and development actions, especially in communities where terrorist organizations draw strength.

There is country ownership of the RISDP and SIPO with regard to the historical Frelimo-Renamo conflict, but not yet with regard to the recent conflict of the Mozambican government with Al Shababa. The research shows that there is lack of results with regard to solving the latter conflict. No data were presented with regard to the inclusiveness of the partnerships established in the implementation of the programs, as well as the transparency and accountability in their implementation.

AFGHANISTAN. Asadullah Mohammadi of Scholarship for Afghanistan in his paper evaluated the World Bank’s “Development Cooperation Projects to Improve Education Access and Quality in Afghanistan” which cover years from 2008 to 2023. He shows how the projects brought about developments in the education sector even as the country is still facing conflicts with the Taliban: enrollment of students has increased, the number of teachers trained for schools has also increased, many school teachers and principals have been trained in school management, and all of these have resulted in an increase in literacy levels. Schools for technical-vocational education have also been established, and the number of enrollees in these schools has increased. Most notable in all these advances is a focus on, and improvements in, gender equality.

Mohammadi enumerates the ways that the projects can be developed:

improving quality, teacher qualifications, geographical distribution, parent and childhood education and combining general education with specialized education. At the same time, he raises important questions about the development path which the current education system in Afghanistan is taking. He says the World Bank embodies the dominant development visions and strategies, and alternative ones should also be discussed. He asserts that education should not foreclose these discussions, or assume that these discussions have been concluded, but should open them up.

With regard to the Triple Nexus discourse, the World Bank education projects in Afghanistan are development projects that bring about steps in the right direction. They, however, need to be examined carefully to see their capacity, in the long run, of bringing about genuine development and therefore addressing the root causes of the conflict. Development projects in this case follow the dominant development vision and strategies - and must be examined in the light of the vision and strategies of people-centered and sustainable development.

There is country ownership of the World Bank programs on education that were evaluated in the paper - even as it raises questions about how the programs serve the long-term interests of the country. The program's results are clear and positive but must be evaluated with regard to the country's interests in attaining people-centered and sustainable development. Inclusive partnerships were built in relation to the program, especially with the involvement of community Shuras.

Transparency and accountability were observed in the program.

MALI. Rosa Belen Agirregomezkorta, of the Centro de Estudios e investigación sobre Mujeres or CEIM, in her paper “Engendering the Nexus: How to Mainstream Gender in the Triple Nexus and its Operationalization through a Case Study” presents an evaluation of the Early Warning System on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict Settings (EWS-GBV) as it was used in the armed conflicts in Mali. The EWS-GBV is a tool developed by feminist organization Mujeres en Zona de Conflicto or MZC in order to “identify the different levels of human rights violations, threats,” particularly in relation to women and girls, “as well as resources and capacities for action.” It was developed based on holistic feminist theorizings of peace and deepens-concretizes an understanding of gender violence and armed conflict. It takes the form of a computerized instrument that collects and processes data derived from informants.

Agirregomezkorta states that the instrument was effective, and was able to show the worsening situation of women in Mali, particularly their trafficking into Spain and Morocco, and other forms of abuse, particularly in the period of 2016-2017. There are areas for improvement for the instrument, but the main problem is the lack of resources and funding. Part of the author's recommendations is greater funding for women's and feminist organizations and programs, as these are currently undervalued and underfunded by donors.

The case study highlights how armed conflicts especially worsen the situation of women, girls and children even as these also worsen the situation of poor people in general. It shows how an important aspect of humanitarian action - one that measures the threat of gender-based violence - provides insights into the state of the conflict and identifies needs for development and humanitarian actions.

The paper shows that the instrument was useful for Mali, but that other countries are yet to adopt it. It shows that the instrument, in the limited opportunity that it was utilized, yields very clear and helpful results with regard to understanding conflicts and the threat of gender-based violence. It also enabled inclusive partnerships, especially with women's civil society organizations (CSOs), and transparent and accountable implementation. These are precisely the reasons why Agirregomezkorta emphatically recommends the adoption and utilization of this instrument.

GUATEMALA. In their contribution, Jose Luis Siguil Lopez of Tzuk Kim Pop, Lorena Palacios of Reality of Aid, and Henry Morales of the AOED Movement present "The Challenge of the Triple Nexus Approach in the Reality of Guatemala: A Fragile State." The authors discuss the country's record in using international assistance in the areas of humanitarian, development and peace actions. In the process, they discuss the deep economic and political problems besetting the country - including state capture by elite and criminal groups, the volatility in government officials, and problems in the government's disaster response coordination agency.

They show, in particular, how the Guatemalan government, in response to the devastation caused by the eruption of the Fuego Volcano and the passage of Hurricanes ETA and IOTA, presided over an inept and politicized humanitarian response. They also show that it is carrying out a development program that prioritizes the demands of foreign corporations and financial institutions over the rights and interests of the Guatemalan people. They also show that it has reneged on the commitments it made in relation to peace actions that were supposed to be undertaken in the aftermath of the armed conflict in the country.

Lopez, Palacios and Morales show that the Guatemalan government and Guatemala as a country face enormous challenges in implementing the Triple Nexus. While bringing the pillars of the Triple Nexus together presents new problems, basic problems persist with regard to implementing these pillars individually. The authors claim that the Triple Nexus remains a foreign concept to the Guatemalan government and even to Guatemalan CSOs. In discussing the economic and political challenges faced by Guatemala, as well as the state of Triple Nexus implementation in the country, they are calling attention to the situation in many developing countries.

The authors show that Guatemala, in implementing programs under the pillar of the Triple Nexus, consistently scores negatively in development effectiveness principles: the government is pushing for development, humanitarian and peace programs in ways that run counter to

the country's interests. The humanitarian actions have limited positive results, while the development and peace actions have results that are contrary to the rights of the people of Guatemala. There are no inclusive partnerships as well as transparency and accountability in the implementation of the programs.

THE PHILIPPINES. In its contribution titled “Dams and Development in Indigenous Peoples’ Communities in the Philippines,” the youth indigenous peoples organization *Kabataan para sa Tribung Pilipino* (Youth for Filipino Indigenous Peoples) or *Katribu* evaluates four development projects in the country that it claims are adversely affecting indigenous peoples as these encroach into their lands: the Jalaur, Kaliwa, Chico River and Wawa dam projects.

Katribu shows that for indigenous peoples, land is life, and their displacement from their lands means numerous violations of their rights that affect their very existence as a community and as a people. It also shows how attempts to obtain the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of the indigenous peoples for these dam projects are riddled with problems. *Katribu* presents the many laws in the country's history that have legalized the dispossession of indigenous peoples' lands. *Katribu* describes how these dam projects will not bring about genuine development for indigenous peoples and even for the Filipino people as a whole. It proposes alternatives to the dam projects, using the very objectives that these are being constructed.

The Philippines presents a case where so-called development projects will not bring about genuine development for indigenous peoples and for the Filipino people in general, and will instead actually worsen existing conflicts. The development projects heighten indigenous people's antagonism towards the Philippine government and when they fight these projects, the government responds with human rights violations.

The case study adds a nuance to the Triple Nexus discourse's claim about the need for development actions to address the root causes of conflicts. Development remains a site of contestation of various voices, including the voice that asserts people-centered and sustainable development. This is a case where development projects even increase the need for peace and humanitarian actions - in the latter's case, for indigenous peoples facing displacement caused by militarization and human-rights violations.

While the development projects being evaluated are embraced by the Philippine government, they run counter to the basic rights of indigenous peoples and of Filipinos. Their results violate basic rights and will not bring about sustainable and people-centered development. They also do not rely on inclusive partnerships and are far from being transparent and accountable to the affected communities and the general public.

THE TRIPLE NEXUS APPROACH puts a premium on concrete analysis of conflicts in their country contexts and how the Triple Nexus can bring together its three pillars and make these work

together towards addressing the root causes of conflicts. It does, however, make general statements on the basis of comparisons between country contexts, identifying trends that emerge - not to change the concrete analysis of conflicts in their country contexts, but to make statements about the needed emphasis in forms of development cooperation and international aid, for example.

In the following, this Conclusion presents observations that cut across the case studies gathered in this collection.

01 SYRIA - development action by the European Union in the country

02 BANGLADESH - peace actions between the Rohingyas and the host community in Cox's Bazar district. This should be done on top of the humanitarian and short-term development actions for both communities. In the long run, peace action between the Rohingyas and the Myanmar government - as well as development action for the entirety of Myanmar and among the Rohingyas.

03 LAKE CHAD REGION - continuing humanitarian action and a need for greater development action.

04 CAMEROON - humanitarian and development actions, as against predominantly peace-security actions.

05 MOZAMBIQUE - peace-security actions, together with development actions.

06 AFGHANISTAN - people-centered and sustainable development.

07 MALI - humanitarian action primarily but development and peace actions secondarily to combat sexual and gender-based violence.

08 GUATEMALA - across-the-board improvements in all pillars of the Triple Nexus when this is implemented in the country.

09 PHILIPPINES - people-centered and sustainable development.

All of the case studies, in varying degrees, support the Triple Nexus discourse's emphasis on the need for development action in situations of conflict and fragility.

There are six case studies that primarily demand development action (Syria, Lake Chad region, Cameroon, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Philippines), with four case studies raising the need for people-centered and sustainable development as opposed to dominant development models (Syria, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Philippines). There are three case studies that emphasize the need for peace actions (Bangladesh, Southern Africa, Guatemala) and the same number of case studies that emphasize the need for humanitarian actions (Lake Chad region, Mali, Guatemala).

Several issues about the localization and implementation of the Triple Nexus can be drawn from the case studies:

01 In most case studies (Syria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Philippines), recommendations that were drawn from the localization of the Triple Nexus are tightly connected with bigger geopolitical, economic and social issues that fall outside the purview of the Triple Nexus. Political decisions outside of the Triple Nexus must be made for such recommendations to be carried out. While this is the case, the Triple Nexus provides a policy discourse that can contribute to the making of such political decisions - particularly in convincing or putting pressure on various stakeholders. And when these political decisions favoring the recommendations are made, the Triple Nexus and its pillars can be instrumental in minimizing the harmful effects of conflicts, addressing the root causes of the conflicts, and facilitating the conflicts' principled resolution.

02 The properly-implemented Triple Nexus program that was evaluated in this collection (Lake Chad region) and the double nexus program that was evaluated here (Bangladesh, which is being recommended to become a Triple Nexus program) both started out as humanitarian actions. In these case studies, the decision to transform the humanitarian action into a double nexus program or a Triple Nexus program emerged from the implementation of the humanitarian action, and

an evaluation and awareness of the latter's achievements and limitations. This situation is indicative of a "problem-solving" approach in conflicts. It may also be indicative of the level of promotion of the Triple Nexus discourse worldwide: the Triple Nexus being used immediately in the situations which the Triple Nexus discourse uses as a starting point - situation of protracted conflict, increasing need for humanitarian assistance, and the need to address the root causes of the conflict.

03 The case studies present or touch on a range of issues of implementation of the Triple Nexus:

Low level of awareness of the Triple Nexus discourse, both on the part of the government and of CSOs (Guatemala, Mozambique).

Problems in the delivery of development cooperation; difference between pledges, let alone needs, and actual delivery; and predictability in timing (Lake Chad region, Cameroon).

Overall donor dependence (Mozambique).

Lack of priority for actions against gender-based violence (Cameroon, Mali).

Lack of inclusive partnerships, especially in relation to CSOs -

affecting and implying lack of transparency and accountability (Bangladesh, Lake Chad region, Cameroon, Mali, Guatemala, Philippines).

Lack of country ownership, or the huge role of donor interests (Syria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Afghanistan, Philippines).

Properly Triple Nexus implementation issues: funding still within the pillars of the Triple Nexus, not for the entire program (Bangladesh, Lake Chad region); differences in funding timelines of humanitarian actions on the one hand and development and peace actions on the other (Bangladesh, Lake Chad region); tendency for development and peace actions to violate principles of humanitarian actions (Lake Chad region, but also seen in Cameroon and Guatemala); and problems on the reporting of collective outcomes (Lake Chad region).

The crystallization of the Triple Nexus and its discussion at the top levels of the United Nations since 2016 present to those involved in its pillars and related fields an interesting, even exciting, field of study. Given the increasing needs for humanitarian, development and peace actions, especially amidst the Covid-19 pandemic and one of the worst economic crises in recent history, the Triple Nexus also presents itself as an urgent field of

study, as nothing less than human lives and the environment are at stake.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The research papers gathered in this collection demonstrate the usefulness and value of the Triple Nexus discourse in analyzing and carrying out efforts to address the root causes of conflicts and states of fragility. It has also shown future areas of study, actual and potential problem areas in implementation, and limitations especially in relation to political decisions that are necessary for its recommendations to be heeded.

The COVID-19 pandemic, as many observers have stated, is aggravating many crises, conflicts and contradictions in the world, and therefore makes efforts in addressing the root causes of these -- such as the Triple Nexus -- both urgent and necessary.

In this light, we offer the following recommendations -- primarily to the international body most responsible for the crystallization and dissemination of the Triple Nexus, the United Nations, and its member-governments. They should implement these recommendations through various partnerships, especially with Civil Society Organizations:

01 UNDERSTANDING THE TRIPLE NEXUS

Promote a common understanding of the Triple Nexus -- its origin, principles, objectives, and proposed practices -- among actors in the three pillars; among

governments, the private sector and especially among CSOs; and across various countries, especially those with intense conflicts and grave situations of fragility.

Promote studies that localize the Triple Nexus in various situations of conflict and fragility. Encourage the use of the Triple Nexus in designing, implementing and assessing projects that fall within any of its three pillars.

Widely share best practices in the implementation of the Triple Nexus -- in the crafting of concrete analyses of situations of conflict and fragility, the setting of collective outcomes, undertaking of multi-year planning, budgeting, among others.

Involve all stakeholders, especially CSOs, in the Triple Nexus processes. This is essential in widening and deepening understanding the Triple Nexus and pursuing its objectives. This is especially important in situations where governments are parties to conflicts or are situated in states of fragility.

02 DEFINING PILLARS

Humanitarian principles should be upheld at all times, unless particular conditions warrant flexibility -- as when,

some commentators say, the conflict is not intense, there are areas of coordination among Triple Nexus actors, and when humanitarian actors agree. Special attention should be taken to draw out the best practices and lessons from the implementation of the Triple Nexus in relation to concerns raised by actors working in the humanitarian pillar.

Guarantee that commitments to humanitarian financing, especially in countries and regions characterized by protracted conflicts, will translate to actual delivery.

In conjunction with the Triple Nexus's thrust of addressing the root causes of conflicts and states of fragility, foster common understanding of people-centered development, from its concept to its concrete and measurable indicators in particular contexts. It should have a special place in analyzing country and region contexts, in designing collective outcomes, and in generally designing projects.

Ensure that peace actions within the Triple Nexus lessen, and do not contribute to, wars, militarism and repression, and that these actions push for respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. Ensure that security actions,

where necessary, are not excessively financed in relation to the pillars of the Triple Nexus.

Even in confronting terrorist organizations, or those that victimize civilians in pursuit of political objectives, the social, economic and political root causes should be highlighted and addressed.

03 ADDRESSING CONCERNS

Empower CSOs to participate in all processes in advancing the Triple Nexus. Open up spaces for CSO participation and speak out and act against the shrinking space for CSOs in various countries. In many countries, the shrinking space holds back many CSOs from meaningfully participating in spaces being opened for them.

Firmly follow through general commitments to gender equality and women empowerment to the designing, implementation and assessment of Triple Nexus projects and projects guided by the Triple Nexus. An immediate area of intervention is violence against women and children in many conflicts and states of fragility.

Consistent with previous UN declarations, special attention should be given to empowering the colored, LGBTQI, disabled, elderly and other populations that have historically suffered

from discrimination in the designing, implementation and assessment of the Triple Nexus.

04 IN RELATION TO THE BIGGER POLITICAL CONTEXT

Special attention should be given to understanding the possibilities and limitations of applying the Triple Nexus discourse in situations where political decisions outside of its purview have to be made so that its recommendations can be heeded.

In relation to the previous point, studies on the Triple Nexus in concrete contexts must be coupled with vibrant work of, and partnerships among, governments, private sectors and CSOs wherever possible to push for the recommendations arrived at in using the Triple Nexus as a frame of analysis and action.


Take action in response to situations where the Triple Nexus exposes certain projects as funded with “tied aid,” or any international aid that one-sidedly benefits donor countries to the detriment of aid-receiving countries, or receiving countries to the detriment of other countries.

05 IN RELATION TO THE GLOBAL AID REGIME

To realize the recommendations stated above, financing for the Triple Nexus should be scaled up, together with ODAs for this purpose.


Especially for donors and governments, uphold development effectiveness principles -- country leadership and ownership of development strategies; a focus on results that matter to the poor in developing countries; inclusive partnerships among development actors based on mutual trust; and transparency and accountability to one another -- in advancing the Triple Nexus, and deepen studies on the relations between the two.

In relation to calls to address the root causes of conflicts and states of fragility, as well as the need to uphold people-centered and sustainable development, the Triple Nexus can open up discussions about CSO calls for democratic governance of International Financial Institutions and an end to policy conditionality in relation to aid. Such openings should be pursued.



KATRIBU

Kabataan para sa Tribung Pilipino



Movimiento
Tzuk Kim-pop



About the Contributors

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ROSA BELEN AGIRREGOMEZKORTA has a degree in Political Science and Sociology and specializes in the areas of human rights, humanitarian action, and gender. She has more than 25 years of experience working with UNESCO, OSCE, various NGOs and international agencies on various countries such as the Philippines, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine, Morocco, Honduras, and Peru. Since 2011 she has been directing the Center for Women's Studies and Research (CEIM), doing consultancy, feminist research and advocacy around women's rights. She collaborates in various networks such as the CEDAW Platform-Istanbul-Beijing shadow; Alliance for a Global Feminist Cooperation, Prostitution Abolitionist Platform, Monitoring Group National Action Plan Women,

Peace and Security, CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness or CPDE, and Reference Group CAD-CSO.

The **TZUK KIM POP MOVEMENT** acts by joining efforts in favor of the development of a just, dignified, and democratic society, based on the strength of its organization, on the critical awareness of its inhabitants and a greater citizen participation of all.

Kabataan para sa Tribung Pilipino (Youth for Indigenous Peoples Rights) or **KATRIBU YOUTH** is a national organization of students and youth dedicated to the assertion of the rights of the indigenous peoples (IPs) of the Philippines. It works to bring the issues of IPs to all sectors of society, especially to the youth with the goal of forging unity for the fight of the indigenous peoples in the Philippines for human rights, social equality, genuine freedom, and democracy.

About the Publishers



The **CSO PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (CPDE)** is an open platform that unites civil society organisations from around the world on the issue of effective development cooperation (EDC). It strives to make development more effective by reshaping the global aid architecture and empowering CSOs working on the ground.

It represents CSOs from six regions (Africa, Asia, Pacific, Europe, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean), and eight sectors (Rural, Feminist Group, Indigenous Peoples, Faith-Based Organisations, International Civil Society Organisations, Youth, Labour, and Migrants and Diaspora).

The Reality of Aid ASIA PACIFIC

REALITY OF AID - ASIA PACIFIC (ROA-AP) is a regional network of CSOs that aims to transform aid relationships by ensuring democratic ownership, accountability, and development results for the poor and marginalized so that developing countries will be able to reduce aid dependency.

RoA-AP engages in policy spaces to influence development actors, publishes research and monitoring reports on aid and development cooperation, and organizes annual meetings and workshops for the capacity development of its members.

RoA-AP hosts the Asia constituency of the CPDE and leads the Peace & Security Working Group of the DAC-CSO Reference Group.



The **INTERNATIONAL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES MOVEMENT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND LIBERATION (IPMSDL)** is a global network of Indigenous Peoples rights activists, advocates, and organizations committed to advancing the rights of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination, land and life. IPMSDL develops this campaign through various forms of education and research, training, advocacy and engagement, and solidarity and networking.

IPMSDL hosts the secretariats of the IP Constituency and Working Group on Conflict and Fragility of the CPDE.



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